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Abstract 
Wenyu ZANG 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
The determinants of inward and outward FDI and their relationship with economic 
growth 
This thesis complements current studies by focusing on developed OECD countries as 
they are the major sources and recipients of world FDI and current studies relating to 
developed countries using aggregate country FDI data are limited. This study 
empirically tests the determinants of FDI inflows and outflows and their relationship 
with economic growth using 2SLS simultaneous equations model between 1981 and 
2008 for a sample of 20 developed OECD countries. The empirical findings suggest that 
FDI inflows do not contribute to economic growth in the host country and economic 
growth positively affects FDI inflows. In addition, trade openness and flexible 
employment protection legislation in the host country attract FDI inflows. In terms of 
FDI outflows, the results show that FDI outflows reduce economic growth in the home 
country, while economic growth in the home country increases FDI outflows. Moreover, 
high past level of outward FDI stock, trade openness, low labour cost and currency 
depreciation in the home country provide incentives for domestic firms to invest abroad. 
Therefore, this study does not support offering special incentives to foreign investors to 
attract FDI inflows or offering promotional policies to domestic firms to encourage FDI 
outflows. Instead, government should provide incentives for domestic investment and 
other sound policies to increase economic growth, which in itself provides a good 
environment to attract FDI inflows and to encourage FDI outflows.  
Keywords: FDI inflows, FDI outflows, two stage least squares simultaneous equations, 
economic growth, labour market flexibility 
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1 Introduction 
FDI plays an important role in influencing the level of economic activity in the world 
with multinational companies accounting for above one-fifth of world employment in 
the non-agricultural sectors (Whyman et al., 2008). The remarkable growth in FDI has 
attracted the attention of many researchers on developing countries, as they believe that 
developing countries have less advanced technology and benefit more from inward FDI 
through technology spillover (Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles, 2003; Roy and Van den 
Berg, 2006). However, developed countries might also benefit from inward FDI. For 
example, take the UK where at the UK Trade & Investment (UKTI) Business Summit in 
2010, Business Secretary, Vince Cable, stated that inward FDI brings new technology 
and good management practice, creates jobs and stimulates economic growth. Whilst 
Prime Minister David Cameron also emphasized that UK needs to maximize the amount 
of inward FDI in order to recover from recession and promote economic growth. 
 
In 2009/2010, the UK had 1,619 foreign direct investment projects from 54 countries, 
which created more than 53,000 new jobs, safeguarded over 40,000 further jobs and 
brought significant added value to the UK‟s economy (UKTI, 2010). For example, the 
automotive sector is of key importance to the UK, whereby the Japanese automotive 
company Nissan employs over 4,000 people in its Sunderland factory, which is the 
largest car factory and the biggest exporter in the UK. In March 2010, Nissan decided to 
build its new electric Leaf car at the Sunderland plant from 2013, which will secure 
4,500 jobs and create up to 20,000 jobs in the region‟s supply sector (Massey, 2010; 
Madslien, 2010). Similarly, Swindon once relied on the Great Western Railway works, 
which employed around 14,000 people, but shut its operations in 1980s. Thereafter, 
Honda built a manufacturing plant in Swindon, which has become the main employer 
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and the key driver in its economy (Young, 2009). Therefore, inward FDI is a key factor 
in creating jobs and achieving economic growth even in developed countries. However, 
there is a risk that inward FDI may transfer the host country‟s advanced technology to 
the home country, resulting in a reduction in the comparative advantage of the host 
country (Dunning, 1994). Another potential drawback is that foreign firms might 
outcompete local firms and drive them out of business. (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997; 
Hill, 2009).  
 
Outward FDI may also bring significant benefits to the home country, with outward 
investing firms benefiting from increasing returns to scale and yielding higher profits by 
investing abroad than by investing in the home market (HM Treasury, 1996). The total 
earnings from outward FDI by UK companies in 2009 are approximately £69.6 billion 
(ONS, 2010), which can be reinvested in the UK, contributing to economic growth. 
Outward FDI may also provide routes to transfer advanced technology, management 
skills and working training to the home country, therefore improving the productivity of 
domestic firms (HM Treasury, 1996). However, concerns arise over the adverse impact 
of outward FDI on employment, domestic investment and exports in the home country. 
Outward investment might lead to a displacement in domestic investment, a reduction in 
employment and exports in the home country.  
 
At the broader level, developed countries have been both the major sources and 
recipients of FDI (UNCTAD, 2006). The majority of FDI inflows into developed 
countries originated from other developed countries and the largest share of outflows 
from developed countries was directed towards other developed countries. However, the 
distribution of FDI flows in the developed countries has been uneven. Using the 
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measure of FDI as a percentage of total world FDI, the top 10 developed FDI host 
countries in 2008 were: US, Belgium, UK, Spain, France, Canada, Australia, Sweden, 
Japan, Switzerland, who received 49 percent of world FDI inflows (UNCTAD, 2011). 
The top 10 developed FDI home countries in 2008 were: US, Belgium, UK, France, 
Japan, Canada, Germany, Spain, Netherlands and Italy, who contributed 67 percent of 
world FDI outflows (UNCTAD, 2011). Therefore, identifying what host country factors 
attract inward FDI and what home country factors encourage outward FDI can help us 
understand the patterns of FDI in developed countries. At the 2010 UKTI Business 
Summit, both Prime Minister David Cameron and Business Secretary Vince Cable 
stressed that the UK needs to build a deregulated labour market and a strong R&D base 
in order to become a more attractive investment destination. According to the World 
Bank‟s assessment, the UK is ranked as the top in Europe and fifth in the world for 
“ease of doing business”, which covers labour market flexibility (UKTI, 2010). In 
addition, the UK has a very strong R&D base, which is ranked as the strongest in 
Europe and the second strongest in the world (UKTI, 2010). Therefore, issues such as 
labour market flexibility and R&D expenditure are key to examining factors influencing 
inward/outward FDI.  
 
Consequently, this thesis contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. 
First, this study considers a „nation‟ as the unit for analysis and uses data on aggregate 
FDI inflows into a country from the rest of the world and aggregate FDI outflows from 
a country to the rest of the world. Second, this study concentrates on developed OECD 
countries (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK and US) as inward/outward FDI might be an important engine to their 
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economic growth and they are the major sources and recipients of FDI. This contrasts 
with the vast majority of empirical studies focusing on developing countries. 
Furthermore, many empirical studies pool both developed countries and developing 
countries into one sample and do not distinguish them in their analysis. Blonigen and 
Wang (2005) argue that FDI plays a different role in developed countries compared to 
developing countries such that pooling developed and developing countries in an 
empirical analysis leads to incorrect inferences. Third, this study empirically examines 
the host country factors that attract inward FDI, especially the effect of labour market 
flexibility. The number of current studies on the impact of labour market flexibility on 
inward FDI using country-level data are limited. Moreover, this study takes into 
consideration the importance of outward FDI on the host country‟s economy, which has 
been largely neglected in the literature. Hence, it analyses the determinants of outward 
FDI, particularly by looking at whether rigid labour market legislation has an impact on 
the decision of domestic firms to invest abroad. In addition, it empirically assesses 
whether inward/outward FDI positively contributes to economic growth. Finally, a Two 
Stage Least Squares (2SLS) simultaneous equations model is employed to take account 
of the interdependence between inward/outward FDI and economic growth, while the 
majority of current studies do not take the interdependence into consideration.  
 
The thesis is organized in seven chapters. Chapter 2 will provide a brief discussion 
about the definition of FDI, types of FDI, FDI trends and FDI distribution. Chapter 3 
will review the economic theories and empirical literature in relation to the determinants 
of inward and outward FDI and their relationship with economic growth. Regarding the 
empirical literature, this study surveys previous studies that employ aggregate country-
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level FDI data and macroeconomic variables. In addition, this chapter will also present 
research approach and data collection method used in this study. 
 
The time period for all data analysis is from 1981 to 2008. It starts from 1981 as one of 
the determinants of FDI – past level of FDI stock data is only available from 1981. It 
ends in 2008 as another determinant of FDI – employment protection legislation index 
is only available until 2008. Chapter 4 will examine the causal relationship between FDI 
inflows/outflows and the host/home country‟s economic growth. Based on the time-
series causality test developed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995), we will analyse the 
causal links for twenty developed countries from 1981 to 2008 and will divide the 
countries into four groups – countries that experience FDI-led growth, countries that 
experience growth-led FDI, countries that experience bi-directional causality and 
countries that do not experience causality.  
 
Based on the causality test results in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 will assess the determinants 
of FDI inflows/outflows in the above four country groups. In particular, we are 
interested in examining whether a country with flexible labour market systems receives 
more FDI inflows. In addition, this chapter will also look at whether a country with 
rigid labour market systems encourages more FDI outflows. In contrast to most 
previous studies that use firm-level, industry-level or bilateral FDI data, this study aims 
to make a contribution to the empirical literature on the determinants of FDI 
inflows/outflows by using aggregate country level data. Both fixed/random effect model 
and 2SLS model will be employed over the period 1981-2008.  
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Due to the limitations of methodologies and research design used in Chapters 4 and 5, 
Chapter 6 will pool all twenty developed countries into one sample and re-analyse the 
determinants of FDI inflows and outflows and their relationship with economic growth. 
Finally, Chapter 7 will draw together the key findings from the range of empirical work 
and will suggest possible future research. 
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2 FDI trends and distribution in developed OECD countries 
2.1 Introduction 
Current country level studies on the relationship between inward FDI and growth have 
focused on developing countries (Zhang, 2001; Campos and Kinoshita, 2002; Basu et 
al., 2003; Lyroudi et al., 2004; Makki and Somwaru, 2004; Lumbila, 2005; Sylwester, 
2005; Hansen and Rand, 2006; Hsiao and Hsiao, 2006; Greenaway et al., 2007; Qi, 
2007; Duttaray et al., 2008; Liu et al., 2009), as they take the view that developing 
countries have less advanced technology and are technological laggards compared to 
developed countries (Roy and Van den Berg, 2006). Therefore, the role of inward FDI 
in transferring technology to developing countries is more important. In addition, many 
studies pool both developed and developing countries into one sample and do not 
distinguish them (Olofsdotter, 1998; de Mello, 1999; Ram and Zhang, 2002; Choe, 
2003; Alfaro et al., 2004; Durham, 2004; Le and Suruga, 2005; Busse and Groizard, 
2006; Batten and Vo, 2009). Blonigen and Wang (2005) argue that significant 
differences exist in developed and developing countries and pooling data together leads 
to false inferences. However, the empirical studies on only developed countries are 
limited (Ericsson and Irandoust, 2001; Ekanayake et al., 2003; Kottaridi, 2005; Roy and 
Van den Berg, 2006; Ghosh and Wang, 2009; Iyer et al., 2009). In addition, studies on 
the impact of outward FDI on the home country‟s economic growth are relatively scarce 
(Herzer, 2008; Ghosh and Wang, 2009). Therefore, it is important to analyse FDI in 
developed countries and that is why this study focuses on developed OECD countries. 
Chapter 3 will discuss the empirical literature in details.  
 
The objective of this chapter is threefold. First, this chapter seeks to define the concept 
of FDI and the different types of FDI. Second, it explains another important reason to 
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investigate FDI in developed countries by looking at the trends of FDI inflows and 
outflows for developed OECD countries, the proportion of world inflows into 
developed OECD countries and the proportion of world outflows from developed 
OECD countries. Finally, it looks at the distribution of FDI for each individual country 
to see whether FDI distribution is even among the group of developed OECD countries.  
2.2 The definition of FDI 
According to IMF (1993), FDI reflects a long-term relationship between a direct 
investor in one country and a direct investment enterprise in another country. The direct 
investor acquires 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power of the 
enterprise, therefore it plays a significant role in influencing the management of the 
enterprise. Although the 10 percent criterion is specified, subjective involvement is 
involved in some countries. If the direct investor owns less than 10 percent of the 
ordinary shares or voting power of the enterprise, but has an effective voice in 
management, the investment might be included as FDI. On the contrary, if the investor 
owns 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power, but does not have an 
effective voice in management, the investment might not be included as FDI.  
 
There are three components of FDI – equity capital, reinvested earnings and inter-
company debt transactions. Equity capital includes equity in branches, all shares in 
subsidiaries and associates, and other capital contributions such as provision of 
machinery. Reinvested earnings consist of the direct investor‟s share of earnings not 
distributed as dividends and earnings not remitted to the direct investor. Inter-company 
debt transactions comprise the borrowing and lending of funds between direct investors 
and subsidiaries, branches and associates.  
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2.3 The types of FDI 
According to Dunning (1993), the main motives for a firm to engage in foreign 
production are to seek natural resources, to seek market, to seek efficiency and to seek 
strategic asset. FDI may be categorized into four types according to the motives of 
investing abroad. 
2.3.1 Natural resource seeking FDI 
A firm of a particular country invests abroad to get access to resources not available in 
the home country or to obtain resources at lower costs. Most output of foreign 
production is exported mainly to developed countries. There are three types of resources 
in a foreign country that a firm may want to acquire. The first type includes physical 
resources such as minerals, raw materials and agricultural products etc. This kind of 
investment involves significant capital expenditure and is location-bound. The second 
type of investment is prompted to seek cheap labour force in labour-intensive 
manufacturing and service sectors. Most locations of this type of investment are 
industrialized developing countries. In the third type, a firm carries out foreign 
production to acquire technology, information, managerial skills and so on (Dunning, 
1993).  
2.3.2 Market seeking FDI 
Market-seeking FDI is investment which is undertaken in a foreign country in order to 
supply goods and services to the foreign market and the other markets in adjacent 
countries. There are a few reasons why multinational enterprises (MNEs) engage in 
market-seeking FDI. First, MNEs invest in a foreign country as their main suppliers 
have set up production facilities in that country. Second, MNEs undertake production 
abroad in order to adapt to local customers‟ tastes, business customs, legal requirements, 
marketing procedures and investment environment etc. Therefore, they are in a better 
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position to compete with local firms and to serve the local market. Another incentive 
might be that the production and transaction costs are lower. MNEs can exploit 
economies of scale in a foreign country with big market size. In addition, outward FDI 
may circumvent trade barriers imposed by the host country‟s government such as 
import controls. The final reason is that MNEs might view it as a global production and 
marketing strategy. MNEs can acquire strategy assets from its local and foreign 
competitors and enhance its competitive advantages (Dunning, 1993).  
2.3.3 Efficiency seeking FDI 
The efficiency seekers are usually large MNEs, which have investment experience in 
different cross-border activities. There are two kinds of efficiency seeking FDI. The 
motivation of the first one is to take advantage of different factor endowments in 
different countries such as natural resources, labour and technology. Investment in 
labour-intensive manufacturing industries and primary product industries tends to take 
place in developing countries, whereas investment in technology-intensive and 
information-intensive industries tends to takes place in developed countries. The 
purpose of the second one is to take advantage of economies of scale and scope, created 
assets and capabilities, the nature of consumer demand, the quality of supporting 
industries and the government policies etc.  This kind of investment is likely to occur in 
countries with similar income levels and economic structures. In addition, as 
experienced investors, MNEs can benefit from the common governance of 
geographically dispersed activities such as cross-border risk diversification, process 
specialization, arbitraging cost, price differentials due to exchange rates and so on 
(Dunning, 1993).  
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2.3.4 Strategic asset seeking FDI 
MNEs in the fourth group are prompted to seek strategic foreign assets to strengthen 
their competitive position in the international market. These assets might include 
technology, innovatory capacity, organizational systems, management and marketing 
skills and so on. Moreover, the MNEs can enjoy other benefits associated with foreign 
production e.g. common governance of diversified cross-border activities, opening up 
new markets, creating R&D synergies, lowering transaction costs, spreading the costs of 
administrative overheads and risk. Most strategic asset seeking FDI concentrates on the 
technology and information intensive sectors (Dunning, 1993).  
2.4 FDI trends 
Figure 2.1 represents the general trend of FDI inflows and FDI outflows in developed 
OECD countries, which form the basis of the empirical analysis. The amount of inflows 
was relatively small and fluctuated a little between 1981 and 1992. From 1992, it rose 
steadily to 1997 and increased dramatically to the peak level in 2000. According to 
UNCTAD (2006), the trends are driven by cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As). However, from the highest level in 2000, inflows fell sharply by about 50 
percent in 2001, returning to the level in 1998. According to UNCTAD (2002), this 
decline reflected the slow-down of economic activity in developed countries and a 
decrease in their stock market activity, which reduced new international investment, 
particularly the cross-border M&As. The event of 11 September 2001 exacerbated the 
slowdown, which may also have contributed to the further decline in 2002 and 2003 
(UNCTAD, 2002). In 2004, inflows started to pick up following three years of decline, 
which reflects the recovery and higher growth rates in some countries (UNCTAD, 
2006). After four years of consecutive growth, inflows rose in 2007 by more than 30% 
and reached another high level, which was close to the record high level in 2000. The 
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increase in inflows reflected high economic growth and strong corporate performance in 
many countries (UNCTAD, 2008). After the global financial and economic crisis in 
2007, the decline of corporate profits and stock prices greatly reduced the value of 
cross-border M&As, which resulted in 29% fall in inflows in 2008 (UNCTAD, 2009).  
Figure 2.1 FDI inflows and outflows in developed OECD countries 
 
Data source: UNCTAD Foreign Direct Investment Database (2011) and World Development Indicators 
(2011). 
Notes: (1) Data are in millions of 2000 US $. (2) Developed OECD countries include Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea 
(Republic of), Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
UK and US.  (3) Germany refers to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany)  before 1990 and 
it refers to both former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) and former democratic republic of 
Germany (East Germany)  from 1990. 
 
FDI outflows followed a similar pattern to that for inflows from 1981 to 2002. Although 
in 2003 outflows started to recover, the recovery was short-lived as there was a further 
decline in 2005, whilst 2006 and 2007 experienced huge increases in outflows. 
Outflows reached the all-time peak level in 2007, which was 39% higher than the 
outflows in 2000. However, outflows fell again by 18% in 2008 due to global financial 
crisis. Another difference between inflows and outflows is that the outflow line is above 
the inflow line for most years, indicating that outflows are more than inflows in 
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developed OECD countries. According to UNCTAD (2006), outflow trends are also 
driven by cross-border M&As.  
 
Turning to the share of world FDI inflows shown in Figure 2.2, we can see that the 
share of developed OECD countries fluctuates from 51% to 85% between 1981 and 
2008, with an average of approximately 67%. Therefore, developed OECD countries 
account for a significant proportion of world inflows. With respect to the share of world 
FDI outflows illustrated in Figure 2.3, developed OECD countries account for most of 
global outflows ranging from 80% to 97% between 1981 and 2008. The average share is 
as high as 89%, so developed OECD countries are the dominant FDI exporters. Hence, 
we conclude that OECD countries are the major sources and recipients of world FDI. 
FDI inflows/outflows in OECD countries drive the world FDI inflows/outflows pattern. 
Compared with developed countries, developing countries only contribute a small 
fraction of world FDI inflows/outflows. However, the majority of current literature 
focuses on FDI in developing countries, studies on developed countries are relatively 
scarce, which will be discussed in Chapter 3. Therefore, it is important to investigate 
FDI inflows and outflows in developed OECD countries and that is why this study 
concentrates on this group of economies. 
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Figure 2.2 Share of world inflows to developed OECD countries (%) 
 
Data source: UNCTAD Foreign Direct Investment Database (2011). 
Notes: (1) Developed OECD countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea (Republic of), Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US. (2) Germany refers to former 
federal republic of Germany (West Germany)  before 1990 and it refers to both former federal republic of 
Germany (West Germany) and former democratic republic of Germany (East Germany)  from 1990. 
 
Figure 2.3 Share of World outflows from developed OECD countries (%) 
 
Data source: UNCTAD Foreign Direct Investment Database (2011). 
Notes: (1) Developed OECD countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea (Republic of), Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US. (2) Germany refers to former 
federal republic of Germany (West Germany)  before 1990 and it refers to both former federal republic of 
Germany (West Germany) and former democratic republic of Germany (East Germany)  from 1990. 
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2.5 FDI distribution 
The distribution of FDI inflows/outflows to/from the developed OECD countries has 
been relatively uneven. Looking at FDI as a percentage of total world, Table 2.1 shows 
that the most attractive host developed countries are US, UK, France, Spain, 
Netherlands, Canada, Germany and Australia in the last three decades, accounting for 
more than 50% of world inflows. Regarding the outflows of FDI, the largest foreign 
investors are US, UK, Japan, France, Germany, Netherlands, Canada and Switzerland, 
accounting about 70% of world outflows. If we take the market size of the host 
countries and home countries into consideration, the rankings change significantly. The 
third and fourth column in Table 2.1 present FDI inflows as a percentage of host 
country‟s GDP and FDI outflows as a percentage of home country‟s GDP. Netherlands, 
Ireland, Iceland, Sweden, UK are successful in attracting FDI inflows. In terms of FDI 
outflows, the largest home countries are Netherlands, Switzerland, Iceland, Sweden and 
UK. However, compared with the first two columns, US is not the largest country in 
terms of inflows and outflows of FDI.   
 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 indicate that around 70% of world FDI inflows go to developed 
OECD countries and about 90% of world FDI outflows originate from developed 
OECD countries. Therefore, developed OECD countries as a whole contribute the 
majority of world inflows/outflows. However, there are significant differences in 
inflows/outflows among individual developed OECD countries shown in Table 2.1. 
Hence, it is interesting to examine why different OECD countries have different 
amounts of FDI inflows/outflows and what factors affect FDI inflows/outflows. 
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Table 2.1 Annual average FDI data from 1981 to 2008 
FDI as a percentage of total world (%) FDI as a percentage of GDP (%) 
Inflows Outflows Inflows Outflows 
US                 23.51 US                  19.38 Netherlands     4.22 Netherlands       6.65 
UK                  8.55 UK                  12.99 Ireland             3.89 Switzerland       6.25 
France             5.48 Japan                8.85 Iceland             3.73 Iceland              6.17 
Spain               3.76 France              8.75 Sweden            3.72 Sweden             4.61 
Netherlands     3.24 Germany          8.01 UK                   2.86 UK                    4.31 
Canada            3.12 Netherlands      5.92 Spain               2.46 France               3.08 
Germany         2.92 Canada             4.29 Denmark          2.41 Finland              3.04 
Australia          2.67 Switzerland      3.29 New Zealand   2.38 Ireland               2.98 
Italy                 1.70 Sweden             2.81 Switzerland     2.38 Spain                 2.71 
Sweden            1.65 Spain                2.71 Canada             2.17 Denmark           2.70 
Switzerland     1.20 Italy                  2.68 Australia          2.14 Canada              2.45 
Denmark         0.62 Australia           1.42 Portugal           2.05 Norway            2.35 
Japan               0.60 Norway            0.90 Finland            1.88 Austria              1.79 
Ireland             0.59 Denmark          0.78 France              1.72 Germany           1.71 
Portugal           0.56 Finland             0.74 Austria             1.48 Portugal             1.41 
Austria            0.55 Austria              0.62 Norway            1.37 Australia           1.15 
Korea              0.48 Korea                0.61 US                   1.12 US                     1.03 
Norway           0.47 Ireland              0.50 Germany          1.03 Italy                   1.01 
New Zealand   0.42 Portugal            0.27 Greece             0.88 Japan                 0.82 
Finland            0.41 New Zealand    0.18 Italy                 0.61 New Zealand     0.74 
Greece             0.40 Iceland              0.09 Korea               0.56 Korea                0.65 
Iceland            0.05 Greece              0.07 Japan               0.09 Greece               0.37 
Belgium              na      Belgium               na      Belgium              na       Belgium               na       
Luxembourg       na Luxembourg        na Luxembourg       na Luxembourg        na 
Data source: UNCTAD Foreign Direct Investment Database (2009). 
Notes: (1) na: not available. (2) Germany refers to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany)  
before 1990 and it refers to both former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) and former 
democratic republic of Germany (East Germany)  from 1990. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
In summary, this chapter discusses the definition of FDI, the types of FDI, FDI trends 
and FDI distribution. From the trends of inward/outward FDI to/from developed OECD 
countries, it is apparent that the developed OECD countries encompass the significant 
proportion of global FDI inflows and outflows. Therefore, we can conclude that 
developed OECD countries have substantial amounts of two-way FDI flows and 
developed OECD countries are major sources and recipients of global FDI. However, 
the majority of current literature concentrates on developing countries, or a sample of 
both developed and developing countries, such that studies on developed countries only 
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are limited, which will be discussed in Chapter 3. Therefore, this thesis contributes to 
the literature by focusing on this group of developed OECD countries. However, from 
FDI distribution, we can see that individual countries have different amounts of FDI 
inflows/outflows. Therefore, it is important to examine what factors attract inward FDI 
and what factors encourage outward FDI.  
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3 Economic theories and empirical literature 
3.1 Introduction  
Ghosh and Wang (2009) argue that developing and developed countries are likely to 
have different experiences in terms of the relationship between inward FDI and 
economic growth, so it is important to distinguish the differences. However, most 
empirical studies either focus on developing countries or pool both developed and 
developing countries into one sample. According to Blonigen and Wang (2005), if the 
relationships between inward FDI and growth for developed and developing countries 
are different, the pooled coefficient estimates significantly misrepresent the true 
relationships for both sets of countries and it is inappropriate to pool the two sets of 
countries together. In addition, Section 2.4 indicates that developed OECD countries are 
the major sources and recipients of world FDI. Therefore, this study concentrates on 
developed OECD countries.  
 
There are three research questions in this thesis. Section 2.4 indicates that developed 
OECD countries attract the majority of inward FDI in the world, so they must provide 
favourable conditions for multinational firms to make profits. The first research 
question examines the favourable factors in developed OECD countries that attract 
inward FDI. Developed OECD countries are also the sources of most outward FDI in 
the world. Thus, the second research question investigates what home country 
characteristics encourage FDI abroad. The third research question is to analyse the 
relationship between inward/outward FDI and economic growth in developed OECD 
countries.  
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This chapter first reviews the theoretical models and empirical studies on the 
determinants of inward/outward FDI (the first and second research questions). 
Following this, it outlines the economic theory and empirical literature on the 
relationship between inward/outward FDI and economic growth (the third research 
question). Finally, it presents the research approach and data collection method used in 
this study. 
3.2 Theoretical determinants of FDI and literature review 
This section presents a review of different theoretical models on the determinants of 
FDI, which explains why some countries invest abroad and why some countries are 
more successful in receiving inward FDI. The theoretical models are divided into 
theories assuming perfect markets and those assuming imperfect markets, which is 
similar with the approach that Agarwal (1980) and Moosa (2002) discuss the theories. 
These theories are referred to as hypotheses suggested by Agarwal (1980) as there is a 
number of competing theories with varying degrees of power to explain FDI. In 
addition, this section also summarizes the findings of empirical studies on determinants 
of FDI based on each theory. 
3.2.1 Theories assuming perfect markets 
Under the assumption of perfect competition on factor and/or product markets, the three 
theories which explain why firms invest abroad are the differential rates of return 
hypothesis, the portfolio diversification hypothesis and the market size hypothesis. 
3.2.1.1 The differential rates of return hypothesis 
Under the assumption of perfect competition, the differential rates of return model 
explains FDI as a function to differences in the rates of return on capital between 
countries. This model is based on Heckscher-Ohlin notion that a capital-abundant 
country should export capital-intensive goods to foreign countries. According to capital 
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theory model, a capital abundant country with lower capital returns invests in capital-
scarce countries with higher capital returns to maximize the expected profits. Hence, 
FDI flows from countries with lower rate of return on capital to countries with higher 
rate of return on capital (Hufbauer, 1975).  
 
The disadvantage of this theory is that it implies that capital flows in one direction only 
– from countries with lower rate of return to countries with higher rate of return. 
Therefore, it cannot explain why a country experiences FDI inflows and FDI outflows 
from/to another country at the same time (Moosa, 2002). Moreover, this hypothesis 
assumes risk neutrality, which implies that FDI and domestic investment are perfect 
substitutes or FDI in one country is a perfect substitute for FDI in any other country 
(Moosa, 2002). Another problem is that the theory relates FDI to the rate of return from 
expected profit and the empirical tests are based on rate of return from reported profit. 
However, reported profits do not accurately reflect the expected profits or actual profits 
as reported profits do not show the effect of tax arrangement, transfer prices, accounting 
procedures and so on (Hufbauer, 1975; Agarwal, 1980; Moosa, 2002). In addition, the 
hypothesis refers to the profits during the whole investment period, whereas the 
reported profits refer to the profits over a year (Agarwal, 1980; Moosa, 2002). Moreover, 
it does not explain why a firm engages in FDI rather than portfolio investment (Moosa, 
2002). Finally, the model assumes that the objective of FDI is to maximize profits. 
However, firms might invest abroad for other reasons, particularly in the short- and 
medium-run, such as achieving higher economies of scale, avoiding trade barriers, 
expanding market in the host country, etc (Agarwal, 1980; Moosa, 2002). 
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Empirical studies testing this hypothesis only offer weak support. Bandera and White 
(1968) analyse American investments in seven developed countries in manufacturing, 
petroleum and trade sectors, they find that the rate of return variable is not significant. 
Moreover, using US manufacturing investment in seven developing countries, Reuber et 
al. (1973) find that US investment and the rate of return in the host country are not 
correlated for five countries. However, a positive and significant relationship is 
observed between the two variables in two countries.  
3.2.1.2 The portfolio diversification hypothesis 
According to this theory, the assumption of risk neutrality is relaxed, investors take into 
account not only the rate of return on capital, but also risk when making investment 
decisions. Investment is positively related with rate of return and negatively related with 
risk. Hence, investors try to achieve higher rate of capital return and diversify 
investment to reduce risk (Hufbauer, 1975; Agarwal, 1980; Moosa, 2002).  
 
This hypothesis offers a plausible explanation of cross-investment between countries 
and industries. However, it does not explain why direct investment is preferred to 
portfolio investment for geographical diversification (Agarwal, 1980; Moosa, 2002). 
Moreover, it cannot explain why firms in certain industries tend to produce abroad, 
while firms in other industries do not (Hufbauer, 1975; Agarwal, 1980). In addition, the 
variance of rate of return is used to measure risk and it is not reliable as the rate of 
return is calculated from reported profits, which are not equal to actual profits (Agarwal, 
1980; Moosa, 2002).   
 
Empirical studies aimed at testing this hypothesis provide some supporting evidence. 
Using manufacturing FDI data from US into Latin America as a whole, Stevens (1969) 
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finds that risk negatively affects FDI in Latin America overall, while at country level, 
the study detects some evidence of the hypothesis in Brazil. However, the results at 
country level are proved to be inferior compared to other empirical models. In addition, 
Prachoway (1972) analyses FDI in the US and finds evidence in favour of the 
hypothesis. Moreover, Cohen (1975) finds that large US corporations with more 
extensive foreign activities appear to have smaller fluctuations in global profits and 
sales.  
3.2.1.3 The market size hypothesis 
This hypothesis postulates that inward FDI is positively correlated with the sales of 
foreign firms in the host country. The theoretical model of market size hypothesis is 
based on the neoclassical domestic investment theories, which indicate that domestic 
firms increase their investment in response to their sales (Agarwal, 1980; Moosa, 2002). 
This hypothesis is applied at the macro level, which indicates that inward FDI is a 
function of the host country‟s market size such as GDP. A large market in the host 
country may help foreign investors to reduce fixed cost per unit of output, capture 
economies of scale of production and reduce the total cost of supplying the local market 
(Torrisi, 1985; Tsai, 1994; Shatz and Venables, 2000; Lim, 2001).  
 
There are some disadvantages about this hypothesis. According to Agarwal (1980) and 
Moosa (2002), the use of macro level market size variable does not have much 
theoretical foundation as the use of foreign firms‟ sales. However, data on the sales of 
foreign firms in the host country are generally not available. Therefore, the majority of 
studies apply macro level variables to measure market size. Moreover, market size tends 
to affect FDI which seeks to serve the domestic market, not FDI which is produced for 
exports (Agarwal, 1980; Moosa, 2002).  
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Most empirical studies support the hypothesis and find that the host country‟s market 
size plays a positive role in explaining the location of inward FDI (Schneider and Frey, 
1985; Torrisi, 1985; Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero, 1994; Shamsuddin, 1994; Tsai, 
1994; Wang and Swain, 1995; Billington, 1999; Globerman and Shapiro, 1999; 
Morisset, 2000; Obwona, 2001; Globerman and Shapiro, 2002; Kucera, 2002; Trevino 
et al., 2002; Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles, 2003; Egger and Winner, 2005; Grosse and 
Trevino, 2005; Kottaridi, 2005; Asiedu, 2006; Fedderke and Romm, 2006; Ramirez, 
2006; Wijeweera and Clark, 2006; Greenaway et al., 2007; Ang, 2008; Fukumi and 
Nishijima, 2010). However, Lipsey (2000), Filippaios et al. (2003), Radulescu and 
Robson (2008) find some evidence of a negative relationship between inward FDI and 
market size, implying that inward FDI is attracted to smaller rather than larger 
economies.  
3.2.2 Theories assuming imperfect markets 
Kindleberger (1969) argues that FDI cannot exist in perfect markets and the market for 
goods or factors must be imperfect in order for FDI to take place. There are five  
theories based on imperfect markets – the Hymer-Kindleberger hypothesis, the product 
life cycle hypothesis, the oligopolistic reaction hypothesis, the internalization 
hypothesis and the eclectic paradigm. These theories assume that the firms investing in 
a foreign country have some comparative advantages over the local firms in the host 
country (Agarwal, 1980). 
3.2.2.1 The Hymer-Kindleberger hypothesis 
The idea of imperfect goods or factor markets was put forward by Hymer in his doctoral 
thesis in 1960 and was published in 1976, whilst Kindleberger (1969) refined and 
extended the theory. According to the hypothesis, foreign firms that undertake FDI have 
some disadvantages compared with local firms such as lack of knowledge of local 
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market and business conditions, differences in political and legal systems, higher 
uncertainty as well as the cost of operating at a distance from their decision-making 
centre. Therefore, foreign firms must possess some ownership advantages in order to 
overcome the costs of operating in the host country and competing with local 
competitors. These ownership advantages have to be transferable from one country to 
another, which includes product differentiation, marketing skills, technology, 
managerial skills and economies of scale. These advantages give rise to goods and 
factor markets imperfection and enable foreign firms earn more than at home and more 
than local firms (Kindleberger, 1969). However, this hypothesis does not provide an 
explanation why FDI is preferred over exports or licensing (Agarwal, 1980). In addition, 
it fails to explain why firms choose to invest in country A rather than country B (Moosa, 
2002). 
 
Establishing ownership advantages as determinants of FDI leads to a number of 
empirical studies. Horst (1972) shows that large US firms are more likely to invest in 
Canada by examining over a thousand American manufacturing corporations. Holding 
firm size constant, the results find that more firms in an industry invest abroad when the 
industry‟s R&D expenditure is higher. Furthermore, industries with more average-sized 
firms have fewer firms investing abroad, because economies of scale only encourage 
large firms to carry out outward FDI. Applying data on 64 industries in Canada and UK, 
Caves (1974) concludes that large foreign firms and multi-plant foreign firms have 
larger sales in Canada and UK. In addition, the industry‟s advertising and research 
intensity in the foreign country are also important determinants of the foreign firms‟ 
sales in Canada. Wolf (1977) examines data on 95 US manufacturing industries and 
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finds that large firm size and high technical manpower stimulate US manufacturing 
firms to invest abroad.  
 
Lall‟s (1980) results support the view that foreign sales by US affiliates are determined 
by US industry‟s monopolistic advantages including advertising expenditure, R&D 
expenditure, economies of scale and general level of skills. Based on Cave‟s (1974) 
work, Saunders (1982) suggests that advertising, R&D expenditure, managerial 
resources and multi-plant development in foreign industries influence foreign firms‟ 
investment decisions in Canada. Analysing data on 115 Canadian manufacturing 
industries, Owen (1982) finds that the ownership advantages of US multinational firms 
are advertising, R&D intensity, economies of scale and firm size. Blomstrom and 
Lipsey (1986) examine American and Swedish manufacturing firms and find that firm 
size has a threshold effect on their outward FDI. Among multinational firms investing 
abroad, large firms do not have more advantages compared with small firms. In addition, 
R&D expenditure and advertising expenditure have positive impacts on American firms‟ 
foreign sales. In terms of Swedish firms, R&D expenditure positively affects their 
foreign sales. 
3.2.2.2 The product life cycle hypothesis 
According to Vernon (1966), the life cycle of a product goes through three stages. In the 
first stage, an innovating firm in the most advanced country produces a new product in 
its home country to take advantage of the home market‟s demand. The firm chooses 
home country as the production location to undertake product improvement and to 
reduce the costs of communication between producers and customers. During the 
second stage, the product is more developed and mature. The rising demand abroad 
leads the innovating firm to export the product to other developed countries. In addition, 
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FDI is undertaken by the innovating firm when the demand in a foreign market is large 
enough to support local production. The final stage is marked by the standardization of 
the product. The intensive price competition from other producers forces the innovating 
firm to relocate the production into less developed countries to reduce labour costs and 
to achieve economies of scale.  
 
However, Vernon (1971) acknowledges that the model deliberately simplifies the reality 
and does not take into consideration the more complex sociological, political and 
idiosyncratic factors. In addition, the model assumes that innovations originate in highly 
innovative industries in developed countries, not in developing countries (Solomon, 
1978). Moreover, it assumes that multinational firms are able to develop and standardise 
products almost at the same time without significant time lags (Buckley, 1985).  
 
Looking at empirical evidence, Parry (1975) analyses a sample of pharmaceutical 
products by six UK-owned multinational pharmaceutical firms and finds a positive link 
between product age and the degree of international production. Therefore, the findings 
lend some support to the validity of the product life cycle hypothesis. 
3.2.2.3 The oligopolistic reaction hypothesis 
Knickerbocker (1973) argues that entry concentration is positively correlated with 
industry concentration except in the market with high structural stability. Oligopolistic 
firms adopt the „follow-the-leader‟ strategy to invest abroad to counter the competitive 
advantages of the leader firm. Knickerbocker (1973) analyses the behaviour of 187 
American firms investing in 23 foreign countries and finds evidence of the hypothesis. 
Therefore Knickerbocker (1973) concludes that FDI is a function of oligopolistic 
reaction. However, there are some criticisms about the theory. It does not explain why 
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the leader firm invests abroad in the first place (Knickerbocker, 1973; Agarwal, 1980). 
Moreover, it fails to explain why some American industries carry out FDI abroad and 
some industries do not (Knickerbocker, 1973). Finally, it does not take into account of 
the firms with dispersive investments (Agarwal, 1980). 
3.2.2.4 The internalization hypothesis 
Buckely and Casson (1976) argue that firms undertake FDI by internalizing in the 
foreign markets due to the imperfections in intermediate product markets such as human 
capital, knowledge, marketing expertise, technology and so on. There are benefits and 
costs of internalising markets such that FDI is taken up as long as benefits are greater 
than costs. Benefits include avoidance of time lags in business activities, 
implementation of price discrimination, elimination of bargaining and buyer uncertainty, 
minimization of the impact of government interventions through transfer pricing. Costs 
of internalization arise from communication, administrative and coordination expenses. 
This theory explains why a firm chooses FDI instead of exporting or licensing. 
However, it does not apply in the short run to small multinational firms operating in 
fewer foreign locations (Agarwal, 1980). In addition, the theory takes into account the 
multinational firms‟ reaction to market imperfections, but does not incorporate the role 
of multinational firms in creating market imperfections (Buckley, 1985). Finally, this 
theory‟s empirical verification is very difficult (Agarwal, 1980) as the hypothesis is so 
general and cannot be tested directly (Buckley, 1988). Buckely and Casson (1976) carry 
out the statistical tests of the theory based on simple assumptions and conclude that the 
process of internalization is concentrated in high R&D expenditure industries. 
3.2.2.5 The eclectic paradigm 
Dunning (1977, 1988 and 1993) introduces the eclectic paradigm, which provides the 
most comprehensive explanation of firms‟ foreign production. This theory combines the 
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various factors discussed above and adds the location advantage in explaining FDI. A 
firm will engage in foreign production activities when three conditions are satisfied, 
namely ownership advantages, internalization advantages and location advantages. The 
more ownership advantages that a country‟s indigenous firms have, the more incentive 
they have to internalize a foreign market. The more location advantages that a foreign 
country has, the more they are likely to engage in outward FDI (Dunning, 1993). A firm 
has to have all of the three advantages in order to engage in FDI. If there are ownership 
advantages, location advantages and no internalisation gains, the firm will licence its 
ownership advantages to another firm. If there are only ownership advantages and 
internalisation advantages, the firm will produce at home and export the products 
abroad (Moosa, 2002). Table 3.1 summarizes the three advantages of the eclectic 
paradigm – ownership advantages, internalization advantages and location advantages. 
Table 3.1 The eclectic paradigm of international production 
1. Ownership-Specific Advantages of an enterprise of one nationality over those of 
another. 
 
a. Property rights and/or intangible asset advantages (Oa); the resource (asset) 
structure of the firm. Product innovations, production management, organizational 
and marketing systems, innovatory capacity, organization of work, non-codifiable 
knowledge: „bank‟ of human capital experience; marketing, finance, know-how, etc. 
Ability to reduce costs of intra and/or inter-firm transactions. 
 
b. Advantages of common governance, that is, of organizing Oa with complementary 
assets (Ot). 
 
i. Those that branch plants of established enterprises may enjoy over de novo 
firms. Those resulting mainly from size, product diversity and learning 
experiences of enterprise (e.g. economies of scope and specialization). 
Exclusive or favoured access to inputs (e.g. labour, natural resources, 
finance, information). Ability to obtain inputs on favoured terms (as a result 
of size or monopsonistic influence). Ability of parent company to conclude 
productive and cooperative inter-firm relationships, for example, as between 
Japanese auto assemblers and their suppliers. Exclusive or favoured access 
to product markets. Access to resources of parent company at marginal cost. 
Synergistic economies (not only in production, but in purchasing, marketing, 
finance, etc, arrangements). 
 
ii. Which specifically arise because of multinationality. Mulitnationality 
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enhances operational flexibility by offering wider opportunities for 
arbitraging, production shifting, and global sourcing of inputs. More 
favoured access to and/or better knowledge about international markets (e.g. 
for information, finance, labour, etc). Ability to take advantage of 
geographic differences in factor endowments, government intervention, 
markets, etc. Ability to diversify or reduce risks (e.g. in different currency 
areas and creation of options and/or political and cultural scenarios). Ability 
to learn from societal differences in organizational and managerial processes 
and systems. Balancing economies of integration need to respond to 
differences in country-specific resources and consumer demands. 
2 Internalization-Incentive Advantages (i.e. to circumvent or exploit market failure). 
 To avoid search and negotiating costs. 
 To avoid costs of moral hazard and adverse selection, and to protect reputation 
of internalizing firm. 
 To avoid costs of broken contracts and ensuing litigation. 
 Buyer uncertainty (about nature and value of inputs, for example, technology, 
being sold). 
 When market does not permit price discrimination. 
 Need of seller to protect quality of intermediate or final products. 
 To capture economies of interdependent activities (see b above). 
 To compensate for absence of future markets. 
 To avoid or exploit government intervention (quotas, tariffs, price controls, tax 
differences, etc). 
 To control supplies and conditions of sale of inputs (including technology). 
 To control market outlets (including those which might be used by competitors). 
 To be able to engage in practices, such as cross-subsidization, predatory pricing, 
leads and lags, transfer pricing as a competitive (or anti-competitive) strategy. 
3 Location-Specific Variables (these may favour home or host countries). 
 Spatial distribution of natural and created resource endowments and markets. 
 Input prices, quality and productivity (e.g. labour, energy, materials, 
components, semi-finished goods). 
 International transport and communication costs. 
 Investment incentives and disincentives (including performance requirements, 
etc). 
 Artificial barriers (e.g. import controls) to trade in goods and services. 
 Societal and infrastructure provisions (commercial, legal, educational, transport 
and communication). 
 Cross-country ideological, language, cultural, business, political differences. 
 Economies of centralization of R&D production and marketing. 
 Economic system and strategies of government: the institutional framework for 
resource allocation. 
Source: Dunning (1993), 81. 
Note: Oa is asset advantages and Ot is transaction cost minimizing advantages. 
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3.2.2.5.1 Ownership advantages 
According to Dunning (1977, 1988 and 1993), ownership advantages are the 
competitive advantages that a country‟s firms may possess over another country‟s firms. 
These must be sufficient to compensate for the costs of producing in a foreign country 
and the disadvantages of competing with local firms. There are three kinds of ownership 
advantages. The first type includes a set of income-generating assets such as property 
rights and intangible assets (eg. technology and information, product innovation, 
innovatory capacity, human capital, organizational systems, marketing, managerial and 
entrepreneurial skills etc). These assets allow the firms to achieve higher levels of 
productivity/efficiency and obtain more market power in a foreign country.  
 
The second kind includes the advantages that an established firm may enjoy over a de 
novo firm producing in a foreign location. These advantages are derived from size, 
monopoly power, better resource capacity and usage of the established firm. For 
example, the established firm may benefit from accessing to resources (e.g. inputs, 
market knowledge, accounting procedures, administrative experience etc.) from parent 
company at low marginal costs, whereas the de novo firm has to bear the full cost in 
getting those resources. Other advantages are favoured access to inputs, favoured access 
to product markets, economies of scale and specialization, economies of joint supply in 
production, purchasing, marketing, finance, etc. The third type of advantages stems 
from the multinationality. Multinationality offers more favoured access to and better 
knowledge about international markets, which enables the firms to take advantage of 
geographic differences in factor endowments/markets and to reduce the foreign 
            Chapter 3 Economic theories and empirical literature 
31 
 
exchange risk/political risk in producing in the host country (Dunning, 1977; Dunning, 
1988; Dunning, 1993).  
3.2.2.5.2 Internalization advantages 
Dunning (1988) argues that a firm enters the intermediate product market in a foreign 
country when it is in its best interest to transfer ownership advantages across national 
boundaries within its own organizations rather than to sell them or their right of use to 
foreign based firms. The incentives for foreign firms to internalize markets are to avoid 
disadvantages of market failure or to exploit the advantages of market failure. Three 
main kinds of market failure are identified. The first one is that buyers and sellers do not 
have complete information. Buyers might be uncertain about the value, quality and 
delivering time of inputs being sold. From the sellers‟ viewpoint, they might want to 
protect their reputation, the quality of intermediate or final products. The second market 
failure is that foreign firms can exploit the economies of large scale production. 
Therefore, by internalizing the markets, the foreign firms can benefit from common 
governance and from other internalizing practices such as arbitraging, cross-
subsidization of costs, leading and lagging in payments, transfer-price manipulation. 
The final market failure occurs where the transaction of a particular good or service 
yields costs and benefits external to that transaction. Internalization can help foreign 
firms to avoid costs of enforcing property rights, to avoid or exploit government 
intervention, to safeguard supplies of inputs, to guarantee markets and so on.  
3.2.2.5.3 Location advantages 
The third advantage is concerned with the location of production. Firms will engage in 
foreign production when they perceive location advantages in a foreign country. 
Otherwise, firms would serve domestic markets by domestic production and foreign 
markets by exports (Dunning, 1988).  
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3.2.2.5.4 Host country factors that affect inward FDI 
The location advantages in a host country might affect the amount of inward FDI that 
the country receives, which includes labour cost, trade union density, employment 
protection legislation, wage bargaining coordination, R&D expenditure, market size, 
economic growth, agglomeration, trade barrier, trade openness, exchange rate, inflation 
rate, corporate tax,  human capital, infrastructure, political instability, country risk, 
corruption and rule of law. 
 
Labour cost 
Labour cost plays an important role in affecting inward FDI, whereby higher labour cost 
in the host country is expected to be a deterrent of inward FDI as foreign investors 
would like to minimize the cost of production. However, the relationship between 
labour cost and inward FDI could be positive such that if higher labour cost reflects a 
higher skill level, FDI may flow to high labour cost countries because of high skill 
requirements (Noorbakhsh et al., 2001). Moreover, Yang et al. (2000) argue that an 
increase in labour cost may result in a substitution in production of capital for labour 
and therefore encourage inward capital investment. Turning to the empirical evidence 
on developed countries, most studies find it to be a negative determinant of inward FDI, 
while two studies find it to be a positive determinant and five studies find it to be an 
insignificant determinant (see Table 3.2). Therefore, we expect a positive or negative 
impact of labour cost on inward FDI in developed host countries.  
Table 3.2 The effect of labour cost in the host country on inward FDI 
Studies on developed host countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Cushman 
(1987) 
Bilateral FDI from 5 
developed countries 
1 developed country Negative 
Culem (1988) 
 
Bilateral FDI from 6 
developed countries 
6 developed 
countries 
Negative  
 
Moore (1993) Bilateral FDI from 17 developed Negative 
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 Germany in 
manufacturing sector 
countries 
Pain (1993) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developed country Negative 
Bajo-Rubio and 
Sosvilla-Rivero 
(1994) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developed country Insignificant 
Barrell and Pain 
(1996) 
Bilateral FDI from 
Japan 
7 developed 
countries  
Negative 
Cooke (1997) 
 
Bilateral FDI from US 
in 9 industries 
19 developed 
countries 
Insignificant 
Billington 
(1999) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
7 developed 
countries 
Insignificant 
Ford and 
Strange (1999) 
FDI from 520 
Japanese firms 
7 developed 
countries 
Negative 
Globerman and 
Shapiro (1999) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developed country Negative 
Vannoni (1999) 
 
FDI from 67 Italian 
firms  
10 developed 
countries 
Negative 
Yang et al. 
(2000) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developed country Positive 
Filippaios et al. 
(2003) 
 
Bilateral FDI from US 4 developed 
countries 
Negative (Australia 
and New Zealand) 
Positive (Japan and 
Korea) 
Love (2003) 
 
Bilateral FDI from 7 
developed countries in 
8 industries 
1 developed country Insignificant 
Kottaridi (2005) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
10 developed 
countries 
Negative 
De Vita and 
Abbott (2007) 
 
Bilateral FDI from 7 
developed countries in 
manufacturing sector 
1 developed country Insignificant 
 
Studies on developing host countries or a mix of developed and developing host 
countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Schneider and 
Frey (1985) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
54 developing 
countries 
Negative 
Shamsuddin 
(1994) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
36 developing 
countries 
Negative 
Tsai (1994) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
62 developing 
countries 
Negative in the 
1980s 
Insignificant in the 
1970s 
Singh and Jun 
(1995) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
31 developed and 
developing countries 
Negative 
Wang and 
Swain (1995) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
2 developing 
countries 
Positive (China) 
Insignificant 
            Chapter 3 Economic theories and empirical literature 
34 
 
(Hungary) 
Cooke and 
Noble (1998) 
Bilateral FDI from US 
in 9 industries 
33 developed and 
developing countries 
Positive 
Bende-Nabende 
et al. (2001) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
5 developing 
countries 
Negative (Indonesia, 
Singapore and 
Thailand)  
Insignificant 
(Malaysia and 
Philippines)  
Noorbakhsh et 
al. (2001) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
36 developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Kucera (2002) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
127 developed and 
developing countries 
Negative 
Campos and 
Kinoshita 
(2003) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
25 developing 
countries 
Negative 
Bognanno et al. 
(2005) 
Bilateral FDI from US 
in 7 industries 
22 developed and 
developing countries 
Negative 
Javorcik and 
Spatareanu 
(2005) 
FDI from 10,000 
European firms 
19 developed and 
developing countries 
Negative 
Fedderke and 
Romm (2006) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developing country Negative 
Greenaway et 
al. (2007) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
54 developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Dewit et al. 
(2009) 
 
Bilateral FDI from 27 
developed and 
developing countries 
27 developed and 
developing countries 
Negative 
Leibrecht and 
Scharler (2009) 
Bilateral FDI from 7 
developed countries 
7 developing 
countries 
Negative  
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
Trade union density 
A high level of trade union density might have a detrimental effect on FDI inflows as it 
raises labour costs and the costs of investment. Moreover, foreign firms incur 
transaction costs associated with union actions such as wage bargaining and strikes etc 
(Cooke, 1997). Furthermore, the rent-extraction activities of trade unions limit the 
profitability of foreign investment (Radulescu and Robson, 2008). In addition, unions 
might have the power to maintain high wages and benefits for workers (Cooke, 1997). 
On the other hand, the impact of unionization on inward FDI can be beneficial due to 
the positive association between unionization and productivity (Karier, 1995; Ford and 
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Strange, 1999). Billington (1999) argues that union membership boosts morale, which 
in turn raises productivity and attracts FDI inflows. Looking at the empirical evidence 
on developed countries, all four studies show that a high rate of union membership in 
the host country deters inward FDI (see Table 3.3). Therefore, based on economic 
theory and empirical literature, we expect a positive or negative relationship between 
union density and inward FDI in developed host countries. 
Table 3.3 The effect of union density in the host country on inward FDI 
Studies on developed host countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Cooke (1997) Bilateral FDI from US in 9 
industries 
19 developed 
countries 
Negative 
Ford and Strange 
(1999) 
520 Japanese firms‟ 
decision to invest abroad 
7 developed 
countries 
Negative 
Ham and Kleiner 
(2007) 
Bilateral FDI from 19 
developed countries 
19 developed 
countries 
Negative 
Radulescu and 
Robson (2008) 
FDI from the rest of world 19 developed 
countries 
Negative 
 
Studies on a mix of developed and developing host countries  
Author Data type Host country Results 
Karier (1995) Bilateral FDI from US in 
32 industries 
10 developed and 
developing countries 
Insignificant 
Cooke and Noble 
(1998) 
Bilateral FDI from US in 9 
industries 
33 developed and 
developing countries 
Negative 
Kucera (2002) FDI from the rest of world 127 developed and 
developing countries 
Insignificant 
Bognanno et al. 
(2005) 
Bilateral FDI from US in 7 
industries 
22 developed and 
developing countries 
Insignificant 
Dewit et al. (2009) Bilateral FDI from 27 
developed  and developing 
countries 
27 developed and 
developing countries 
Negative 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
Employment protection legislation 
Employment protection legislation is regarded as crucial in determining the relative 
attractiveness of locations to foreign investors. Rigid employment protection legislation 
incurs higher costs of employment adjustments (Dewit et al., 2009) and imposes higher 
costs of production adjustments (Leibrecht and Scharler, 2009). Therefore, countries 
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with fewer employment protection restrictions have comparative advantages in 
attracting inward FDI (Dewit et al., 2009). However, rigid regulation can be perceived 
to be an advantage for a country to attract FDI as it might reinforce commitment and 
loyalty to the employer, reduce labour turnover costs and maintain a trained workforce 
(Whyman et al., 2008). The empirical studies use an index to measure employment 
protection legislation, whereby a higher index shows more rigid employment protection 
legislation (see Table 3.4). All three studies on developed countries suggest that host 
countries with flexible employment regulations are more successful in attracting inward 
FDI (see Table 3.4). Hence, based on economic theory and empirical literature, we 
expect a positive or negative effect of employment protection legislation on inward FDI 
in developed host countries. 
Table 3.4 The effect of employment protection legislation in the host country on inward 
FDI 
Studies on developed host countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Cooke (1997) Bilateral FDI from US in 
9 industries 
19 developed countries Negative 
Ham and Kleiner 
(2007) 
Bilateral FDI from 19 
developed countries 
19 developed countries Negative 
Radulescu and 
Robson (2008) 
FDI from the rest of 
world 
19 developed countries Negative 
 
Studies on developing host countries or a mix of developed and developing host 
countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Cooke and Noble 
(1998) 
Bilateral FDI from US in 
9 industries 
33 developed and 
developing countries 
Negative 
Bognanno et al. 
(2005) 
Bilateral FDI from US in 
7 industries 
22 developed and 
developing countries 
Negative 
Gorg (2005) Bilateral FDI from US 33 developed and 
developing countries 
Negative 
Javorcik and 
Spatareanu (2005) 
7150 European firms‟ 
decisions to invest 
abroad 
19 developed and 
developing countries 
Negative 
Benassy-Quere et 
al. (2007) 
Bilateral FDI from 53 
developed and 
developing countries 
50 developed and 
developing countries 
Negative 
Dewit et al. (2009) Bilateral FDI from 27 
developed  and 
27 developed and 
developing countries 
Negative 
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developing countries 
Leibrecht and 
Scharler (2009) 
Bilateral FDI from 7 
developed countries 
7 developing countries Insignificant 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
Note: A higher index shows more rigid employment protection legislation. 
 
Wage bargaining coordination 
According to Radulescu and Robson (2008), foreign investors are likely to locate in 
countries where wage bargaining is uncoordinated, so that foreign investors can decide 
their own firm-level wages and employment conditions according to the specific 
characteristics of the firms, which suggests that decentralisation facilitates labour 
market flexibility and encourages inward FDI (Whyman et al., 2008). However, 
Whyman et al. (2008) argue that inward FDI might be higher in countries with 
coordinated wage bargaining system as it might secure a lower rate of growth in 
aggregate real wages, reduce labour turnover and decrease labour recruitment costs. 
One study on developed countries analyses the effect of wage bargaining coordination 
on inward FDI and provides evidence that a coordinated system of wage bargaining 
(high index) reduces the attractiveness of an economy as a location for FDI (see Table 
3.5). Therefore, based on economic theory and empirical literature, we expect that wage 
bargaining coordination either positively or negatively influences inward FDI in 
developed host countries. 
Table 3.5 The effect of wage bargaining coordination in the host country on inward FDI 
Studies on developed host countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Radulescu and 
Robson (2008) 
FDI from the rest of world 19 developed 
countries 
Negative 
 
Studies on a mix of developed and developing host countries  
Author Data type Host country Results 
Dewit et al. (2009) Bilateral FDI from 27 
developed  and developing 
countries 
27 developed and 
developing countries 
Negative 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
Note: A higher index shows a more coordinated wage bargaining system. 
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R&D expenditure 
A firm might set up its production facilities abroad through FDI to exploit its ownership 
advantages such as advanced technology, marketing and management expertise, etc. 
Hence, FDI transfers technology from the home country to the host country. According 
to Kogut and Chang (1991), R&D expenditure leads to the creation of advanced 
technology. Therefore, higher inward FDI might be correlated with lower R&D 
expenditure in the host country. However, the motive of foreign investors to invest in a 
host country might be to access technology in the host country and transfer it to the 
home country. In that case, advanced technology in the host country attracts inward FDI. 
A number of studies investigate the impact of R&D expenditure in the host developed 
country and most studies find a positive impact (see Table 3.6). However, Kottaridi 
(2005) finds that R&D expenditure and inward FDI is negatively related in EU 
periphery countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). In addition, three 
studies do not find it as a significant determinant of inward FDI. Therefore, we expect a 
positive or negative relationship between R&D expenditure and inward FDI in 
developed host countries.  
Table 3.6 The effect of R&D expenditure in the host country on inward FDI 
Studies on developed host countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Kogut and 
Chang (1991) 
FDI from Japanese 
firms in 297 industries 
1 developed 
country 
Positive 
Drake and 
Caves (1992) 
Bilateral FDI from 
Japan in 102 industries 
1 developed 
country 
Insignificant 
Neven and 
Siotis (1996) 
Bilateral FDI from 4 
developed countries in 
8 industries 
Bilateral FDI from US 
and Japan in 8 
industries 
4 developed 
countries in  
EC 
Bilateral investment 
among EC countries 
Insignificant 
 
Bilateral US investment 
in EC countries 
Positive 
 
Bilateral Japan 
investment in EC 
countries 
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Positive 
Vannoni 
(1999) 
FDI from 67 Italian 
firms 
European Union 
(EU) 
Positive 
Driffield and 
Munday 
(2000) 
FDI from the rest of 
world in 102 industries 
1 developed 
country 
Positive 
Love (2003) 
 
Bilateral FDI from 7 
developed countries in 
8 industries 
1 developed 
country 
Insignificant 
Kottaridi 
(2005) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
10 developed 
countries 
Positive (Belgium-
Luxembourg, France, 
Germany, Netherlands 
and UK) 
 
Negative (Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain) 
 
Studies on developing host countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Moosa (2009) FDI from the rest of the 
world 
18 developing 
countries 
Positive 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
Market size and economic growth 
As discussed in 3.2.1.3, market size is expected to be positively correlated with inward 
FDI given that inward FDI is primarily to serve the local market. A large market in the 
host country may help foreign investors to reduce fixed cost per unit of output, capture 
economies of scale of production and reduce the total cost of supplying the local market 
(Torrisi, 1985; Tsai, 1994; Shatz and Venables, 2000; Lim, 2001). Most empirical 
studies on developed countries support these hypotheses and find that the host country‟s 
market size plays a positive role in explaining the location of inward FDI. However, 
three studies find a negative relationship between inward FDI and market size implying 
that inward FDI is attracted to smaller rather than larger developed economies. For 
example, Lipsey (2000) argues that large countries measured by nominal GDP receive 
less FDI, while rich countries measured by real GDP per capita receive more FDI. In 
addition, another two studies do not find any significant relationship (see Table 3.7). 
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Therefore, we expect that market size has a positive impact on inward FDI in developed 
host countries. 
Table 3.7 Empirical studies that test market size hypothesis 
Studies on developed host countries 
Author Data type Host country Results  
Bandera and 
White (1968) 
 
Bilateral FDI from 
US in manufacturing 
sector, petroleum 
sector, trade sector 
7 developed countries Positive  
 
Scaperlanda 
and Mauer 
(1969) 
FDI from US European Economic 
Community (EEC) 
Positive  
 
Scaperlanda 
and Mauer 
(1972) 
FDI from US European Economic 
Community (EEC) 
Positive  
 
Schmitz and 
Bieri (1972) 
FDI from US European Economic 
Community (EEC) 
Positive  
 
Lunn (1980) 
 
FDI from US European Economic 
Community (EEC) 
Positive  
 
Lunn (1983) 
 
FDI from US European Economic 
Community (EEC) 
Positive  
 
Scaperlanda 
and Balough 
(1983) 
Manufacturing FDI 
from US 
European Economic 
Community (EEC) 
Positive  
 
Cushman 
(1987) 
Bilateral FDI from 5 
developed countries 
1 developed country Positive 
Culem (1988) Bilateral FDI from 6 
developed countries 
6 developed countries Positive  
 
Moore (1993) 
 
Bilateral FDI from 
US in manufacturing 
sector 
17 developed countries Positive  
 
Bajo-Rubio and 
Sosvilla-Rivero 
(1994) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developed country Positive 
Billington 
(1999) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
7 developed countries Positive 
 
Globerman and 
Shapiro (1999) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developed country Positive 
Lipsey (2000) 
 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
22 developed countries  Negative  
 
Yang et al. 
(2000) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developed country Insignificant 
Filippaios et al. 
(2003) 
 
Bilateral FDI from 
US 
4 developed countries Negative 
(Australia and 
New Zealand) 
 
Positive (Japan 
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and Korea) 
Kottaridi 
(2005) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
10 developed countries Positive 
Wijeweera and 
Clark (2006) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developed country Positive 
Ham and 
Kleiner (2007) 
Bilateral FDI from 19 
developed countries 
19 developed countries Insignificant 
Wijeweera et 
al. (2007) 
Bilateral FDI from 9 
countries 
1 developed country Positive 
Radulescu and 
Robson (2008) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
19 developed countries Positive in 3 
models and 
negative in 1 
model 
 
Studies on developing host countries or a mix of developed and developing host 
countries 
Author Data type Host country Results  
Stevens (1969) Bilateral FDI from 
US in manufacturing 
sector 
4 developing countries Positive 
(Argentina, 
Brazil, and 
Venezuela) 
 
Insignificant 
(Mexico) 
Reuber et al. 
(1973) 
Bilateral FDI from 
US in manufacturing 
sector 
23 developing countries 
109 developing countries 
Positive  
 
Schneider and 
Frey (1985) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
54 developing countries Positive  
Torrisi (1985) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developing country Positive  
 
Shamsuddin 
(1994) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
36 developing countries Positive 
Tsai (1994) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
62 developing countries Positive 
 
Karier (1995) 
 
Bilateral FDI from 
US in 32 industries 
10 developed and 
developing countries 
Positive 
Singh and Jun 
(1995) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
31 developed and 
developing countries 
Insignificant 
Wang and 
Swain (1995) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
2 developing countries Positive 
Cooke and 
Noble (1998) 
Bilateral FDI from 
US in 9 industries 
33 developed and 
developing countries 
Positive 
 
Morisset 
(2000) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
71 developing countries Positive 
Bende-
Nabende et al. 
(2001) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
5 developing countries Positive 
(Indonesia) 
 
Insignificant 
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(Malaysia, 
Philippines, 
Singapore and 
Thailand) 
Obwona (2001) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developing country Positive 
 
Globerman and 
Shapiro (2002) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
144 developed and 
developing countries 
Positive 
Kucera (2002) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
127 developed and 
developing countries 
Positive 
Trevino et al. 
(2002) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
7 developing countries Positive 
Bengoa and 
Sanchez-
Robles (2003) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
18 developing countries Positive 
Campos and 
Kinoshita 
(2003) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
25 developing countries Insignificant 
Egger and 
Winner (2005) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
73 developed and 
developing countries 
Positive 
Gorg (2005) 
 
Bilateral FDI from 
US 
33 developed and 
developing countries  
Insignificant 
Grosse and 
Trevino (2005) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
13 developing countries Positive 
Asiedu (2006) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
22 developing countries Positive 
Fedderke and 
Romm (2006) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developing country Positive 
Ramirez (2006) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developing country Positive 
Benassy-Quere 
et al. (2007) 
 
Bilateral FDI from 53 
developed and 
developing countries 
50 developed and 
developing countries 
 
Positive 
Greenaway et 
al. (2007) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
54 developing countries Positive  
 
Ang (2008) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developing country Positive  
 
Dewit et al. 
(2009) 
 
Bilateral FDI from 27 
developed and 
developing countries 
27 developed and 
developing countries 
Positive 
Leibrecht and 
Scharler (2009) 
Bilateral FDI from 7 
developed countries 
7 developing countries Positive 
Fukumi and 
Nishijima 
(2010) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
19 developing countries Positive 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
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Furthermore, economic growth can be seen as an indicator of future market potential in 
the host country, whereby higher rate of economic growth ensures long-term 
commitment by foreign investors as it leads to increase in income and consumer 
demand for goods and services (Noorbakhsh et al., 2001). It also implies better 
infrastructure, provides greater incentive for inward FDI (Tsai, 1994) and influences 
positively the business climate for inward FDI (Morisset, 2000). Moreover, rapid 
growth may also give rise to the presence of economic rents that will encourage inward 
FDI (Globerman and Shapiro, 1999). Four empirical studies on developed countries 
indicate the beneficial impact of economic growth on inward FDI, while five studies on 
developed countries show evidence of no significant impact (see Table 3.8). However, 
Filippaios et al. (2003) find some evidence of a negative impact in Japan and Korea. 
They argue that fast growing host economies (Japan and Korea) generate a dynamic 
microeconomic environment such as cultural idiosyncrasy, which deters inward FDI. 
Therefore, we expect that economic growth positively affect inward FDI in developed 
host countries. 
Table 3.8 The effect of economic growth in the host country on inward FDI 
Studies on developed host countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Scaperlanda 
and Mauer 
(1969) 
 
Bilateral FDI from US European 
Economic 
Community 
(EEC) 
Insignificant 
Culem (1988) Bilateral FDI from 6 
developed countries 
6 developed 
countries 
Positive 
Moore (1993) 
 
Bilateral FDI from US 
in manufacturing sector 
17 developed 
countries 
Insignificant 
Billington 
(1999) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
7 developed 
countries 
Positive 
Ford and 
Strange (1999) 
520 Japanese firms‟ 
decision to invest 
abroad 
7 developed 
countries 
Insignificant 
Lipsey (2000) 
 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
22 developed 
countries  
Positive 
Filippaios et 
al. (2003) 
Bilateral FDI from US 4 developed 
countries 
Insignificant (Australia 
and New Zealand) 
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 Negative (Japan and 
Korea) 
De Vita and 
Abbott (2007) 
 
Bilateral FDI from 7 
developed countries in 
manufacturing sector 
1 developed 
country 
Positive 
Radulescu and 
Robson (2008) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
19 developed 
countries 
Insignificant 
 
Studies on developing host countries or a mix of developed and developing host 
countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Schneider and 
Frey (1985) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
54 developing 
countries 
Positive 
Torrisi (1985) FDI from the rest of the 
world 
1 developing 
country 
Insignificant 
Tsai (1994) FDI from the rest of the 
world 
62 developing 
countries 
Insignificant (1975-
1978) 
Positive (1983-1986) 
Singh and Jun 
(1995) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
31 developed 
and developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Wang and 
Swain (1995) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
2 developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Gastanaga et 
al. (1998) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
49 developing 
countries 
Positive 
Bende-
Nabende et al. 
(2001) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
5 developing 
countries 
Positive (Malaysia and 
Thailand) 
 
Negative (Indonesia, 
Philippines and 
Singapore) 
Noorbakhsh et 
al. (2001) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
36 developing 
countries 
Positive 
Obwona 
(2001) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
1 developing 
country 
Positive 
Asiedu (2002) FDI from the rest of the 
world 
71 developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Hsiao and 
Shen (2003) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
23 developing 
countries 
Positive 
Greenaway et 
al. (2007) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
54 developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Naude and 
Krugell (2007) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
43 developing 
countries 
Positive 
Ang (2008) FDI from the rest of the 
world 
1 developing 
country 
Positive 
Moosa (2009) FDI from the rest of the 
world 
18 developing 
countries 
Positive 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
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Agglomeration  
Inward FDI may appear to cluster in certain locations, which is referred as an 
agglomeration effect (Shatz and Venables, 2000; Campos and Kinoshita, 2003). It is 
measured as the past level of inward FDI and is expected to be positively related with 
current level of inward FDI. There are several reasons why past investment influences 
the current investment. First, foreign investors acquire information on market and cost 
conditions in the host country through direct experience, which forms the basis for 
making new investments and results in continued investments by existing foreign 
investors (Kinoshita and Mody, 1997). Thus, foreign investors tend to favour familiar 
countries, and view investing in locations that they do not have enough knowledge of as 
risky decisions (Noorbakhsh et al., 2001). In addition, foreign investors may lack 
knowledge about whether a country is a good location. Thus they view investment 
decisions by others as a good signal, locate where other foreign investors are operating 
and hope to benefit from the same opportunities. Moreover, clustering of inward FDI 
may be due to synergies among firms, linkages among projects, technology spillovers 
and R&D spillovers (Shatz and Venables, 2000; Obwona, 2001; Campos and Kinoshita, 
2003). Finally, the herd effect may occur because of the supply and demand of 
intermediate inputs (Shatz and Venables, 2000; Campos and Kinoshita, 2003). Most 
empirical studies on developed countries find a positive effect of past inward FDI on 
current inward FDI. However, Yang et al. (2000) find an insignificant effect (see Table 
3.9). Therefore, we expect that the past inward FDI and current inward FDI are 
positively related in developed host countries.  
Table 3.9 The effect of agglomeration in the host country on inward FDI 
Studies on developed host countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Ford and Strange 
(1999) 
520 Japanese firms‟ 
decision to invest 
abroad 
7 developed countries Positive 
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Lipsey (2000) FDI from the rest of the 
world 
22 developed countries Positive 
Yang et al. (2000) FDI from the rest of the 
world 
1 developed country Insignificant 
De Vita and 
Abbott (2007) 
Bilateral FDI from 7 
developed countries in 
manufacturing sector 
1 developed country Positive 
Radulescu and 
Robson (2008) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
19 developed countries Positive 
 
Studies on developing host countries or a mix of developed and developing host 
countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Singh and Jun 
(1995) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
31 developed and 
developing countries 
Positive 
Gastanaga et al. 
(1998) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
49 developing countries Positive 
Noorbakhsh et al. 
(2001) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
36 developing countries Positive 
Campos and 
Kinoshita (2003) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
25 developing countries Positive 
Hsiao and Shen 
(2003) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
23 developing countries Positive 
Gorg (2005) 
 
Bilateral FDI from US 33 developed and 
developing countries  
Positive 
Naude and Krugell 
(2007) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
43 developing countries Negative 
Bhaumik and 
Dimova (2009) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
86 developing countries Positive 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
Trade barrier and trade openness 
FDI might be undertaken to gain access to the market in the host country because of 
trade barriers. So high trade barriers in the host country provide a disincentive for 
exports and an incentive for inward FDI (Scaperlanda and Mauer, 1969; Goldberg, 1972, 
Culem, 1988; Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero, 1994). Therefore, FDI is viewed as a 
substitute for trade and open economies should receive fewer inward FDI (Moosa, 
2002). Empirical studies on developed countries seek to test this hypothesis, but fail to 
produce conclusive results. Eight studies find a positive impact of trade barrier on 
inward FDI, while six studies find an insignificant impact (see Table 3.10).  
            Chapter 3 Economic theories and empirical literature 
47 
 
Table 3.10 The effect of trade barrier in the host country on inward FDI 
Studies on developed host countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Scaperlanda and 
Mauer (1969) 
FDI from US European Economic 
Community (EEC) 
Insignificant 
Goldberg 
(1972) 
FDI from US European Economic 
Community (EEC) 
Insignificant 
Schmitz and 
Bieri (1972) 
FDI from US European Economic 
Community (EEC) 
Positive 
Lunn (1980) 
 
FDI from US European Economic 
Community (EEC) 
Positive 
Lunn (1983) 
 
FDI from US European Economic 
Community (EEC) 
Insignificant 
Scaperlanda and 
Balough (1983) 
Manufacturing FDI 
from US 
European Economic 
Community (EEC) 
Positive  
Culem (1988) 
 
Bilateral FDI from 6 
developed countries 
6 developed countries Insignificant 
Kogut and 
Chang (1991) 
FDI from Japanese 
firms in 297 industries 
1 developed country Positive 
Drake and 
Caves (1992) 
Bilateral FDI from 
Japan in 102 
industries 
1 developed country Positive 
Moore (1993) 
 
Bilateral FDI from 
Germany in 
manufacturing sector 
17 developed 
countries 
Insignificant  
Bajo-Rubio and 
Sosvilla-Rivero 
(1994) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developed country  Positive 
Neven and 
Siotis (1996) 
 
Bilateral FDI from US 
and Japan in 8 
industries 
4 developed countries Bilateral FDI from 
US to 4 developed 
countries 
Positive 
 
Bilateral FDI from 
Japan to 4 
developed 
countries 
Insignificant 
Barrell and Pain 
(1999) 
Bilateral FDI from 
Japan 
7 developed countries Positive 
 
Studies on developing host countries or a mix of developed and developing host 
countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Karier (1995) 
 
Bilateral FDI from US 
in 32 industries 
10 developed and 
developing countries 
Positive 
Wang and 
Swain (1995) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
2 developing countries Insignificant 
(Hungary) 
Negative (China) 
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Gastanaga et al. 
(1998) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
49 developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Bognanno et al. 
(2005) 
Bilateral FDI from US 
in 7 industries 
22 developed and 
developing countries 
Positive 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
However, more recent studies believe that trade openness might lead to a better business 
climate through enhanced expectations of economic growth prospects, whereby open 
economies may encourage more inward FDI (Lim, 2001). However, only one empirical 
study on developed countries supports the above hypothesis, while two studies on 
developed countries do not find any significant relationship. In addition, three studies 
on developed countries find that trade openness negatively influences inward FDI (see 
Table 3.11). For example, Filippaios et al. (2003) argue that the negative link between 
trade openness and inward FDI indicates that inward FDI is used to cater for the local 
market in the host countries, while Yang et al. (2000) argue that inward FDI is a 
substitute for trade  and it is used to avoid trade barriers. Hence, we expect a positive or 
negative impact of trade openness on inward FDI.  
Table 3.11 The effect of trade openness in the host country on inward FDI 
Studies on developed host countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Billington (1999) FDI from the rest of the 
world 
7 developed countries Insignificant 
Lipsey (2000) FDI from the rest of the 
world 
22 developed 
countries 
Positive 
Yang et al. 
(2000) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
1 developed country Negative 
Filippaios et al. 
(2003) 
Bilateral FDI from US 4 developed countries Negative 
De Vita and 
Abbott (2007) 
Bilateral FDI from 7 
developed countries in 
manufacturing sector 
1 developed country Negative 
Radulescu and 
Robson (2008) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
19 developed 
countries 
Insignificant 
 
Studies on developing host countries or a mix of developed and developing host 
countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Singh and Jun FDI from the rest of the 31 developed and Positive 
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(1995) world developing countries 
Morisset (2000) FDI from the rest of the 
world 
71 developing 
countries 
Positive 
Bende-Nabende 
et al. (2001) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
5 developing countries Positive 
Noorbakhsh et al. 
(2001) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
36 developing 
countries 
Positive 
Asiedu (2002) FDI from the rest of the 
world 
71 developing 
countries 
Positive 
Kucera (2002) FDI from the rest of the 
world 
127 developed and 
developing countries 
Positive 
Greenaway et al. 
(2007) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
54 developing 
countries 
Positive 
Naude and 
Krugell (2007) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
43 developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Ang (2008) FDI from the rest of the 
world 
1 developing country Positive 
Bhaumik and 
Dimova (2009) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
86 developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Fukumi and 
Nishijima (2010) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
19 developing 
countries 
Positive 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
Exchange rate 
Currency devaluation measured by the exchange rate is likely to encourage inward FDI 
in the host country as it makes the host country‟s assets undervalued, reduces the unit 
cost of the host country‟s factor of production and increases the relative wealth position 
of foreign investors (Froot and Stein, 1991; Globerman and Shapiro, 1999; Ramirez, 
2006). However, the counter argument also holds that as foreign investors might take a 
depreciating domestic currency as a signal of future depreciation and thus reduce 
investment (Globerman and Shapiro, 1999). Moreover, Ramirez (2006) also argues that 
the appreciation of the domestic currency might attract inward FDI as it enhances the 
foreign currency value of the remittances of profits and dividends back to the parent 
company. Empirical studies on developed countries reach mixed conclusions about the 
effect of exchange rate on FDI. Four studies find a positive link, four studies find a 
negative link and four studies do not find a link between the two variables (see Table 
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3.12). Therefore, we expect that exchange rate has a positive or negative impact on 
inward FDI in developed host countries. 
Table 3.12 The effect of exchange rate in the host country on inward FDI 
Studies on developed host countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Slemrod (1989) 
 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developed 
country 
Negative 
Drake and 
Caves (1992) 
 
Bilateral FDI from 
Japan in 102 
industries 
1 developed 
country 
Positive 
Pain (1993) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developed 
country 
Negative 
Bajo-Rubio and 
Sosvilla-Rivero 
(1994) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developed 
country 
Negative in the short-
run and insignificant 
in the long-run 
Cooke (1997) 
 
Bilateral FDI from US 
in 9 industries 
19 developed 
countries 
Positive 
Globerman and 
Shapiro (1999) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developed 
country 
Positive 
Yang et al. 
(2000) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developed 
country 
Insignificant 
Wijeweera and 
Clark (2006) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developed 
country 
Insignificant 
De Vita and 
Abbott (2007) 
Bilateral FDI from 7 
developed countries in 
manufacturing sector 
1 developed 
country 
Insignificant 
Wijeweera et al. 
(2007) 
Bilateral FDI from 9 
developed countries 
1 developed 
country 
Positive 
Radulescu and 
Robson (2008) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
19 developed 
countries 
Negative 
 
Studies on developing host countries or a mix of developed and developing host 
countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Singh and Jun 
(1995) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
31 developed and 
developing 
countries 
Negative 
Wang and 
Swain (1995) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
2 developing 
countries 
Positive (China) 
Insignificant 
(Hungary) 
Cooke and 
Noble (1998) 
Bilateral FDI from US 
in 9 industries 
33 developed and 
developing 
countries 
Positive 
Kucera (2002) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
127 developed and 
developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Trevino et al. FDI from the rest of 7 developing Insignificant 
            Chapter 3 Economic theories and empirical literature 
51 
 
(2002) the world countries 
Grosse and 
Trevino (2005) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
13 developing 
countries 
Negative 
Ramirez (2006) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developing 
country 
Negative 
Ang (2008) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developing 
country 
Negative 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
Note: An increase in exchange rate means a devaluation of the currency in the host country and a 
decrease in exchange rate means an appreciation of the currency in the host country. 
 
Inflation rate 
Inflation rate is used to capture macroeconomic instability and is expected to negatively 
influence inward FDI. According to de Mello (1997), high inflation rate increases the 
user cost of capital in the host country and negatively influences profitability of FDI. 
Two empirical studies on developed countries find a negative relationship between 
inflation rate and inward FDI (see Table 3.13). Therefore, we expect a negative impact 
of inflation rate on inward FDI in developed host countries.  
Table 3.13 The effect of inflation rate in the host country on inward FDI 
Studies on developed host countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Bajo-Rubio and 
Sosvilla-Rivero (1994) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developed country Negative 
Yang et al. (2000) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developed country Negative 
 
Studies on developing host countries  
Author Data type Host country Results 
Schneider and Frey 
(1985) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
54 developing 
countries 
Negative 
Obwona (2001) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developing country Insignificant 
Asiedu (2002) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
71 developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Trevino et al. (2002) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
7 developing countries Negative 
Bengoa and Sanchez-
Robles (2003) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
18 developing 
countries 
Negative 
Campos and Kinoshita 
(2003) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
25 developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Grosse and Trevino 
(2005) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
13 developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
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Asiedu (2006) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
22 developing 
countries 
Negative 
Greenaway et al. 
(2007) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
54 developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Naude and Krugell 
(2007) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
43 developing 
countries 
Negative 
Fukumi and Nishijima 
(2010) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
19 developing 
countries 
Negative 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
Corporate tax rate 
Higher corporate tax rate has a disincentive effect on attracting inward FDI as it 
increases the cost of business (Hsiao and Shen, 2003) and  lowers the return of 
investment (Fedderke and Romm, 2006). Looking at the empirical literature on 
developed countries, it is found to exert a negative effect on inward FDI in the majority 
of studies and is found to be insignificant in two studies (see Table 3.14). Therefore, we 
expect that corporate tax and inward FDI are negatively associated in developed host 
countries. 
Table 3.14 The effect of corporate tax in the host country on inward FDI 
Studies on developed host countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Slemrod (1989) 
 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developed country Negative 
Cooke (1997) 
 
Bilateral FDI from 
US in 9 industries 
19 developed 
countries 
Negative 
Billington (1999) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
7 developed 
countries 
Negative  
Wijeweera and 
Clark (2006) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developed country Negative in the long 
run and insignificant 
in the short run 
Wijeweera et al. 
(2007) 
Bilateral FDI from 9 
developed countries 
1 developed country Negative 
Ham and Kleiner 
(2007) 
Bilateral FDI from 
19 developed 
countries 
19 developed 
countries 
Negative 
Radulescu and 
Robson (2008) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
19 developed 
countries 
Insignificant 
 
Studies on developing host countries or a mix of developed and developing host 
countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
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Cooke and Noble 
(1998) 
Bilateral FDI from 
US in 9 industries 
33 developed and 
developing countries 
Negative 
Gastanaga et al. 
(1998) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
49 developing 
countries 
Negative 
Hsiao and Shen 
(2003) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
23 developing 
countries 
Negative 
Bognanno et al. 
(2005) 
Bilateral FDI from 
US in 7 industries 
22 developed and 
developing countries 
Insignificant 
Gorg (2005) 
 
Bilateral FDI from 
US 
33 developed and 
developing countries  
Negative 
Javorcik and 
Spatareanu 
(2005) 
FDI from 10,000 
European firms 
19 developed and 
developing countries 
Negative 
Fedderke and 
Romm (2006) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developing country Negative 
Ang (2008) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
1 developing country Negative 
Leibrecht and 
Scharler (2009) 
Bilateral FDI from 7 
developed countries 
7 developing 
countries 
Negative 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
Human capital  
The quality of labour force is supposed to be a positive determinant of FDI location 
decision. Campos and Kinoshita (2003) argue that it is easier for local educated workers 
to learn new technology and it costs less for foreign investors to train local educated 
workers. However, empirical studies on developed countries use different measures of 
human capital such as the average years of education by Cooke (1997), the number of 
students in upper secondary education as a percentage of total population by Ford and 
Strange (1999) and high school graduation rate by Ham and Kleiner (2007). All three 
studies on developed countries support the hypothesis that good human capital attracts 
inward FDI (see Table 3.15). Therefore, we expect a positive correlation between 
human capital and inward FDI in developed host countries.  
Table 3.15 The effect of human capital in the host country on inward FDI 
Studies on developed host countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Cooke (1997) 
 
FDI from US in 9 
industries 
19 developed 
countries 
Positive 
Ford and FDI from 520 7 developed Positive 
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Strange (1999) Japanese firms countries 
Ham and 
Kleiner (2007) 
 
Bilateral FDI from 
19 developed 
countries 
19 developed 
countries 
Positive 
 
Studies on developing host countries or a mix of developed and developing host 
countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Schneider and 
Frey (1985) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
54 developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Cooke and 
Noble (1998) 
Bilateral FDI from 
US in 9 industries 
33 developed and 
developing countries 
Positive 
Morisset (2000) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
71 developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Bende-Nabende 
et al. (2001) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
5 developing 
countries 
Positive (Malaysia, 
Singapore and 
Thailand) 
Negative (Philippines) 
Insignificant 
(Indonesia) 
Noorbakhsh et 
al. (2001) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
36 developing 
countries 
Positive 
Globerman and 
Shapiro (2002) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
144 developed and 
developing countries 
Positive 
Kucera (2002) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
127 developed and 
developing countries 
Insignificant 
Campos and 
Kinoshita 
(2003) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
25 developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Hsiao and Shen 
(2003) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
23 developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Egger and 
Winner (2005) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
73 developed and 
developing countries 
Positive 
Asiedu (2006) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
22 developing 
countries 
Positive 
Bhaumik and 
Dimova (2009) 
FDI from the rest of 
the world 
86 developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Moosa (2009) FDI from the rest of 
the world 
18 developing 
countries 
Positive 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
Infrastructure  
Good infrastructure development increases the attractiveness of countries to inward FDI 
as it lowers transaction costs (Fedderke and Romm, 2006), increases the productivity of 
investments (Asiedu, 2002) and is therefore seen as a necessary condition for foreign 
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investors to operate successfully (Peck, 1996). However, the empirical studies on 
developed countries find the impact of infrastructure insignificant (see Table 3.16). 
Wijeweera et al. (2007) argue that developed countries have good infrastructure, so 
foreign investors do not consider it as an important factor when investing in developed 
countries. Therefore, we expect an insignificant effect of infrastructure on inward FDI 
in developed host countries.  
Table 3.16 The effect of infrastructure in the host country on inward FDI 
Studies on developed host countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Billington (1999) FDI from the rest 
of the world 
7 developed 
countries 
Insignificant 
Wijeweera et al. 
(2007) 
Bilateral FDI 
from 9 developed 
countries 
1 developed 
country  
Insignificant 
 
Studies on developing host countries  
Author Data type Host country Results 
Morisset (2000) FDI from the rest 
of the world 
71 developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Bende-Nabende et 
al. (2001) 
FDI from the rest 
of the world 
5 developing 
countries 
Positive (Indonesia,  
Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand) 
Insignificant (Malaysia)  
Asiedu (2002) FDI from the rest 
of the world 
71 developing 
countries 
Positive 
Bengoa and 
Sanchez-Robles 
(2003) 
FDI from the rest 
of the world 
18 developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Campos and 
Kinoshita (2003) 
FDI from the rest 
of the world 
25 developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Hsiao and Shen 
(2003) 
FDI from the rest 
of the world 
23 developing 
countries 
Positive 
Asiedu (2006) FDI from the rest 
of the world 
22 developing 
countries 
Positive 
Naude and Krugell 
(2007) 
FDI from the rest 
of the world 
43 developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Ang (2008) FDI from the rest 
of the world 
1 developing 
country 
Positive 
Moosa (2009) FDI from the rest 
of the world 
18 developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
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Political instability or country risk 
A country with higher risk or instability is less appealing to FDI. Political instability or 
country risk may disrupt the economic process (Schneider and Frey, 1985), create 
uncertainty (Grosse and Trevino, 2005; Fedderke and Romm, 2006), cause unexpected 
modifications of the legal and fiscal frameworks (Moosa, 2002) and incur higher costs 
to foreign investors (Trevino et al., 2002; Grosse and Trevino, 2005). Therefore it 
lowers the return to foreign investors and is predicted to be a deterrent to FDI. However, 
there is no empirical study on the effect of political instability or country risk on inward 
FDI in developed countries (see Table 3.17). The possible reason is that developed 
countries are politically stable, so it is not a crucial factor influencing the amount of 
inward FDI.  Therefore, we expect that political instability or country risk does not have 
a significant impact on inward FDI in developed countries.  
Table 3.17 The effect of political instability or country risk in the host country on 
inward FDI 
Studies on developing host countries or a mix of developed and developing host 
countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Schneider and Frey 
(1985) 
FDI from the rest 
of the world 
54 developing countries Negative 
Singh and Jun 
(1995) 
FDI from the rest 
of the world 
31 developed and developing 
countries 
Negative 
Wang and Swain 
(1995) 
FDI from the rest 
of the world 
2 developing countries Negative 
Cooke and Noble 
(1998) 
Bilateral FDI from 
US in 9 industries 
33 developed and developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Gastanaga et al. 
(1998) 
FDI from the rest 
of the world 
49 developing countries Negative 
Noorbakhsh et al. 
(2001) 
FDI from the rest 
of the world 
36 developing countries Insignificant 
Asiedu (2002) FDI from the rest 
of the world 
71 developing countries Insignificant 
Trevino et al. 
(2002) 
FDI from the rest 
of the world 
7 developing countries Insignificant 
Grosse and Trevino 
(2005) 
FDI from the rest 
of the world 
13 developing countries Negative 
Asiedu (2006) FDI from the rest 
of the world 
22 developing countries Negative 
Fedderke and FDI from the rest 1 developing country Negative 
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Romm (2006) of the world 
Ramirez (2006) FDI from the rest 
of the world 
1 developing country Negative 
Naude and Krugell 
(2007) 
FDI from the rest 
of the world 
43 developing countries Negative 
Moosa (2009) FDI from the rest 
of the world 
18 developing countries Negative 
Leibrecht and 
Scharler (2009) 
Bilateral FDI from 
7 developed 
countries 
7 developing countries Insignificant 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
Corruption and rule of law 
Host country institutions assess business operation conditions in the host country and 
influence investment decisions. Corruption is expected to deter FDI as it creates 
uncertainty, raises the cost and reduces the profit of foreign firms (Egger and Winner, 
2005; Grosse and Trevino, 2005). In addition, it reduces the productivity of public 
inputs (Egger and Winner, 2005). Rule of law measures the strength and impartiality of 
the legal system (Campos and Kinoshita, 2003; Asiedu, 2006). Therefore, inward FDI is 
attracted to countries with better legal systems. Turning to the empirical literature, there 
are no studies on the association between corruption or rule of law and inward FDI in 
developed countries (see Tables 3.18 and 3.19). Developed countries have good legal 
systems and low corruption, so they are not important determinants of inward FDI. 
Therefore, we expect that corruption or rule of law does not significantly affect inward 
FDI in developed host countries.  
Table 3.18 The effect of corruption in the host country on inward FDI  
Studies on developing host countries or a mix of developed and developing host 
countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Gastanaga et al. 
(1998) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
49 developing countries Negative  
Hsiao and Shen 
(2003) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
23 developing countries Negative 
Bognanno et al. 
(2005) 
Bilateral FDI from US in 
7 industries 
22 developed and 
developing countries 
Negative  
Egger and FDI from the rest of the 73 developed and Negative 
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Winner (2005) world developing countries 
Grosse and 
Trevino (2005) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
13 developing countries Negative 
Asiedu (2006) FDI from the rest of the 
world 
22 developing countries Negative 
Naude and 
Krugell (2007) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
43 developing countries Insignificant 
Bhaumik and 
Dimova (2009) 
FDI from the rest of the 
world 
86 developing countries Insignificant 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
Table 3.19 The effect of rule of law in the host country on inward FDI 
Studies on developing host countries or a mix of developed and developing host 
countries 
Author Data type Host country Results 
Campos and 
Kinoshita (2003) 
FDI from the rest 
of the world 
25 developing 
countries 
Positive 
Grosse and 
Trevino (2005) 
FDI from the rest 
of the world 
13 developing 
countries 
Positive 
Egger and 
Winner (2005) 
FDI from the rest 
of the world 
73 developed and 
developing countries 
Positive 
Asiedu (2006) FDI from the rest 
of the world 
22 developing 
countries 
Positive 
Naude and 
Krugell (2007) 
FDI from the rest 
of the world 
43 developing 
countries 
Positive in 1 model and 
negative in 1 model 
Bhaumik and 
Dimova (2009) 
FDI from the rest 
of the world 
86 developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
3.2.2.5.5 Home country factors that affect outward FDI 
Kyrkilis and Pantelidis (2003) argue that a country‟s outward FDI positively depends on 
domestic firms‟ ability to acquire and utilise internally income yielding assets. 
Furthermore, firms‟ ability is a function of home country specific assets or 
characteristics, such as national income, exchange rate, human capital, openness of the 
economy and so on. Hence, outward FDI can be considered as a function of home 
country specific characteristics (Kyrkilis and Pantelidis, 2003). Moreover, Lipsey (2000) 
believes that the determinants of outward FDI are the same economic characteristics as 
those of inward FDI. Furthermore, Globerman and Shapiro (1999, 2002) argue that 
inward FDI and outward FDI are symmetrical and the same factors that attract foreign 
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firms into a country may also encourage domestic firms to invest abroad. Therefore, we 
incorporate all the factors that might influence inward FDI to examine the determinants 
of outward FDI including labour cost, trade union density, employment protection 
legislation, wage bargaining coordination, R&D expenditure, market size, economic 
growth, agglomeration, trade barrier, trade openness, exchange rate, inflation rate, 
corporate tax, human capital, infrastructure, political instability, country risk, corruption 
and rule of law. 
 
Labour cost 
High labour cost in the home country can be an important motivation for outward FDI 
as the domestic firms tend to invest abroad to reduce the cost of production and home 
country becomes less attractive to domestic firms (Globerman and Shapiro, 1999; 
Banga, 2007). However, the relationship could be positive if higher labour cost reflects 
a higher labour skill level (Noorbakhsh et al., 2001). Three studies on developed 
countries confirm a positive linkage between labour cost and outward FDI (see Table 
3.20). Therefore, based on economic theory and empirical literature, we expect that 
labour cost positively or negatively affects outward FDI in developed home countries. 
Table 3.20 The effect of labour cost in the home country on outward FDI 
Studies on developed home countries 
Author Data type Home country Results 
Cushamn (1987) 
 
Bilateral FDI to 5 developed 
countries 
1 developed country Positive 
Barrell and Pain 
(1996) 
FDI of a sample of American 
firms to the rest of the world 
1 developed country Positive 
Globerman and 
Shapiro (1999) 
FDI to the rest of the world 1 developed country Positive 
 
Studies on developing home countries 
Author Data type Home country Results 
Banga (2007) FDI to the rest of the world 13 developing countries Positive 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
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Union density 
Karier (1995) argues that strong unions in the home country might encourage outward 
FDI as they raise wages, increase production costs and create a comparative 
disadvantage in the home country. However, the relationship can be negative if unions 
raise productivity, which offsets higher wages (Karier, 1995). Only one empirical study 
on developed countries addresses this issue and does not find any significant 
relationship between the two variables (see Table 3.21). Therefore, based on economic 
theory and empirical literature, we expect a positive or negative impact of trade union 
density on outward FDI in developed home countries.  
Table 3.21 The effect of union density in the home country on outward FDI 
Studies on developed home countries 
Author Data type Home country Results 
Karier (1995) Bilateral FDI to 10 
developed and developing 
countries in 32 industries  
1 developed country Insignificant  
 
Studies on developing home countries 
Author Data type Home country Results 
Banga (2007) FDI to the rest of the world 13 developing countries Insignificant 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
Employment protection legislation 
According to Dewit et al. (2009), employment protection restriction in the home 
country incurs employment adjustment costs for domestic firms and provides an 
impetus for outward FDI. On the other hand, rigid domestic employment protection 
legislation may help the home country retain domestic firms, increase domestic 
employment, thus reduce outward FDI (Dewit et al., 2009). Turning to the empirical 
literature on developed countries, Benassy-Quere et al. (2007) suggest that employment 
protection legislation in the home country does not have a significant impact on outward 
FDI. Another study by Dewit et al. (2009) finds that employment protection rigidity in 
the home country can help to anchor domestic firms and make them reluctant to invest 
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abroad (see Table 3.22). Therefore, based on economic theory and empirical literature, 
we expect a positive or negative association between employment protection legislation 
and outward FDI in developed home countries. 
Table 3.22 The effect of employment protection legislation in the home country on 
outward FDI 
Studies on a mix of developed and developing home countries 
Author Data type Home country Results 
Benassy-Quere et 
al. (2007) 
Bilateral FDI to 50 developed 
and developing countries 
53 developed and 
developing 
countries  
Insignificant 
Dewit et al. 
(2009) 
Bilateral FDI to 27 developed 
and developing countries 
27 developed and 
developing 
countries 
Negative 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
Note: A high index shows a rigid employment protection legislation. 
 
Bargaining coordination 
In terms of bargaining coordination, Radulescu and Robson (2008) believe that firms 
tend to decide their own firm-level wages and employment conditions. Therefore, 
countries with coordinated wage bargaining are more likely to get involved in outward 
FDI. However, outward FDI might be lower in countries with coordinated wage 
bargaining system as it might secure a lower rate of growth in aggregate real wages, 
reduce labour turnover and decrease labour recruitment costs (Whyman et al., 2008). 
For empirical studies in relation to outward FDI and bargaining coordination, there is no 
study on this topic. Therefore, based on economic theory, we expect that coordinated 
wage bargaining system positively or negatively affects outward FDI in developed 
home countries. 
 
R&D expenditure 
According to the notion of ownership advantages in the eclectic paradigm, a firm sets 
up its production facilities abroad through FDI to exploit its ownership advantages such 
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as advanced technology, marketing and management expertise, etc. Hence, FDI 
transfers technology from the home country to the host country. For example, R&D 
expenditure leads to the creation of advanced technology (Kogut and Chang, 1991). 
Therefore, outward FDI and R&D expenditure in the home country are positively 
correlated. However, the motive of foreign investors to invest in a host country might be 
to access technology in the host country and transfer it to the home country. In that case, 
outward FDI and R&D expenditure in the home country might be negatively associated. 
Three empirical studies on developed countries find that R&D expenditure in the home 
country and outward FDI are positively correlated. However, no correlation is observed 
by Vannoni (1999) (see Table 3.23). Therefore, based on economic theory and 
empirical literature, we expect that R&D expenditure has a positive or negative impact 
on outward FDI in developed home countries. 
 Table 3.23 The effect of R&D expenditure in the home country on outward FDI 
Studies on developed home countries 
Author Data type Home country Results 
Kogut and 
Chang (1991) 
Bilateral FDI to US in 297 
industries 
1 developed country Positive 
Drake and 
Caves (1992) 
Bilateral FDI to US in 102 
industries 
1 developed country Positive 
Vannoni (1999) Bilateral FDI to 10 developed 
countries 
1 developed country Insignificant 
Love (2003) 
 
Bilateral FDI to 7 developed 
countries in 8 industries 
1 developed country Positive 
 
Studies on developing home countries 
Author Data type Home country Results 
Lin and Yeh 
(2005) 
FDI to the rest of world in 1 
industry  
1 developing country Positive 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
Market size and economic growth 
Market size and economic growth are positively related with outward FDI. With higher 
economic performance and development, the banks in the home country are able to 
provide more loans for firms to invest abroad (Wang and Wong, 2007). According to 
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the investment-development path model, the outward FDI increases as the economy 
becomes more developed. Firms are more likely to develop their ownership advantages 
in terms of economies of scale in the production, improvement of marketing expertise, 
invention and adoption of new technology etc. These are competitive advantages for 
firms to undertake foreign production (Globerman and Shapiro, 1999; Kyrkilis and 
Pantelidis, 2003; Kueh et al., 2009). Most studies on developed countries find positive 
effects of market size and economic growth on outward FDI. However, Lipsey (2000) 
finds that large countries invest less FDI abroad, while rich countries invest more (see 
Tables 3.24 and 3.25). Therefore, based on economic theory and empirical literature, we 
expect that market size and economic growth have positive impacts on outward FDI in 
developed home countries. 
Table 3.24 The effect of market size variables in the home country on outward FDI 
Studies on developed home countries 
Author Data type Home country Results 
Globerman and 
Shapiro (1999) 
FDI to the rest of the 
world 
1 developed country Positive  
Lipsey (2000) FDI to the rest of the 
world 
22 developed countries Negative  
 
Kyrkilis and 
Pantelidis (2003) 
FDI to the rest of the 
world 
5 developed countries Positive  
Wang and Wong 
(2007) 
FDI to the rest of the 
world 
25 developed countries Positive 
Leibrecht and 
Scharler (2009) 
Bilateral FDI to 7 
developing countries 
7 developed countries Positive 
 
Studies on developing home countries or a mix of developed and developing home 
countries 
Author Data type Home country Results 
Globerman and 
Shapiro (2002) 
FDI to the rest of the 
world 
144 developed and 
developing countries 
Positive  
Kyrkilis and 
Pantelidis (2003) 
FDI to the rest of the 
world 
4 developing countries Positive (Brazil) 
Insignificant 
(Korea, 
Singapore and 
Argentina) 
Wang and Wong 
(2007) 
FDI to the rest of the 
world 
20 developing countries Positive  
Banga (2007) FDI to the rest of the 
world 
13 developing countries Insignificant  
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Benassy-Quere et 
al. (2007) 
 
Bilateral FDI to 50 
developed and 
developing countries 
53 developed and 
developing countries 
Positive  
Dewit et al. 
(2009) 
 
Bilateral FDI to 27 
developed and 
developing countries 
27 developed and 
developing countries 
Positive  
Kueh et al. 
(2009) 
FDI to the rest of the 
world 
1 developing country Positive 
Williams (2009) FDI to the rest of the 
world 
15 developing countries Positive  
 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
Table 3.25 The effect of market potential in the home country on outward FDI 
Studies on developed home countries 
Author Data type Home country Results 
Lipsey (2000) FDI to the rest of the world 22 developed countries Positive  
 
Studies on developing home countries  
Author Data type Home country Results 
Williams (2009) FDI to the rest of the world 15 developing countries Positive 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
Past level of outward FDI 
Past level of outward FDI might positively affect the current level of outward FDI. 
There are several reasons why past investment influences the current investment. First, 
domestic investors acquire information on market and cost conditions in a foreign 
country through direct experience, which forms the basis for making new investments 
and results in continued investments by existing investors in the same foreign location 
(Kinoshita and Mody, 1997). Moreover, the positive effect may be due to synergies 
among firms, linkages among projects, technology spillovers, R&D spillovers, the 
supply and demand of intermediate inputs (Shatz and Venables, 2000; Obwona, 2001; 
Campos and Kinoshita, 2003). Three empirical studies on developed countries confirm 
the positive impact. However, Shapiro (1980) fails to find a significant link between the 
two variables (see Table 3.26). Therefore, we expect that past level of outward FDI and 
current level of outward FDI are positively related.  
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Table 3.26 The effect of past level of outward FDI in the home country on current level 
of outward FDI 
Studies on developed home countries 
Author Data type Home country Results 
Shapiro (1980) FDI to the rest of the world 1 developed country Insignificant 
Lipsey (2000) FDI to the rest of the world 22 developed 
countries 
Positive 
Gorg (2005) 
 
Bilateral FDI to 33 
developed and developing 
countries 
1 developed country Positive 
De Vita and 
Abbott (2007) 
Bilateral FDI to UK in 
manufacturing sector 
7 developed countries Positive 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
Trade Openness 
Trade openness in the home country is quite often measured as the sum of imports and 
exports as a percentage of GDP and it is positively related with outward FDI. Higher 
levels of exports enable firms to get access to foreign markets, to acquire information 
about foreign markets and to get knowledge about organizing foreign operations. 
Therefore, the uncertainty and risk of outward FDI are reduced (Kyrkilis and Pantelidis, 
2003; Banga, 2007; Kueh et al., 2009). Higher levels of imports may increase the 
competition between foreign firms and domestic firms. Thus, it may encourage 
domestic firms to invest in foreign countries where production cost is lower and market 
size is larger (Banga, 2007). However, the effect of trade openness could be negative if 
exports and outward FDI are substitutes. In terms of empirical literature on developed 
countries, three studies find that trade openness encourages outward FDI, while Kyrkills 
and Pantelidis (2003) do not find a significant relationship between the two variables in 
France, Italy, Netherlands and UK (see Table 3.27). Therefore, based on economic 
theory and empirical literature, we expect a positive or negative association between 
trade openness and outward FDI in developed home countries.  
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Table 3.27 The effect of trade openness in the home country on outward FDI 
Studies on developed home countries 
Author Data type Home country Results 
Lipsey (2000) FDI to the rest 
of the world 
22 developed 
countries 
Positive 
Kyrkilis and 
Pantelidis (2003) 
FDI to the rest 
of the world 
5 developed 
countries 
Positive (Germany) 
Insignificant (France, 
Italy, Netherlands and 
UK) 
Wang and Wong 
(2007) 
FDI to the rest 
of the world 
25 developed 
countries 
Positive 
 
Studies on developing home countries 
Author Data type Home country Results 
Kyrkilis and 
Pantelidis (2003) 
FDI to the rest 
of the world 
4 developing 
countries 
Positive (Korea and 
Argentina) 
Insignificant (Brazil and 
Singapore) 
Wang and Wong 
(2007) 
FDI to the rest 
of the world 
20 developing 
countries 
Positive 
Kueh et al. 
(2009) 
FDI to the rest 
of the world 
1 developing country Positive 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
Exchange rate 
Currency appreciation in the home country might lead to an increase in outward FDI. It 
reduces costs of acquiring foreign assets in domestic currency units, helps firms raise 
capital easier (Kyrkilis and Pantelidis, 2003; Wang and Wong, 2007). In addition, it 
might reduce the incentive for exports, thus increasing the motive for foreign 
investments (Kyrkilis and Pantelidis, 2003). However, Globerman and Shapiro (1999) 
argue that the relationship could be opposite. Currency depreciation in the home country 
may be viewed as a signal of future depreciation leading to more investment abroad. 
The empirical studies on developed countries have failed to produce conclusive results. 
Two studies find a positive impact of exchange rate on outward FDI, five studies find a 
negative impact and three studies do not find any significant impact (see Table 3.28). 
Therefore, we expect that exchange rate positively or negatively influences outward FDI 
in developed home countries.  
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Table 3.28 The effect of exchange rate in the home country on outward FDI 
Studies on developed home countries 
Author Data type Home country Results 
Drake and Caves 
(1992) 
Bilateral FDI to 
US in 102 
industries 
1 developed 
country 
Negative 
Barrell and Pain 
(1996) 
FDI of a sample of 
American firms to 
the rest of the 
world 
1 developed 
country  
Negative in short-run and 
positive in long-run 
Globerman and 
Shapiro (1999) 
FDI to the rest of 
the world 
1 developed 
country 
Insignificant 
Kyrkilis and 
Pantelidis (2003) 
FDI to the rest of 
the world 
5 developed 
countries 
Positive (Germany and 
UK)  
Negative (France) 
Insignificant (Italy and 
Netherlands) 
De Vita and 
Abbott (2007) 
 
Bilateral FDI to 
UK in 
manufacturing 
sector 
7 developed 
countries 
Insignificant 
Wang and Wong 
(2007) 
FDI to the rest of 
the world 
25 developed 
countries 
Negative 
Wijeweera et al. 
(2007) 
Bilateral FDI to 
US 
9 developed 
countries 
Negative 
 
Studies on developing home countries 
Author Data type Home country Results 
Lin and Szenberg 
(1998) 
FDI to the rest 
of the world 
1 developing 
country 
Negative  
Kyrkilis and 
Pantelidis (2003) 
FDI to the rest 
of the world 
4 developing 
countries 
Positive (Argentina) 
Negative (Brazil and 
Singapore)  
Insignificant (Korea) 
Wang and Wong 
(2007) 
FDI to the rest 
of the world 
20 developing 
countries 
Insignificant 
Kueh et al. 
(2009) 
FDI to the rest 
of the world 
1 developing 
country 
Positive 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
Note: An increase in exchange rate means depreciation of the currency in the home country and a 
decrease in exchange rate means appreciation of the currency in the home country. 
 
Inflation rate 
A high inflation rate in the home country may encourage outward FDI as it increases 
production cost in the home market (Williams, 2009) and lowers real return from 
domestic investment (Wang and Wong, 2007). However, only one study on developed 
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countries finds evidence of the above hypothesis, while another study on developed 
countries finds that the relationship between the two variables is insignificant (see Table 
3.29). Therefore, we expect that inflation rate and outward FDI are positively correlated 
in developed home countries.  
Table 3.29 The effect of inflation rate in the home country on outward FDI 
Studies on developed home countries 
Author Data type Home country Results 
Shapiro (1980) FDI to the rest of the 
world 
1 developed country Insignificant 
Wang and Wong 
(2007) 
FDI to the rest of the 
world 
25 developed countries Positive 
 
Studies on developing home countries 
Author Data type Home country Results 
Wang and Wong 
(2007) 
FDI to the rest of the 
world 
20 developing countries Insignificant 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
Corporate tax rate 
High corporate tax rate in the home country reduces the after-tax rate of return to 
domestic firms, which leads them to invest abroad (Wijeweera et al., 2007). There is 
only one empirical study on developed countries, which confirms the positive impact of 
corporate tax (see Table 3.30). Therefore, we expect that corporate tax rate positively 
influences outward FDI in developed home countries. 
Table 3.30 The effect of corporate tax in the home country on outward FDI 
Studies on developed home countries 
Author Data type Home country Results 
Wijeweera et al. (2007) Bilateral FDI to US 9 developed countries Positive 
 
Studies on developing home countries 
Author Data type Home country Results 
Banga (2007) FDI to the rest of the 
world 
13 developing countries Positive 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
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Human capital 
Good human capital in the home country gives the domestic firms the ability to acquire 
competitive advantage to invest abroad (Kyrkilis and Pantelidis, 2003). In addition, 
Banga (2007) believes that human capital indicates the capability of domestic firms and 
countries with higher levels of human capital undertake higher investment abroad. 
There is only one empirical study on developed countries, which confirms the beneficial 
effect of human capital (see Table 3.31). Therefore, we expect a positive effect of 
human capital on outward FDI in developed home countries. 
Table 3.31 The effect of human capital in the home country on outward FDI 
Studies on developed home countries 
Author Data type Home country Results 
Kyrkilis and 
Pantelidis (2003) 
FDI to the rest of the 
world 
5 developed countries  Positive  
 
Studies on developing home countries or a mix of developed and developing home 
countries 
Author Data type Home country Results 
Globerman and 
Shapiro (2002) 
FDI to the rest of the 
world 
144 developed and 
developing countries 
Insignificant 
Kyrkilis and 
Pantelidis (2003) 
FDI to the rest of the 
world 
4 developing countries Insignificant 
Banga (2007) FDI to the rest of the 
world 
13 developing countries Positive 
Williams (2009) FDI to the rest of the 
world 
15 developing countries 
 
Insignificant 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
Infrastructure 
Banga (2007) argues that low availability of infrastructure in the home country is 
associated with high infrastructure cost leading to high level of outward FDI. However, 
there are no empirical studies on developed countries addressing this issue (see Table 
3.32). The possible reason is that developed countries have good infrastructure, so we 
do not expect that infrastructure has a significant impact on outward FDI in developed 
home countries.  
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Table 3.32 The effect of infrastructure in the home country on outward FDI 
Studies on developing home countries 
Author Data type Home country Results 
Banga (2007) FDI to the rest of the world 13 developing countries Negative 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
Corruption 
Higher corruption level in the home country increases the cost of doing business and 
stimulates domestic firms to relocate production processes abroad to generate some cost 
savings (Williams, 2009). Therefore, a high level of corruption level in the home 
country is associated with a high level of outward FDI. However, there is no empirical 
literature on developed countries examining the relationship between the two variables 
probably because developed countries have low corruption levels (see Table 3.33). 
Therefore we expect that corruption is not a significant determinant of outward FDI in 
developed home countries.  
Table 3.33 The effect of corruption in the home country on outward FDI 
Studies on developing home countries 
Author Data type Home country Results 
Williams (2009) FDI to the rest of the world 15 developing countries Positive 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
Other variables 
High political instability, high country risk and weak legal system in the home country 
might encourage domestic firms to invest abroad. However, there are no empirical 
studies investigating the impacts of them on outward FDI probably due to the fact that 
developed countries have good legal system and are politically stable. Therefore, they 
are not treated as crucial factors affecting outward FDI and we expect that political 
instability, country risk and rule of law do not have significant effects on outward FDI 
in developed home countries.  
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3.3 Theories of the relationship between FDI and economic growth and 
empirical literature 
This section presents the economic theories on the impact of aggregate inward/outward 
FDI on host/home country‟s economic growth and the impact of host/home country‟s 
economic growth on the amount of aggregate inward/outward FDI. In addition, this 
section also summarizes the findings of empirical studies on the relationship between 
inward/outward FDI and host/home country‟s economic growth using aggregate country 
level data.  
3.3.1 The impact of inward FDI on host country’s economic growth 
3.3.1.1 Neoclassical growth theory  
According to the neoclassical growth model, output is a function of labour and capital, 
technology is considered as an exogenous factor (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). 
Inward FDI is a driving force of growth as it increases capital accumulation in the host 
country. However, it only has short-run effect on economic growth (Ericsson and 
Irandoust, 2001; Asheghian, 2004). 
3.3.1.2 Endogenous growth theory 
Consequently, the research on the long-run impact of inward FDI on growth has led to 
the endogenous growth theory, which emphasizes the importance of knowledge and 
technology in the economic growth process and postulates that technological change is 
an endogenous determinant of economic growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). 
Inward FDI increases long-run economic growth not only through capital accumulation, 
but also through technological progress. Inward FDI can make a positive contribution to 
the host country by supplying advanced technology, product and process innovations 
(Dunning, 1994; Whyman et al., 2008). The entry of foreign firms might stimulate 
domestic firms to protect their market shares and profits, which leads to severe 
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competition, low price, wide consumer choice and high quality standards in the host 
country (Dunning, 1994; Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997; OECD, 2002; Hill, 2009). 
Increased competition may force local firms to use resources more efficiently, to 
develop product and process innovation and to promote technological upgrading, etc 
(Zhang, 2001; OECD, 2002; Ozturk, 2007; Hill, 2009). Therefore, the productivity of 
local firms can be improved by imitating the more advanced technology brought by 
inward FDI, by exploiting existing technology and resources more efficiently or by 
seeking for more advanced technology (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997, Saggi, 2000; 
Ozturk, 2007). Furthermore, inward FDI may create forward and backward linkages as 
foreign firms transfer technology to local suppliers of intermediate goods and customers 
(Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997; Saggi, 2000; Zhang, 2001; OECD, 2002).  
 
Inward FDI may enhance human capital in the host country by introducing the host 
country management practices, organizational and marketing techniques (de Mello, 
1999; Ericsson and Irandoust, 2001). The foreign firms might provide managerial and 
working training to their employees. The important information can be transferred to the 
host country as domestic employees move from foreign to local firms or set up their 
own businesses (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997; Saggi, 2000; OECD, 2002; Meier and 
Rauch, 2005; Hill, 2009). Additionally, the superior skills of foreign firms may 
stimulate local firms to improve or develop their own skills (Hill, 2009). 
3.3.1.3 Other impacts on the host country 
Inward FDI can increase the level of employment in the host country (Baker, 1999; Hill, 
2009; Salvatore, 2012). Another benefit is that it improves the efficiency of resource 
allocation in the host country by engaging in the economic activities where the host 
country has a comparative advantage (Dunning, 1994; Whyman et al., 2008). In 
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addition, the increased competition and demonstration effects encourage domestic firms 
to use resources more efficiently (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997; OECD, 2002). 
Moreover, Inward FDI improves the balance of payments in the host country if inward 
FDI and imports are substitutes (Hill, 2009). Another benefit to the balance of payments 
arises when foreign firms undertake production in the host country and export products 
to other countries (Dunning, 1994; Hill, 2009). Furthermore, the host country can gain 
through tax revenue from foreign profits (Dunning, 1994; Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997). 
Finally, inward FDI has the potential to bring environmental benefits to the host country 
by introducing good practices and clean technologies (OECD, 2002).  
 
Alternatively, there is a risk that foreign technology and working practices cannot 
accommodate local capacities and needs (Dunning, 1994). Additionally, inward FDI 
may transfer the host country‟s advanced technology to the home country, resulting in a 
reduction in the comparative advantages of the host country (Dunning, 1994). Another 
potential drawback is that foreign firms might out-compete local firms and drive local 
firms out of business, which might lead to foreign firms establish monopolies and raise 
prices in the host country‟s market (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997; Hill, 2009). 
Moreover, the balance of payments in the host country may be deteriorated if the 
repatriated profits to the home country are more than the initial capital investment in the 
host country (Hill, 2009) or if inward FDI promotes imports and limits exports in the 
host country (Dunning, 1994; Hill, 2009). In addition, foreign firms may try to lower 
tax paid to the host country through transfer pricing manipulation (Dunning, 1994; 
Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997). Finally, inward FDI might bring harmful impact on the 
host country‟s environment, especially in the extractive and heavy industries (OECD, 
2002).  
            Chapter 3 Economic theories and empirical literature 
74 
 
3.3.2 The impact of outward FDI on home country’s economic growth 
Technology sourcing might be an important motivation behind outward FDI (Neven and 
Siotis, 1996; Love, 2003). Home countries can benefit from potential spillovers if the 
firms that invest abroad access the superior technology, organizational and management 
techniques in the foreign countries and transfer them back to the home country 
(Dunning, 1994; Hill, 2009). Additionally, it may facilitate the formation of inter-firm 
networking and cross-border cooperative alliances, which will benefit the home country 
(Dunning, 1994). 
 
Outward FDI can also exert a positive influence on home country‟s economic growth in 
the following channels. First, outward FDI facilitates firms in the home countries to get 
access to the global market and to expand production/sales in the foreign markets 
(Dunning, 1994; O‟Connor et al., 1998; Wang and Wong, 2007). Second, it can help 
firms in the home country avoid domestic competition and compete with foreign firms 
(O‟Connor et al., 1998). Third, the profits earned by the firms abroad can be repatriated 
to the home country, benefiting its economic development (O‟Connor et al., 1998). 
Moreover, outward FDI may secure raw materials and resources supplies in the foreign 
country and avoid trade barriers to the foreign market (Dunning, 1994; Baker, 1999; 
Salvatore, 2012). In addition, outward FDI may help the home country reduce the 
production costs and increase production efficiency. Finally, the home country‟s 
balance of payments can be improved if the inward flow of foreign profits is more than 
the initial outward investment (Hill, 2009). Furthermore, if outward FDI requires the 
home country to export inputs, intermediate goods, capital equipment etc to the foreign 
countries, it will benefit the balance of payments in the home country (Hill, 2009). The 
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increased exports will have a positive impact on the employment level in the home 
country (O‟Connor et al., 1998; Hill, 2009; Williams, 2009). 
 
In contrast, one harmful effect of outward FDI on the home country is the loss of 
domestic jobs (Salvatore, 2012). Furthermore, the unemployment level increases if 
outward FDI is a substitute for exports (O‟Connor et al., 1998; Hill, 2009). In addition, 
outward FDI might have a detrimental effect on the balance of payments in the home 
country. The balance of payments suffers if the initial outward capital investment is 
more than the subsequent inward foreign profits. The situation will get worse if outward 
FDI and exports are substitutes (Hill, 2009). Moreover, multinational firms can avoid 
domestic monetary policies due to their access to international capital markets, which 
might create difficulties on government control over the home country‟s economy 
(Salvatore, 2012). Finally, there are costs of adjusting to local language and culture, 
adapting to local business practices and customer needs, learning about the quality of 
local infrastructure etc (Dunning, 1994). 
3.3.3 The impact of economic growth on inward/outward FDI 
The previous section discussed the possible effects of inward/outward FDI on 
host/home country‟s economic growth. However, there might be a reverse relationship 
from economic growth to inward/outward FDI. Ignoring the feedback relationship 
might lead to biased empirical results and restrict the dynamics (Kim and Seo, 2003).  
3.3.3.1 Investment development path 
Dunning (1981) puts forward the investment development path, which suggests that 
inward and outward direct investment positions of a country are related to its economic 
development. The basic hypothesis is that as country develops, the OLI (Ownership, 
Location, Internalization) advantages facing its indigenous firms that might invest 
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abroad and foreign firms that might invest in the country change. As a consequence, the 
amounts of inward and outward FDI also change. The investment development path 
identifies that countries tend to go through five stages of development (Dunning, 1993; 
Dunning and Narula, 1996; Dunning, 2001). Figure 3.1 shows the pattern of the 
investment development path. The horizontal line represents GNP. The vertical line 
represents net outward investment (NOI) position, which is the gross outward direct 
investment stock outside a country‟s national boundaries minus the gross inward direct 
investment stock within its boundaries. 
 
Stage 1  
In stage 1, a country is under pre-industrialisation stage with low level of income, the 
only location advantage to attract foreign firms is the possession of natural resources. 
The lack of location advantages may be due to small domestic market, undeveloped 
economic systems, inappropriate government policies, inadequate infrastructure and the 
lack of educated workforce. Inward FDI is likely to occur in the primary good sector 
and labour-intensive manufacturing sectors to supply the local or export markets. In 
addition, the country has not generated sufficient ownership advantages to overcome the 
barriers of foreign production. Outward FDI is directed to agricultural and labour-
intensive craft industries for trade-supporting or asset-seeking purposes. Hence, inward 
FDI is little, outward FDI is negligible and the net outward investment is negative. The 
appropriate government policies at this stage are to improve infrastructure and human 
capital (Dunning, 1993; Dunning and Narula, 1996; Dunning, 2001). 
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Figure 3.1 The pattern of the investment development path 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Dunning and Narula (1996) 
 
Stage 2 
A country‟s development in the second stage is driven by investment. The locational 
attractions increase probably because of increased expenditures on secondary education, 
public utilities, transport and communication, etc. Furthermore, the growth of market 
size in the host country encourages foreign firms to exploit economies of scale. One 
type of inward FDI takes the form of import substituting investment in labour-intensive 
manufacturing sectors, which is market-seeking and might be stimulated by import 
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barriers imposed by host government. Another type is export-oriented investment in 
natural resources and primary commodities sectors, which is attracted to seek natural 
resources, raw materials and cheap labour cost in the host country (Dunning, 1993; 
Dunning and Narula, 1996; Dunning, 2001). 
 
The ownership advantages are developed due to the improvement of location 
advantages, the development of primary industries and its support industries. The 
purpose of outward FDI is to seek market in countries at lower stage and to acquire 
foreign technology in countries at higher stages. Outward FDI is shifted towards capital-
intensive sectors and standardized consumer goods sectors. The amount of outward FDI 
emerges at this stage, but remains low. Inward FDI is increasing at a faster rate than 
outward FDI. As a consequence, the net outward investment is decreased. At this stage, 
the government plays an important role in developing ownership advantages by 
providing indigenous firms the impetus to develop and acquire advanced technology 
(Dunning, 1993; Dunning and Narula, 1996; Dunning, 2001). 
 
Stage 3 
As a country moves along the development path to the third stage, its economic growth 
is driven by innovation. Foreign firms are attracted to the country due to skilled labour, 
managerial skills and innovatory capacity instead of low labour cost and natural 
resources. Inward FDI shifts towards sophisticated goods production due to consumers‟ 
demand for high quality goods. In addition, some inward FDI occur in strategic asset 
acquiring production to seek technology. The improved location advantages, in addition 
to the presence of foreign firms and governments‟ policies, make indigenous firms 
upgrade their ownership advantages such as product innovation. Outward market-
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seeking investment and export-oriented investment are directed to less developed 
countries in differentiated consumer goods sectors, whereas outward FDI is directed to 
more developed countries to seek markets and to acquire or upgrade technology 
(Dunning, 1993; Dunning and Narula, 1996; Dunning, 2001). 
  
At this stage, the growth rate of outward FDI is increasing while the growth rate of 
inward FDI is decreasing. However, the amount of inward FDI still exceeds that of 
outward FDI resulting in negative and increasing net outward FDI. The government‟s 
role as developing ownership advantages is less significant. The government mainly 
seeks to attract inward FDI in those sectors where it has weak ownership advantages 
and strong location advantages. At the same time, it attempts to encourage outward FDI 
in those sectors where it has strong ownership advantages and weak location advantages 
(Dunning, 1993; Dunning and Narula, 1996; Dunning, 2001). 
  
Stage 4 
The location advantages at this stage are similar with those in stage 3. The ownership 
advantages are stronger due to the ability to organize geographically dispersed assets 
and process specialization. Firms have an increasing propensity to penetrate foreign 
markets in the form of FDI. Firms are induced to move operations to countries at lower 
stages to maintain their competitive advantages, to overcome trade barriers, to seek 
market and resources. Some outward FDI is also directed towards higher stage countries 
to overcome trade barriers and to acquire strategic assets (Dunning, 1993; Dunning and 
Narula, 1996; Dunning, 2001). 
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The income level and industrial structure of a developing country at this stage are 
approaching those of a developed country. Outward FDI is still rising at a faster rate 
than inward FDI. Furthermore, the propensity of indigenous firms to engage in outward 
FDI exceeds that of foreign firms to engage in inward FDI. As a consequence, outward 
FDI is greater than inward FDI and net outward investment is positive. The main roles 
of the government are to reduce transaction costs of economic activity and to maintain 
efficiency of markets and resource allocation by facilitating the economy rather than 
direct intervention (Dunning, 1993; Dunning and Narula, 1996; Dunning, 2001). 
 
Stage 5 
The final stage is the most advanced stage of economic development, which has been 
reached by some developed industrial countries. The attractions of a particular location 
depend on asset accumulation, support services and market facilitating services. Market-
seeking and asset-seeking inward FDI come from countries at lower stages, while 
rationalized and asset-seeking inward FDI come from countries in stage 4 or stage 5. 
The ownership advantages are based on the ability to acquire assets, the ability to 
upgrade technology, the efficiency of economic and organizational systems, the ability 
to coordinate different ownership advantages and the ability to exploit the benefits of 
cross-border common governance. Resource-seeking outward FDI is directed to less 
developed countries, whereas asset-seeking outward FDI is directed to more developed 
countries. Both inward FDI and outward FDI are likely to occur mainly in information 
and high-value service sectors (Dunning, 1993; Dunning and Narula, 1996; Dunning, 
2001). 
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Both inward FDI and outward FDI continue to rise. The net outward investment first 
falls and then fluctuates around the zero level. At the final stage, the income levels and 
economic structures of developed countries become more similar. In addition, the 
ownership advantages and location advantages are transferable across national 
boundaries. As a result, these factors may lead to increased convergence among 
countries. Therefore, the international direct investment positions are likely to become 
more balanced, which results in roughly equal amounts of inward and outward FDI for a 
particular country. The government still plays an active role in maintaining efficient 
market, reducing structural adjustment costs and other transaction costs. More 
importantly, the government tries to overcome market failure, which arises due to 
technological complexity and the interdependence of markets. Another role of the 
government is to ensure the quality of location advantages and to set the competitive 
environment for their own firms to upgrade ownership advantages (Dunning, 1993; 
Dunning and Narula, 1996; Dunning, 2001). 
3.3.3.2 Other impacts of economic growth on inward/outward FDI 
Economic growth can be seen as an indicator of future market potential in the host 
country, whereby higher rate of economic growth ensures long-term commitment by 
foreign investors as it leads to an increase in income and consumer demand for goods 
and services (Noorbakhsh et al., 2001). It also implies better infrastructure, provides 
greater incentive for inward FDI (Tsai, 1994) and influences positively the business 
climate for inward FDI (Morisset, 2000). Moreover, rapid growth may also give rise to 
the presence of economic rents that will encourage inward FDI (Globerman and Shapiro, 
1999). 
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Furthermore, economic growth in the home country are positively related with outward 
FDI. With higher economic performance and development, the banks in the home 
country are able to provide more loans for firms to invest abroad (Wang and Wong, 
2007). Moreover, firms are more likely to develop their ownership advantages in terms 
of economies of scale in the production, improvement of marketing expertise, invention 
and adoption of new technology etc. These are competitive advantages for firms to 
undertake foreign production (Globerman and Shapiro, 1999; Kyrkilis and Pantelidis, 
2003; Kueh et al., 2009). 
3.3.4 Empirical literature on the relationship between inward/outward FDI and 
economic growth 
This section reviews the empirical studies that investigate the relationship between 
inward/outward FDI and host/home country‟s overall economic growth, which use 
aggregate inward/outward FDI from/to the rest of the world. Some studies only examine 
whether there is a one-way relationship from inward/outward FDI to economic growth 
or whether there is a one-way relationship from economic growth to inward/outward 
FDI, therefore ignoring the reverse relationship. However, the causality studies examine 
the two-way relationship between the two variables.  
3.3.4.1 The relationship between inward FDI and economic growth 
Empirical studies examine the impact of inward FDI on growth, the impact of growth 
on inward FDI and the two-way relationship illustrated in Table 3.34 – Table 3.36. In 
Table 3.34, most studies relate to developing or a mix of developing and developed 
countries experiences and find a positive impact of FDI on growth. However, the 
positive impact of FDI is conditional on the host country‟s threshold absorptive capacity, 
such as human capital, trade openness, income level, financial development, 
institutional development etc. Thus, only countries that are above threshold level of 
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development benefit from inward FDI. Alternatively, countries that are above threshold 
level of development benefit more from inward FDI than countries that are below 
threshold level of development. There are only three studies (Blonigen and Wang, 2005; 
Kottaridi, 2005; Ghosh and Wang, 2009) focusing explicitly on developed countries. 
Blonigen and Wang (2005) do not find a significant impact of inward FDI on economic 
growth in the developed countries. According to Kottaridi (2005), inward FDI plays a 
positive role in booting economic growth in the core countries (Belgium-Luxembourg, 
France, Germany, Netherlands and UK) and the beneficial effect of FDI is enhanced for 
countries with good human capital. However, inward FDI is incapable of increasing 
economic growth in the peripheral countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). 
In addition, Ghosh and Wang (2009) find the evidence of a positive effect of inward 
FDI on economic growth in 24 developed countries and the positive effect does not 
depend on the R&D expenditure in the host country. 
 
Empirical studies also investigate the reverse impact of economic growth on inward 
FDI in the host country (see Table 3.35). However, the majority of studies focus on 
developing countries or a mix of developed and developing countries, there are only 
three studies on developed countries. Two studies find a positive impact of economic 
growth on inward FDI, while one study does not find a significant impact.  
 
Many studies examine the two-way relationship between inward FDI and economic 
growth with the majority of empirical studies apply causality testing and find FDI-led 
growth, growth-led FDI, bi-directional causality and no causality between the two 
variables (see Table 3.36). However, most causality test studies concentrate on 
developing countries, only five studies (Ericsson and Irandoust, 2001; Ekanayake et al., 
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2003; Asheghian, 2004; Qi, 2007; Iyer et al., 2009) focus explicitly or partly on 
developed countries. Studies on developed countries find different results based on 
country sample, time period and methodology. However, these studies do not look for a 
pattern in the results.  
 
This study tries to fill in the literature gap by examining the causal relationship between 
inward FDI and economic growth in developed OECD countries in Chapter 4. In 
addition, it tries to look for a pattern in the results to explain why different developed 
countries experience different FDI-growth relationships.  
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Table 3.34 Empirical studies that examine the impact of inward FDI on economic growth in the host country 
Studies on developed host countries 
Authors Host country  Empirical results Other findings 
Blonigen and Wang 
(2005) 
A sample of developed and 
developing countries 
Insignificant in developed countries  
Kottaridi (2005) 10 developed countries Positive in the core countries and stronger 
effect for countries with good human capital. 
Insignificant in the peripheral countries  
The effect of FDI on growth depends on 
the level of human capital in the core 
countries. 
The effect of FDI on growth does not 
depend on the level of human capital in 
the peripheral countries. 
Ghosh and Wang 
(2009) 
24 developed countries Positive  The effect of FDI on growth does not 
depend on the level of expenditure in 
R&D in the host country. 
 
Studies on developing host countries or a mix of developed and developing host countries 
Authors Host country  Empirical results Other findings 
Papanek (1973) 85 developing countries All countries 
Positive 
 
Asian and Mediterranean countries 
Positive 
 
Sub-Saharan African and Latin American 
countries 
Insignificant 
 
Kaufman et al. 
(1975) 
17 developing countries Positive  
Stoneman (1975) 70 developing countries Negative  
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Bornschier et al. 
(1978) 
76 developing countries FDI flow has an insignificant effect 
FDI stock has a negative effect, stronger 
negative effect for richer countries 
 
McGowan and 
Smith (1978) 
30 developing countries Positive  
Gobalet and 
Diamond (1979) 
56 developed and 
developing countries 
Negative in the whole sample 
Stronger negative effect for poor countries  
Stronger negative effect for poor countries with 
small domestic market size 
 
Jackman (1982) 72 developing countries Positive in the whole sample and for wealthy 
countries 
Insignificant for poor countries 
 
Rothgeb (1984a) 68 developing countries FDI flow has a positive effect in the short run 
and FDI stock has a negative effect in the long 
run 
 
Rothgeb (1984b) 18 developing countries FDI flow has an immediate negative effect, 
followed by a positive effect after 5 years. FDI 
stock has a negative effect in the long run 
 
Yang and Stone 
(1985) 
86 developing countries Positive in semi-peripheral countries 
Negative in peripheral countries 
 
Sharma (1986) 62 developing countries Positive  
De Gregorio (1992) 12 developing countries Positive   
Fry (1993) 16 developing countries Positive for countries with low levels of 
distortion and negative for countries with high 
levels of distortion 
The effect of FDI on growth depends on 
the level of financial repression and trade 
distortions in the host country. 
Blomstrom et al. 
(1994) 
101 developed and 
developing countries 
 
Positive in the whole sample and the 
developing countries sample 
Positive in higher-income developing 
countries, insignificant in lower-income 
The effect of FDI on growth depends on 
the level of income in the host country. 
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developing countries. 
Tsai (1994) 62 developing countries Insignificant  
Balasubramanyam 
et al. (1996) 
46 developing countries Positive in the whole sample and export 
promoting countries, insignificant in import 
substituting countries 
The effect of FDI on growth depends on 
trade policy regime in the host country. 
Dutt (1997) 58 developing countries Negative   
Bende-Nabende and 
Ford (1998) 
1 developing country Positive   
Borensztein et al. 
(1998) 
69 developing countries Positive for countries with high level of human 
capital and negative for countries with low 
level of human capital 
The effect of FDI on growth depends on 
the level of human capital in the host 
country. 
Nyatepe-Coo (1998) 12 developing countries Positive for countries with developed financial 
systems and high degree of openness 
The effect of FDI on growth depends on 
the level of financial development and the 
degree of openness in the host country. 
The effect of FDI on growth does not 
depend on the level of human capital in 
the host country. 
Olofsdotter (1998) 50 developed and 
developing countries 
 
Stronger positive effect for countries with 
higher level of institutional development 
 
The effect of FDI on growth depends on 
the level of institutional development in 
the host country. 
The effect does not depend on the degree 
of openness and the level of human 
capital in the host country. 
Balasubramanyam 
et al. (1999) 
46 developing countries Positive for countries with higher joint level of 
labour force and human capital 
The effect of FDI on growth depends on 
the joint level of labour force and human 
capital in the host country. 
de Mello (1999) 32 developed and 
developing countries 
Stronger positive effect for technological 
advanced countries, where the degree of 
substitutability between FDI and domestic 
The effect of FDI on growth depends on 
the degree of complementarity and 
substitution between FDI and domestic 
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investment is high investment in the host country. 
Bende-Nabende et 
al. (2001) 
5 developing countries 
 
Positive for Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Philippines, negative for Singapore, 
insignificant for Thailand 
 
Nair-Reichert and 
Weinhold (2001) 
24 developing countries Stronger positive effect for open economies The effect of FDI on growth depends on 
the degree of openness in the host 
country. 
Sadik and Bolbol 
(2001) 
5 developing countries 
 
Insignificant for Jordan, Morocco and Oman, 
negative for Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia 
 
Jalilian and Weiss 
(2002) 
42 developed and 
developing countries 
Stronger positive effect for countries with 
higher human capital and lower income 
The effect of FDI on growth depends on 
the level of human capital and income in 
the host country. 
Oliva and Rivera-
Batiz (2002) 
119 developing countries Positive   
Ram and Zhang 
(2002) 
85 developed and 
developing countries 
 
Positive The effect of FDI on growth does not 
depend on the level of human capital in 
the host country. 
Bengoa and 
Sanchez-Robles 
(2003) 
18 developing countries Positive   
Hermes and Lensink 
(2003) 
67 developing countries Positive for countries with  good financial 
development and negative for countries with 
weak financial development 
The effect of FDI on growth depends on 
the level of financial development in the 
host country. 
Kohpaiboon (2003) 1 developing country 
 
Positive under export promotion trade regime 
and negative under import substitution trade 
regime 
The effect of FDI on growth depends on 
trade regimes. 
Trevino and 
Upadhyaya (2003) 
5 developing countries Positive  
Akinlo (2004) 1 developing country Insignificant  
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Alfaro et al. (2004) 71 developed and 
developing countries 
Positive for countries with developed financial 
market 
The effect of FDI on growth depends on 
the level of financial development in the 
host country. 
Atique et al. (2004) 1 developing country 
 
Stronger positive effect under export 
promotion trade regime 
The effect of FDI on growth depends on 
trade regimes. 
Durham (2004) 83 developed and 
developing countries 
Positive for countries with good financial and 
institutional development. 
The effect of FDI on growth depends on 
the level of financial and institutional 
development in the host country. 
The effect does not depend on the level of 
human capital, trade and corruption in the 
host country. 
Lyroudi et al. 
(2004) 
17 developing countries. Insignificant 
 
The effect of FDI on growth does not 
depend on the level of income and growth 
rate in the host country. 
Makki and 
Somwaru (2004) 
66 developing countries  Positive for countries with high levels of trade The effect of FDI on growth depends on 
the level of trade in the host country. 
The effect does not depend on the level of 
human capital and domestic investment in 
the host country. 
Blonigen and Wang 
(2005) 
A sample of developed and 
developing countries 
Insignificant for the whole sample 
Positive for developing countries with high 
levels of human capital 
The effect of FDI on growth in 
developing countries depends on the level 
of human capital in the host country. 
Carkovic and 
Levine (2005) 
72 developed and 
developing countries 
Insignificant The effect of FDI on growth does not 
depend on the stock of human capital, the 
level of income per capita, the level of 
financial development and the degree of 
trade openness in the host country. 
Khawar (2005) 59 developing countries Positive  
Le and Suruga 105 developed and Stronger positive effect for countries with The effect of FDI on growth depends on 
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(2005) developing countries lower public investment the level of public investment in the host 
country. 
Lumbila (2005) 47 developing countries Positive for countries with low inflation and 
low risk, insignificant for countries with high 
inflation and high risk 
Stronger positive effect for countries with 
higher level of human capital and infrastructure 
development 
The effect of FDI on growth depends on 
the level of inflation, human capital, 
infrastructure development and country 
risk. 
Sylwester (2005) 29 developing countries Positive  
Busse and Groizard 
(2006) 
89 developed and 
developing countries 
Positive for less regulated countries and  
negative for most regulated countries 
 
The effect of FDI on growth depends on 
government regulations in the host 
country. 
Fedderke and 
Romm (2006) 
1 developing country 
 
Positive   
Basu and Guariglia 
(2007) 
119 developing countries Positive  
Greenaway et al. 
(2007) 
77 developing countries Insignificant in the whole sample 
Positive for open economies and negative for 
closed economies. 
The effect of FDI on growth depends on 
trade regime in the host country. 
Yang (2008) 110 developed and 
developing countries 
1973-1987 period 
Positive in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
negative in the North Africa and Middle East, 
insignificant in South Asia, East Asia and 
Pacific 
 
1988-2002 period 
Positive in OECD, Europe and Central Asia, 
negative in Sub-Saharan Africa,  insignificant 
in South Asia, East Asia and Pacific 
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Batten and Vo 
(2009) 
79 developed and 
developing countries 
Stronger positive effect for countries with 
higher level of human capital, higher level 
openness to trade,  better stock market 
development and lower inflation rate 
The effect of FDI on growth depends on 
the level of human capital, openness to 
trade, stock market development and 
inflation rate in the host country. 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
Table 3.35 Empirical studies that examine the impact of economic growth on inward FDI in the host country 
Studies on developed host countries 
Authors Host country Empirical Results 
Billington (1999) 7 developed countries Positive 
Lipsey (2000) 22 developed countries Positive 
Radulescu and Robson (2008) 19 developed countries Insignificant 
 
Studies on developing host countries or a mix of developed and developing host countries 
Authors Host country  Empirical Results 
Schneider and Frey (1985) 54 developing countries Positive 
Torrisi (1985) 1 developing country Insignificant 
Tsai (1994) 62 developing countries Insignificant (1975-1978) 
Positive (1983-1986) 
Singh and Jun (1995) 31 developed and developing countries Insignificant 
Wang and Swain (1995) 2 developing countries Insignificant 
Dunning and Narula (1996) 88 developed and developing countries Positive  
Gastanaga et al. (1998) 49 developing countries Positive 
Bende-Nabende et al. (2001) 5 developing countries Positive (Malaysia and Thailand) 
Negative (Indonesia, Philippines and Singapore) 
Noorbakhsh et al. (2001) 36 developing countries Positive 
Obwona (2001) 1 developing country Positive 
Asiedu (2002) 71 developing countries Insignificant 
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Hsiao and Shen (2003) 23 developing countries Positive 
Greenaway et al. (2007) 54 developing countries Insignificant 
Naude and Krugell (2007) 43 developing countries Positive 
Ang (2008) 1 developing country Positive 
Moosa (2009) 18 developing countries Positive 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
Table 3.36 Empirical studies that examine the two-way relationship between inward FDI and economic growth in the host country 
Studies on developed host countries 
Authors Host country  Empirical results Other findings 
Ericsson and Irandoust 
(2001) 
4 developed countries 
 
FDI-led growth in Norway 
Bi-directional causality in Sweden  
No causality in Denmark and Finland 
 
Bende-Nabende et al. 
(2003) 
1 developed country No relationship in Japan 
 
 
Ekanayake et al. (2003) 2 developed  countries  
 
FDI-led growth in US 
No causality in Canada 
 
Asheghian (2004) 1 developed country FDI-led growth in United States  
Roy and Van den Berg 
(2006) 
1 developed country 
 
Positive effect of FDI on growth and negative effect of 
growth on FDI in United States 
 
Qi (2007) 13 developed countries Short-run 
Growth-led FDI in 2 countries 
No causality in 11 countries 
 
Long-run 
Bi-directional causality in 1 country 
No causality in 10 countries 
More growth → less FDI in 2 countries 
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Iyer et al. (2009) 1 developed country 
 
Short-run  
FDI-led growth in Australia 
 
Long-run 
FDI-led growth in Australia 
 
 
Studies on developing host countries or a mix of developed and developing host countries 
Authors Host country  Empirical results Other findings 
Kraska and Taira (1974) 13 developing countries Positive effect of FDI on growth and positive effect of 
growth on FDI 
 
Khan and Leng (1997) 3 developing countries 
 
Growth-led FDI in Singapore 
No causality in Korea and Taiwan 
 
Gyapong and Karikari 
(1999) 
2 developing countries 
  
FDI-led growth in Ghana  
Growth-led FDI in Ivory Coast 
 
Obwona (2001) 1 developing country Insignificant effect of FDI on growth positive effect of 
growth on FDI 
 
Zhang (2001) 11 developing countries 
 
Short-run causality for 6 countries 
FDI-led growth in Singapore  
Growth-led FDI in Brazil, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand  
No causality in Argentina 
 
Long-run causality for 5 countries 
FDI-led growth in Hong Kong and Taiwan  
Growth-led FDI in Colombia 
Bi-directional causality in Indonesia and Mexico 
 
Alguacil et al. (2002) 1 developing country FDI-led growth in Mexico  
Chakraborty and Basu 
(2002) 
1 developing country 
 
Growth-led FDI in India  
Campos and Kinoshita 25 developing countries Positive effect of FDI on growth The effect of FDI on growth 
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(2002) does not depend on the level 
of human capital in the host 
country. 
Liu et al. (2002) 1 developing country Bi-directional causality in China  
Shan (2002) 1 developing country 
 
Two-way positive relationship in China The effect of growth on FDI 
is more significant than the 
effect of FDI on growth 
Basu et al. (2003) 23 developing countries Short run 
Bi-directional causality for all countries 
Bi-directional causality for more closed economies 
Bi-directional causality for more open economies 
 
Long run 
Bi-directional causality for all countries 
Growth-led FDI for more closed economies 
Bi-directional causality for more open economies 
FDI-growth linkage depends 
on the level of trade 
openness in the host 
country. 
Bende-Nabende et al. 
(2003) 
4 developing countries 
 
No relationship in Hong Kong 
Positive effect of FDI on growth and negative effect of 
growth on FDI in Philippines 
Negative effect of FDI on growth and positive effect of 
growth on FDI in Taiwan 
Positive effect of FDI on growth and negative effect of 
growth on FDI in Thailand 
 
Choe (2003) 80 developed and 
developing countries 
Bi-directional causality 
 
Growth-led FDI is more 
apparent than FDI-led 
growth. 
Ekanayake et al. (2003) 3 developing countries  
 
FDI-led growth in Mexico  
Growth-led FDI in Chile 
Bi-directional causality in Brazil 
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Hsiao and Shen (2003) 1 developing country Two-way positive relationship in China  
Kim and Seo (2003) 1 developing country 
 
Insignificant effect of FDI on growth and positive effect of 
growth on FDI in Korea 
 
Mencinger (2003) 8 developing countries More FDI leads to less growth          
Cuadros et al. (2004) 3 developing countries 
 
FDI-led growth in Argentina and Mexico 
No causality in Brazil 
 
Li and Liu (2005) 84 developed and 
developing countries 
Developed countries sample 
Positive two-way relationship 
Stronger positive effect of FDI on growth for countries 
with good human capital 
 
Developing countries sample 
Positive two-way relationship 
Stronger positive effect of FDI on growth for countries 
with good human capital and negative effect of FDI on 
growth for countries with wide technology gap compared 
with the United States 
The effect of FDI on growth 
depends on the level of 
human capital in the 
developed countries. 
 
The effect of FDI on growth 
depends on the level of 
human capital and 
technology-absorptive 
ability in the developing 
countries. 
Baharumshah and 
Thanoon (2006) 
8 developing countries Bi-directional causality  
Chowdhury and 
Mavrotas (2006) 
3 developing countries 
 
Growth-led FDI in Chile  
Bi-directional causality in Malaysia and Thailand 
 
 
Hansen and Rand (2006) 31 developing countries FDI-led growth The effect of FDI on growth 
does not depend on the level 
of GDP per capita, human 
capital, trade openness and 
financial development. 
Hsiao and Hsiao (2006) 8 developing countries 
 
Time-series data 
FDI-led growth in Singapore  
Growth-led FDI in China 
Panel data 
FDI also causes growth 
indirectly through exports 
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Bi-directional causality in Thailand  
No causality in Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines 
and Taiwan 
 
Panel data 
FDI-led growth 
Chang (2007) 1 developing country No causality in Taiwan  
Qi (2007) 34 developing countries Short-run 
FDI-led growth in 5 countries 
Growth-led FDI in 7 countries 
Bidirectional causality in 1 country 
No causality in 16 countries 
More FDI → less growth in 2 countries 
More FDI → more growth → less FDI in 1 country 
More FDI → less growth → more FDI in 1 country 
More FDI → less growth → less FDI in 1 country 
 
Long-run 
FDI-led growth in 3 countries 
Growth-led FDI in 12 countries 
Bi-directional causality in 8 countries 
No causality in 5 countries 
More FDI → less growth in 2 countries 
More growth → less FDI in 2 countries 
More FDI → less growth → more FDI in 2 countries 
 
 
Duttaray et al. (2008) 66 developing countries FDI affects growth in 29 countries, of which FDI directly 
causes growth in 21 countries 
 
Growth affects FDI in 20 countries, of which growth 
FDI also affects growth 
through exports and /or 
productivity. 
Growth also affects FDI 
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directly causes FDI in 18 countries through exports and 
productivity. 
Herzer et al. (2008) 28 developing countries Short-run 
FDI-led growth in 4 countries 
Growth-led FDI in 3 countries 
Bi-directional causality in 1 country 
No causality in 16 countries 
More FDI → less growth in 4 countries 
 
Long-run 
No causality in 21 countries 
More FDI → less growth in 1 country 
More growth → less FDI in 2 countries 
More FDI → less growth → less FDI in 4 countries 
FDI-growth linkage does 
not depend on the level of 
per capita income, education 
level, the degree of 
openness and the level of 
financial market 
development. 
 
 
Ang (2009) 1 developing country 
 
Short-run  
No causality in Malaysia 
 
Long-run 
Growth-led FDI in Malaysia 
 
FDI contributes to growth 
through financial 
development. 
The positive effect of FDI 
on growth depends on the 
level of financial 
development in the host 
country. 
Lee (2009) 1 developing country 
 
Short-run  
FDI-led growth in Malaysia 
 
Long-run 
Growth-led FDI in Malaysia 
 
Liu et al. (2009) 9 developing countries 
 
FDI, imports and exports together enhance economic 
growth in Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
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Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan 
Economic growth, imports and exports together attract FDI 
in Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
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3.3.4.2 The relationship between outward FDI and economic growth 
Empirical studies on the relationship between outward FDI and home country‟s 
economic growth are limited (see Table 3.37). Looking at the studies on developed 
countries, Ghosh and Wang (2009) find that outward FDI plays a positive role in the 
home country‟s economic growth in 24 developed countries. In addition, Lipsey (2000) 
examines the determinants of outward FDI and finds that economic growth is a factor 
positively affecting outward FDI in 22 developed home countries. Finally, Herzer (2008) 
tests the two-way relationship and finds bi-directional causality between outward FDI 
and economic growth for 14 developed home countries.  
 
Hence, this study will contribute to the current studies by investigating the causal 
relationship between outward FDI and economic growth in developed OECD countries 
in Chapter 4. Moreover, it will try to look at whether FDI-growth relationship depends 
on country-specific factors such as  income level, trade openness, financial development 
and so on.  
Table 3.37 Empirical studies that examine the relationship between outward FDI and 
economic growth in the home country 
The impact of outward FDI on economic growth  
Studies on developed home countries 
Authors Home country  Empirical results 
Ghosh and Wang (2009) 24 developed countries Positive 
 
The impact of economic growth on outward FDI  
Studies on developed home countries 
Authors Home country Empirical results 
Lipsey (2000) 22 developed countries Positive 
Studies on developing home countries or a mix of developed and developing home 
countries 
Authors Home country Empirical results 
Dunning and Narula 
(1996) 
54 developed and developing 
countries 
Positive  
 
Williams (2009) 15 developing countries Positive 
 
The two-way relationship between outward FDI and economic growth 
Studies on developed home countries 
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Authors Home country Empirical results 
Herzer (2008) 14 developed countries Bi-directional causality 
Studies on developing home countries 
Authors Home country Empirical results 
Chang (2007) 1 developing country No causality 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
 
3.4 Research methodology 
This section presents research approach and data collection method used in this study. 
Research approaches can be classified as quantitative and qualitative research. 
Quantitative research involves collection of numerical data and emphasizes a deductive 
approach to test theories, while qualitative research is more concerned with words rather 
than numbers and emphasizes an inductive approach to generate theories (Bryman and 
Bell, 2007). This study adopts a quantitative approach as quantitative research is 
associated with testing hypotheses and theories, which is suitable for the deductive 
approach of this research. Moreover, quantitative research is employed as a result of the 
review of previous empirical FDI related studies in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. There are a 
variety of data collection techniques which can be utilised in quantitative studies, 
including secondary data, questionnaire, interview and observation (Saunders et al., 
2009). 
 
Secondary data are used in this research as they offer numerous advantages to 
researchers. First, some secondary data are available without cost in public libraries or 
on the internet, so researchers save time and money to use them (Bryman and Bell, 2007; 
Henn et al., 2009; Saunders et al., 2009). Second, secondary data such as government 
official statistics allow researchers to examine high quality data as they are collected by 
technical experts (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Henn et al., 2009; Saunders et al., 2009). In 
addition, the availability of data over time and across different regions offer the 
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opportunity for cross-regional and longitudinal analysis (Frankfort-Nachmias, 1994; 
Bryman and Bell, 2007; Henn et al., 2009; Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
However, there are some limitations of secondary data. First, some variables of your 
interest may not be available (Frankfort-Nachmias, 1994; Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
Second, access to certain data sources may be difficult or costly (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Moreover, the definition and collection methods used in certain data sources might be 
unsuitable for your research questions (Saunders et al., 2009). Furthermore, variables 
from different data sources may be collected using different definitions and methods, so 
it might be difficult to compare and combine different data sources (Henn et al., 2009; 
Saunders et al., 2009). In addition, there might be some problems of potential bias and 
calculation errors (Frankfort-Nachmias, 1994). Finally, secondary data on recent years 
might not be available due to the time-lag between collection and publication of results 
(Henn et al., 2009). 
 
Despite these limitations, secondary data are suitable for this research rather than 
questionnaires, interviews and observations for several reasons. First, the empirical 
analysis of this thesis rests upon country-level macroeconomic variables, such that 
official statistics are the only sources available for these variables, as only the 
governments and international organizations (e.g. the OECD, IMF and World Bank) 
have the capacity to collect data on a global scale. Second, previous literature in 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 entirely employs official statistics in their examination of FDI-
related issues. In addition, there are no ethical issues involved when using secondary 
data from official sources. Therefore, secondary data are appropriate for this research.  
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3.5 Conclusion  
This thesis investigates three research questions relating to the determinants of inward 
and outward FDI and their relationship with economic growth for a group of developed 
OECD countries. Current empirical studies on the determinants of inward FDI 
concentrate on developing countries. In terms of the developed countries, empirical 
studies employ firm level data, industry level data, bilateral FDI data, with limited 
studies on aggregate inward FDI data from the rest of the world including Bajo-rubio 
and Sosvilla-Rivero (1994), Billington (1999), Globerman and Shapiro (1999),  Lipsey 
(2000), Yang et al. (2000), Kottaridi (2005), Wijeweera and Clark (2006), Radulescu 
and Robson (2008). The literature review also shows that market size, economic growth, 
agglomeration effect, trade openness, exchange rate, inflation rate, corporate tax, labour 
cost, trade union density, employment protection legislation, wage bargaining 
coordination, R&D expenditure and human capital play important roles in affecting 
inward FDI into developed countries. However, studies on labour market flexibility 
using aggregate FDI data are limited with only one study by Radulescu and Robson 
(2008). Finally, current studies on developed countries include economic growth as an 
important determinant of inward FDI, but do not take into account the reverse 
relationship from inward FDI to economic growth. 
 
Turning to the determinants of outward FDI, there are only five studies on developed 
countries using aggregate outward FDI data to the rest of the world (Shapiro, 1980; 
Globerman and Shapiro, 1999; Lipsey, 2000; Kyrkilis and Pantelidis, 2003; Wang and 
Wong, 2007). Moreover, Globerman and Shapiro (1999, 2002) believe that inward FDI 
and outward FDI are symmetrical, so outward FDI is influenced by the same factors that 
affect inward FDI. Therefore, the same factors that influence inward FDI (market size, 
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economic growth, agglomeration effect, trade openness, exchange rate, inflation rate, 
corporate tax, labour cost, trade union density, employment protection legislation, wage 
bargaining coordination, R&D expenditure and human capital) are also important 
determinants of outward FDI. In addition, there are no studies on the effect of labour 
market flexibility on outward FDI. Finally, current studies on developed countries 
include economic growth as an explanatory variable in outward FDI equation, but 
ignore the feedback relationship from outward FDI to economic growth. 
 
For the last research question, most studies analyse the one-way relationship from 
inward FDI to economic growth or the two-way relationship focusing on developing 
countries or a mix of developed and developing countries. However, studies on 
developed countries that test the two-way relationship between inward FDI and 
economic growth are limited and find mixed results depending on the country sample, 
time period and methodology. In addition, these studies do not explain why different 
countries experience different FDI-growth relationships. Moreover, there is a dearth of 
empirical literature on the two-way link between outward FDI and home country‟s 
economic growth. 
 
Therefore, this research contributes to the existing literature by focusing on developed 
OECD countries and aggregate inward/outward FDI data from/to the rest of the world. 
Moreover, it examines the determinants of inward/outward FDI with economic growth 
as an explanatory variable and takes into account of the feedback relationship from 
inward/outward FDI to economic growth. In addition, this study analyses whether 
labour market flexibility has a significant impact on inward/outward FDI. Finally, it 
investigates the two-way relationship between inward/outward FDI and economic 
            Chapter 3 Economic theories and empirical literature 
104 
 
growth and looks at whether country-specific factors can explain the different FDI-
growth relationships in different countries.     
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4 The causal relationship between inward/outward FDI and 
economic growth 
4.1 Introduction 
The role of inward FDI on economic growth has attracted the attention of researchers 
for many years as the beneficial impact of inward FDI has been recognised theoretically 
by scholars and policy makers. However, the empirical evidence in the literature 
remains ambiguous (Yang, 2008). In fact, there is conflicting evidence in the literature 
regarding the effect of inward FDI on economic growth (Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 
2001).  
 
The objective of this chapter is to investigate the causal relationship between FDI 
inflows/outflows and economic growth in developed OECD countries. Investigation of 
the causal link between FDI inflows and growth has important implications for 
policymakers. If there is a unidirectional causality from FDI inflows to economic 
growth, it would support the FDI-led growth hypothesis that FDI inflows promote 
economic growth in the host country. If the causal link runs in the opposite direction, it 
would imply that economic growth may be a prerequisite for countries to attract FDI. If 
the causal process is bi-directional, FDI inflows and growth would have a reinforcing 
causal relationship (Zhang, 2001).   
 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature by focusing on developed countries as 
inward/outward FDI has become an increasingly significant factor in influencing the 
economic activity in a developed country. Moreover, most previous time-series 
causality studies focus on developing countries and only a few studies cover developed 
countries (Ericsson and Irandoust, 2001; Ekanayake et al., 2003; Asheghian, 2004; Qi, 
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2007; Iyer et al., 2009). However, almost all of the world‟s FDI originates from 
developed countries and the majority of FDI is also located in developed countries. 
Another feature is that this chapter also tests the causal link between outward FDI and 
economic growth. Outward FDI might promote the home country‟s economic growth as 
it might yield higher profits, transfer technology and management skills to the home 
country, expand production abroad, secure raw materials overseas, avoid trade barriers 
and so on.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 describes empirical causality testing 
methodology. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 present model specification and data. The next 
Section discusses empirical results. Finally, it ends with conclusion. 
4.2 Methodology 
4.2.1 Conventional causality test 
The idea of causality testing was developed by Granger (1969) between two variables Xt 
and Yt based on the model of one variable Xt (Yt) on the lagged values of both variables. 
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The unidirectional causality from X to Y is to test that the lagged X variables in equation 
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and the lagged X variables in equation (4.2) are jointly zero (


k
i
i
1
2 0 ). If both the 
lagged Y variables in equation (4.1) and the lagged X variables in equation (4.2) are 
jointly different from zero (


k
i
i
1
2 0  and 


k
i
i
1
1 0 ), there is a feedback relationship 
between the two variables. Finally, if both the lagged Y variables in equation (4.1) and 
the lagged X variables in equation (4.2) are jointly zero (


k
i
i
1
2 0  and 
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k
i
i
1
1 0 ), 
there is no causal relationship between the two variables. 
4.2.2 Causality test developed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) 
The Granger (1969) conventional causality test is valid for a VAR model with 
stationary or trend stationary variables as the Wald tests for causality follow standard 
chi-squared distribution asymptotically (Toda and Yamamoto, 1995). However, if the 
variables in the VAR model are integrated or cointegrated, the Wald tests have 
nonstandard asymptotic properties and the conventional causality test is not applicable 
(Dolado and Lutkepohl, 1996). For instance, if variables are known to be integrated of 
order one with no cointegration, VAR in first-order differences of the variables should 
be estimated (Dolado and Lutkepohl, 1996). Moreover, if the variables are known to be 
integrated of order one and to be cointegrated of order one, then error correction model 
(ECM) should be specified (Toda and Yamamoto, 1995).  
 
Therefore, tests for unit roots and cointegration rank are usually required before 
estimating the VAR model. However, this can prove problematic because the unit root 
tests to test the null hypothesis of stationarity have low power against the alternative 
hypothesis of (trend) stationarity (Toda and Yamamoto, 1995).  Moreover, simulation 
experiments show that Johansen‟s tests for cointegrating ranks are not very reliable for 
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sample sizes that are typical for economic time series (Toda and Yamamoto, 1995). 
Hence, size distortion and pre-test bias may cause serious problems (Yamada and Toda, 
1998). 
 
In order to overcome the above problems, Toda and Yamamoto (1995) propose a 
method that is applicable whether the VAR variables are stationary, integrated or 
cointegrated and ensures that the Wald tests have standard asymptotic distributions. 
Following Toda and Yamamoto (1995), we set up the following VAR model with two 
variables. 
t
dk
i
iti
dk
i
itit YXX 1
1
1
1
11   





             (4.3) 
t
dk
i
iti
dk
i
itit YXY 2
1
2
1
22   





                (4.4) 
where k is the optimal lag order, d is the maximal order of integration of the variables, 
1 , 2  and 3   are white noise error terms. 
 
The optimal lag length (k) is determined and the VAR(p) model (p=k+d) is estimated 
with additional d-max lags as long as d does not exceed k. The conventional Wald test is 
then applied on the first k coefficient matrices using the standard 2 statistics. The 
coefficient matrices of the last dmax lagged vectors in the model are ignored since they 
are assumed as zeros (Toda and Yamamoto, 1995). The causal relationships between the 
variables are determined by the joint significance of the lagged variables. For example, 
only Yt Granger causes Xt if the joint test of i1  are statistically different from zero and 
the joint test of i2  are zero (i ≤ k). Only Xt Granger causes Yt if the joint test of i2  are 
statistically different from zero and the joint test of i1  are zero (i ≤ k). If both i2  and 
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i1  (i ≤ k) are statistically different from zero, a two-way causal link exists. If both i2  
and i1  (i ≤ k) are zero, there is no causal link between the two variables. 
 
The advantage of this methodology is that tests for unit roots and cointegration rank are 
not required, as they have proved to be problematic. Hence, this methodology is 
applicable whether the variables are stationary, integrated or cointegrated. There are 
some limitations on this approach. The Monte Carlo simulations suggest that this 
approach has advantages in terms of size stability, but might be inefficient in terms of 
low estimation power (Yamada and Toda, 1998). Toda and Yamamoto (1995) argue 
that the inefficiency depends on the specific model such that this might be big if a VAR 
system has many variables and the lag length is one (Toda and Yamamoto, 1995). On 
the other hand, the inefficiency might be relatively small if a VAR system has a small 
number of variables and long lag length (Toda and Yamamoto, 1995). In our model, we 
have a VAR system with three variables and long lag length. Therefore, the 
methodology is appropriate for our model as the inefficiency is relatively small. 
4.3 Model specification 
We incorporate inward FDI, outward FDI and economic growth into the VAR model, 
the equations to be estimated for each country are as follows: 
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t is the number of years 
k is the optimal lag order 
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d is the maximal order of integration of the three variables 
  is white noise error terms. 
X is inward FDI 
Y is growth rate of real GDP 
Z is outward FDI 
4.4 Data 
Annual FDI flow data are used as most previous time-series causality studies use flow 
data. The variables are FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP, FDI outflows as a 
percentage of GDP and the growth rate of GDP in constant 2000 US dollars. Real FDI 
values are not used since the investment deflator is not available, instead we use FDI 
inflows/outflows as a percentage of GDP and GDP in constant 2000 US dollars from 
World Development Indicators (2011). The time period is between 1981 and 2008. The 
reason for the starting year 1981 is that the data for determinants of inward/outward FDI 
in Chapter 5 are only available from 1981. The country sample includes 20 developed 
OECD countries – Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US, although we include Switzerland where data are only 
available between 1983 and 2008. Other countries are not included as there are not 
enough observations: Belgium (2002-2008), Greece (1999-2008), Iceland (1986-2008), 
Luxembourg (2002-2008). 
4.5 Data analysis 
4.5.1 Unit root tests  
The most commonly used test of the unit root in time-series is the augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test. FDI-growth time-series causality studies that use ADF test include 
Khan and Leng (1997), Gyapong and Karikari (1999), Zhang (2001), Liu et al. (2002), 
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Ekanayake et al. (2003), Cuadros et al. (2004), Chowdhury and Mavrotas (2006), Hsiao 
and Hsiao (2006), Chang (2007), Qi (2007), Duttaray et al. (2008), Ang (2009), Iyer et 
al. (2009) and Liu et al. (2009).  However, Hsiao and Hsiao (2006) argue that the DF-
GLS test (Elliot et al., 1996) for unit root has higher power in the sense that it is more 
likely to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root and accept the alternative hypothesis of 
no unit root. Therefore Hsiao and Hsiao (2006) use both ADF test and DF-GLS test for 
unit root. So we follow their method and apply both tests for comparison. 
 
Table 4.1 presents the results from the ADF and DF-GLS unit root tests for each 
country. The details of unit root tests are shown in Appendix 9.1. From Table 4.1, we 
summarize the order of integration, which is presented in Table 4.2. 
4.5.2 Optimum lags 
There are different criteria for choosing optimum lag length including Akaike‟s 
information criterion (AIC), the final prediction error (FPE), the Hannan-Quinn 
information criterion (HQIC), likelihood ratio (LR) test, and Schwarz‟s Bayesian 
information criterion (SBIC). Most time-series causality studies use only one criterion 
to select optimum lag order (Ericsson and Irandoust, 2001; Zhang, 2001; Ekanayake et 
al., 2003; Chowdhury and Mavrotas, 2006; Hsiao and Hsiao, 2006; Chang, 2007; Qi, 
2007; Duttaray et al., 2008; Ang, 2009; Lee, 2009; Liu et al., 2009). However, we 
employ all five criteria to select the optimum lag in order to show a broad picture. Table 
4.3 presents the number of optimum lags for each country according to the above five 
criteria. 
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Table 4.1 Unit root test results 
  Australia Austria Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Italy Japan 
FDI inflows DF-GLS test I(0) Unknown I(0) I(1) Unknown I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(1) 
ADF test I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(1) I(1) Unknown  I(1) I(1) 
FDI outflows DF-GLS test I(0) I(1) Unknown I(0) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(1) Unknown  I(1) 
ADF test I(0) I(1) Unknown I(0) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(2) I(1) Unknown  
GDP growth 
rate 
DF-GLS test I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(2) I(0) I(1) 
ADF test I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(2) I(1) I(1) 
 
  Korea Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland UK US 
FDI inflows DF-GLS test I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(0) I(0) 
ADF test I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(1) I(2) I(0) I(0) 
FDI outflows DF-GLS test I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(2) 
ADF test Unknown I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(2) 
GDP growth 
rate 
DF-GLS test I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) Unknown  I(0) 
ADF test I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(2) 
Note: Data in Germany refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) before 1990, data refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) and 
former democratic republic of Germany (East Germany) from 1990. 
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Table 4.2 The number of integration order 
Country DF-GLS test ADF test 
Australia  0 1 
Austria  1 1 
Canada  0 1 
Denmark  1 1 
Finland 1 2 
France  1 1 
Germany  1 1 
Ireland 2 2 
Italy  2 1 
Japan  1 1 
Korea  1 1 
Netherlands  1 1 
New Zealand  1 1 
Norway  1 1 
Portugal  1 1 
Spain  1 2 
Sweden  1 1 
Switzerland  2 2 
UK  0 0 
US  2 2 
Note: Data in Germany refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) before 1990, data 
refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) and former democratic republic of Germany 
(East Germany) from 1990. 
 
Table 4.3 Optimum lags 
Country LR FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
Australia 4 1 4 1 1 
Austria  4 4 4 4 4 
Canada  4 4 4 4 1 
Denmark  4 0 0 0 0 
Finland 4 4 4 4 0 
France  4 4 4 4 4 
Germany 4 2 4 2 1 
Ireland 4 4 4 4 1 
Italy  4 1 4 1 1 
Japan  4 1 4 1 1 
Korea  2 2 2 2 1 
Netherlands  4 2 2 2 2 
New Zealand  4 4 4 4 0 
Norway  3 3 3 3 0 
Portugal  3 3 3 3 3 
Spain  4 4 4 4 1 
Sweden  4 1 1 1 1 
Switzerland  4 4 4 4 4 
UK  3 1 3 1 1 
US  4 1 4 1 1 
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Notes: (1) Data in Germany refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) before 1990, 
data refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) and former democratic republic of 
Germany (East Germany) from 1990. (2) Duttaray et al. (2008) set the maximum lag length as 4 using 27 
observations and Qi (2007) sets the maximum lag length as 5 using 34 observations. The maximum lag is 
set as 4 for all countries as the number of observation is 28.  
 
4.5.3 Diagnostic Tests 
In the time-series causality literature, most studies do not mention, or do not report 
diagnostic tests results (Khan and Leng, 1997; Zhang, 2001; Alguacil et al., 2002; 
Ekanayake et al., 2003; Asheghian, 2004; Cuadros et al., 2004; Hsiao and Hsiao, 2006; 
Qi, 2007; Duttaray et al., 2008; Iyer et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2009).  
 
However, three diagnostic tests are conducted to test the model, namely skewness 
statistic, kurtosis statistic and the Jarque-Bera statistic tests for normally distributed 
disturbances after VAR, Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for residual autocorrelation after 
VAR, stability test to check stability condition of VAR. These diagnostic tests are 
carried out using different combinations of integration order (Table 4.2) and optimal 
lags (Table 4.3). According to Toda and Yamamoto (1995), (k+1)-th order VAR model 
should be estimated when the optimal lag length is k and the order of integration is zero. 
Therefore the maximum order of integration d is one when the order of integration in 
Table 4.2 is zero. Details of Diagnostic tests are in Appendix 9.2. Table 4.4 presents the 
diagnostic tests results using the best combinations of optimum lags and maximum 
order of integration for each country. However, most of these countries do not satisfy all 
three diagnostic tests, which means that the econometric model could be mis-specified 
and the analysis results could be biased for some countries.  
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Table 4.4 Summary of diagnostic tests 
Country Optimum lag k Maximum order  
of integration d 
Normality  
tests 
LM test Stability 
test  
Australia 1 1 X √ √ 
Austria 4 1 X X X 
Canada 1 1 X X √ 
Denmark 4 1 √ X X 
Finland 4 1 √ √ X 
France 4 1 √ √ X 
Germany 4 1 √ √ X 
Ireland 4 2 X X
a
 X 
Italy 1 1 X √ √ 
Japan 1 1 X √a √ 
Korea 2 1 √a √ √ 
Netherlands 4 1 X √ X 
New Zealand 4 1 √ X √ 
Norway 3 1 √ √ X 
Portugal 3 1 √ √ √ 
Spain 1 1 X X √ 
Sweden 4 1 √ X √ 
Switzerland 4 2 X X
a
 X 
UK 1 1 X √ √ 
US 4 2 √a Xa X 
Notes: (1) Data in Germany refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) before 1990, 
data refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) and former democratic republic of 
Germany (East Germany) from 1990. (2) Normality tests include skewness statistic, kurtosis statistic and 
the Jarque-Bera statistic tests for normally distributed disturbances after VAR. The null hypothesis is that 
the errors are normally distributed after VAR at 10% level. √ means that the null hypothesis is accepted at 
10% level. √a means the null hypothesis is accepted at 5% level, but rejected at 10% level. X means the 
null hypothesis is rejected at both 5% level and 10% level. (3) In Lagrange-multiplier (LM) test for 
residual autocorrelation after VAR, the null hypothesis is that the residual is not auto-correlated after 
VAR at 10% level. √ means that the null hypothesis is accepted at 10% level until lag 4, √a means the null 
hypothesis is accepted at 5% level, but rejected at 10% level until lag 4. X means the null hypothesis is 
rejected at both 5% and 10% level until lag 4. X
a
: the exogenous variables may not be collinear with the 
dependent variables or their lags. (4) In stability test, √ means that the VAR model satisfies stability 
condition and X means that the VAR model does not satisfy stability condition.  
 
4.5.4 Causality tests 
Table 4.5 shows the causality test results and Table 4.6 summarizes the causal 
relationship between FDI inflows/outflows and the growth rate of GDP. The analysis 
results indicate a one-way relationship from FDI inflows to growth in two countries 
(Australia and Sweden), a one-way relationship from growth to FDI inflows in two 
countries (Japan and Korea), a two-way relationship in eleven countries (Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
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Switzerland and US) and no causal relationship in five countries (Canada, Germany, 
Italy, Spain and UK). In terms of the link between FDI outflows and growth, the causal 
link runs from FDI outflows to growth for four countries (Australia, France, New 
Zealand and Norway), the reverse causality is found in four countries (Germany, Korea, 
Portugal and UK), the bi-directional causality exists for eight countries (Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and US) and no causality 
is found in four countries (Canada, Italy, Japan and Spain).  
Table 4.5 Causality test results 
Country FDI inflows → 
GDP growth 
GDP growth → 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows → 
GDP growth 
GDP growth → 
FDI outflows 
Australia  
(k=1, d=1) 
6.32** 
(0.0119) 
2.37 
(0.1239) 
7.47*** 
(0.0063) 
0.46 
(0.4966) 
Austria 
(k=4, d=1) 
11.22** 
(0.0242) 
17.81*** 
(0.0013) 
9.92** 
(0.0418) 
27.13*** 
(0.0000) 
Canada 
(k=1, d=1) 
2.58 
(0.1082) 
1.00 
(0.3171) 
0.56 
(0.4562) 
0.96 
(0.3265) 
Denmark 
(k=4, d=1) 
23.91*** 
(0.0001) 
25.07*** 
(0.0000) 
25.60*** 
(0.0000) 
47.13*** 
(0.0000) 
Finland  
(k=4, d=1) 
22.04*** 
(0.0002) 
56.90*** 
(0.0000) 
16.37*** 
(0.0026) 
42.52*** 
(0.0000) 
France  
(k=4, d=1) 
23.99*** 
(0.0001) 
13.76*** 
(0.0081) 
29.36*** 
(0.0000) 
4.26 
(0.3717) 
Germany  
(k=4, d=1) 
4.00 
(0.4054) 
1.36 
(0.8508) 
5.01 
(0.2864) 
12.42** 
(0.0145) 
Ireland 
(k=4, d=2) 
40.90*** 
(0.0000) 
45.16*** 
(0.0000) 
25.28*** 
(0.0000) 
18.58*** 
(0.0009) 
Italy  
(k=1, d=1) 
0.90 
(0.3423) 
0.14 
(0.7130) 
0.91 
(0.3408) 
0.24 
(0.6253) 
Japan  
(k=1, d=1) 
2.65 
(0.1037) 
4.46** 
(0.0346) 
0.09 
(0.7694) 
1.48 
(0.2241) 
Korea 
(k=2, d=1) 
3.72 
(0.1556) 
8.78** 
(0.0124) 
0.25 
(0.8841) 
13.42*** 
(0.0012) 
Netherlands 
(k=4, d=1)  
8.36* 
(0.0792) 
19.59*** 
(0.0006) 
13.16** 
(0.0105) 
21.64*** 
(0.0002) 
New Zealand  
(k=4, d=1) 
17.93*** 
(0.0013) 
9.65** 
(0.0468) 
24.64*** 
(0.0001) 
4.74 
(0.3152) 
Norway  
(k=3, d=1) 
6.99* 
(0.0722) 
8.95** 
(0.0299) 
7.34* 
(0.0619) 
0.98 
(0.8055) 
Portugal  
(k=3, d=1) 
17.95*** 
(0.0005) 
18.23*** 
(0.0004) 
5.84 
(0.1196) 
15.50*** 
(0.0014) 
Spain 
(k=1, d=1) 
0.47 
(0.4921) 
0.02 
(0.8880) 
0.17 
(0.6787) 
0.58 
(0.4462) 
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Sweden  
(k=4, d=1) 
23.33*** 
(0.0001) 
2.11 
(0.7161) 
14.01*** 
(0.0073) 
17.03*** 
(0.0019) 
Switzerland  
(k=4, d=2) 
177.36*** 
(0.0000) 
53.72*** 
(0.0000) 
383.16*** 
(0.0000) 
24.48*** 
(0.0001) 
UK  
(k=1, d=1) 
0.08 
(0.7816) 
0.44 
(0.5087) 
0.00 
(0.9831) 
2.83* 
(0.0925) 
US  
(k=4, d=2) 
29.43*** 
(0.0000) 
21.12*** 
(0.0003) 
18.73*** 
(0.0009) 
33.79*** 
(0.0000) 
Notes: (1) Data in Germany refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) before 1990, 
data refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) and former democratic republic of 
Germany (East Germany) from 1990. (2) Null hypothesis: FDI inflows/outflows does not Granger cause 
GDP growth or GDP growth does not Granger cause FDI inflows/outflows. (3) The number in brackets 
shows the Wald Chi-square significance level. (4) ***, **, * denote rejection of null hypothesis at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively.  
 
Table 4.6 Summary of causality tests 
  Countries 
Relationship 
between FDI 
inflows and  
growth 
FDI → growth                           Australia, Sweden 
FDI ← growth          Japan, Korea 
FDI ↔ growth Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Switzerland, US 
No causality Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK 
 
Relationship 
between FDI 
outflows and  
growth 
FDI → growth                              Australia, France, New Zealand, Norway 
FDI ← growth        Germany, Korea, Portugal, UK 
FDI ↔ growth Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, US 
No causality Canada, Italy, Japan, Spain 
Notes: (1) Data in Germany refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) before 1990, 
data refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) and former democratic republic of 
Germany (East Germany) from 1990. (2) It is significant at 10% level. 
 
4.5.5 FDI-growth relationship and country-specific factors 
As shown in Table 4.6, different countries experience different FDI-growth 
relationships, hence we analyse whether the reasons depend on country-specific factors 
(e.g. financial development, GDP per capita, trade openness, domestic investment, 
R&D expenditure, inflation rate, corporate tax revenue, trade union density, 
employment protection legislation index and unemployment rate). For example, we try 
to investigate whether countries with good financial development, higher GDP per 
capita etc experience FDI-led growth. 
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Financial development is measured as domestic credit to private sector as a percentage 
of GDP, GDP per capita is measured in constant 2000 US dollars, trade openness is 
measured as the sum of imports and exports of goods and services as a percentage of 
GDP. Domestic investment is measured as gross capital formation as a percentage of 
GDP, R&D expenditure is measured as gross domestic expenditure on R&D as a 
percentage of GDP, inflation rate is measured as the annual percentage change of 
consumer price index. Corporate tax revenue is corporate tax revenue on profits and 
capital gains as a percentage of GDP, trade union density is measured as trade union 
members as a percentage of total number of wage and salary earners. A higher 
employment protection index shows a stricter employment regulation. Unemployment 
rate is measured as the total unemployment as a percentage of total labour force. We 
find the average data on these country-specific factors for each country based on 
causality test period and data availability, and then compare period average data with 
FDI-growth relationship for each country (see Appendix 9.3). However, the period 
average data on country specific factors in Appendix 9.3 do not provide evidence why 
different countries follow different patterns in FDI-growth relationship. 
 
The reasons for not being able to find a pattern on FDI-growth relationship might be 
due to the limitations of Granger causality test proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995). 
First, the causality test suffers from inefficiency because of the artificially augmented 
lag (Kurozumi and Yamamoto, 2000). In addition, although the empirical size of the 
test statistic is less distorted when the sample size is small, but the approach is not 
completely free from size distortion and it still has a large size distortion in some cases 
(Kurozumi and Yamamoto, 2000). Another limitation is that the causality test only 
examines the directions of causal links between inflows/outflows and economic growth, 
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but does not check whether the causal links are positive or negative. Finally, most 
sample countries do not satisfy all diagnostic test, so the econometric model could be 
mis-specified.  
4.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter investigates the causal relationship between FDI 
inflows/outflows and economic growth for a group of 20 developed OECD countries. 
Most previous studies focus on the link between FDI inflows and growth in developing 
countries. This chapter tries to fill in the literature gap by analysing both the inflows-
growth and outflows-growth relationship in developed countries. The results show that 
the majority of countries experience bi-directional causality between FDI 
inflows/outflows and economic growth. However, FDI-growth relationship does not 
depend on country specific factors such as financial development, GDP per capita, trade 
openness, domestic investment, R&D expenditure, inflation rate, corporate tax revenue, 
trade union density, employment protection legislation index and unemployment rate. 
The causality test divides the sample countries into 4 groups – countries which 
experience FDI-led growth, countries which experience growth-led FDI, countries 
which experience bi-directional causality and countries which do not experience 
causality. The next chapter will examine the determinants of FDI inflows/outflows for 
each group. 
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5 The determinants of inward and outward FDI based on causality 
test results 
5.1 Introduction 
The rapid increase in inward FDI and the recognition of the benefits of inward FDI have 
motivated the studies on the determinants of FDI locations. Chapter 4 examines the 
causal relationship between FDI inflows/outflows and economic growth with the 
analysis dividing the sample into four groups – countries that experience FDI-led 
growth, countries that experience growth-led FDI, countries that experience bi-
directional causality, countries that do not experience causality. The objective of this 
chapter is to investigate what factors attract FDI into a country and what factors 
encourage FDI abroad for each country group (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2).  
 
This research extends the previous empirical evidence on the determinants of FDI 
inflows/outflows on several directions. First, a large number of studies on developing 
countries have been conducted on the determinants of FDI inflows, but the effectiveness 
of developed countries in attracting FDI using aggregate country-level data has not been 
analysed sufficiently due to limited studies on this area. Current studies on developed 
countries employ firm level FDI data (Kogut and Chang, 1991;  Ford and Strange, 1999;  
Vannoni, 1999), industry level FDI data (Bandera and White, 1968; Scaperlanda and 
Balough, 1983; Moore, 1993;  Cooke, 1997; Love, 2003; De Vita and Abbott, 2007) or 
bilateral FDI data (Cushman, 1987; Culem, 1988; Barrell and Pain, 1996, Filippaios et 
al., 2003, Ham and Kleiner, 2007; Wijeweera et al., 2007). However, there are a limited 
number of studies using aggregate FDI inflow data from the rest of the world, including 
Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero (1994) on Spain, Billington (1999) on 7 developed 
countries, Globerman and Shapiro (1999) on Canada, Lipsey (2000) on 22 developed 
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countries, Yang et al.  (2000) on Australia, Kottaridi (2005) on 10 developed countries, 
Wijeweera and Clark (2006) on US, Radulescu and Robson (2008) on 19 developed 
OECD countries. Second, there is a dearth of research on the factors that affect FDI 
outflows. Only five current studies apply aggregate country level data and analyse the 
determinants of FDI outflows in developed countries, including Shapiro (1980) on US, 
Globerman and Shapiro (1999) on Cananda, Lipsey (2000) on 22 developed countries, 
Kyrkilis and Pantelidis (2003) on 6 developed countries, Wang and Wong (2007) on 25 
developed countries. In addition, this study examines the importance of host/home 
country labour market flexibility on FDI inflows/outflows after taking a wide set of 
control variables into consideration. Moreover, a panel 2SLS simultaneous equations 
model is applied to allow economic growth to be endogenous. 
 
The structure of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the 
explanatory variables. The next two sections contain econometric methodology and the 
estimation model. Section 5.5 describes variables and presents data sources. Data 
analysis is reported in Section 5.6. Finally, it ends with conclusion. 
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Figure 5.1 The links between inward FDI‟s relationship with economic growth and its determinants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
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Figure 5.2 The links between outward FDI‟s relationship with economic growth and its determinants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author‟s own work. 
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5.2 Explanatory variables 
Chapter 3 indicated that the host country factors that affect inward FDI in developing 
countries are labour cost, trade union density, employment protection legislation, wage 
bargaining coordination, market size, economic growth, agglomeration, trade barrier, 
trade openness, exchange rate, inflation rate, corporate tax, human capital, 
infrastructure, political instability, country risk, corruption and rule of law. In contrast, 
the determinants of inward FDI in developed countries are labour cost, trade union 
density, employment protection legislation, wage bargaining coordination, R&D 
expenditure, market size, economic growth, agglomeration, trade barrier, trade 
openness, exchange rate, inflation rate, corporate tax and human capital. Developed 
countries have a good level of infrastructure and good legal systems. In addition, they 
are politically stable and less corrupt. Therefore, infrastructure, political stability, 
country risk, corruption and rule of law are not important determinants of inward FDI in 
developed countries. 
 
Of the remaining determinants, wage bargaining coordination is not used in this study, 
as the degree of wage bargaining coordination tends to be high in highly unionized 
countries (Radulescu and Robson, 2008). Hence, wage bargaining coordination and 
trade union density might be highly correlated. In addition, data on wage bargaining 
coordination from Ochel (2000), OECD (2004) and Nickell (2006) are only available 
until 2000. Moreover, trade barrier is not included as an explanatory variable, as it is 
relatively low in developed countries due to globalization and most recent studies use 
trade openness variable instead of trade barrier (Greenaway et al., 2007; Naude and 
Krugell, 2007; Ang, 2008; Radulescu and Robson, 2008; Bhaumik and Dimova, 2009;  
Fukumi and Nishijima, 2010). Furthermore, trade openness indicates the level of trade 
Chapter 5 The determinants of inward and outward FDI based on causality test results 
125 
 
barrier such that a higher level of trade openness is associated with a lower level of 
trade barrier.  
 
Market size is normally measured in real GDP, however, it is not included as an 
explanatory variable since the inclusion of real GDP and economic growth may raise a 
technical problem as economic growth is the growth rate of real GDP. Moreover, global 
trade liberalization allows multinational firms to set up production facilities in a host 
country and export the outputs to other countries rather than selling to local customers 
in the host country (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003). Hence, this has reduced the 
importance of market size as a determinant of FDI inflows. Therefore, access to 
international markets is particularly important and trade openness is used to measure it. 
Furthermore, Gastanaga et al. (1998) argue that the size of country effect is dealt with 
by defining dependent variable as FDI as a percentage of GDP. Hence, some empirical 
studies do not include market size variable of real GDP, such as Gastanaga et al. (1998), 
Noorbakhsh et al. (2001), Asiedu (2002), Hsiao and Shen (2003), Naude and Krugell 
(2007). Finally, human capital is not used as an independent variable as school 
enrolment data in primary, secondary and tertiary education are only available from 
1998 in Word Development Indicators (2011). Furthermore, developed countries have 
good human capital levels, less variation exists among countries and all studies on 
developed countries using aggregate FDI data (Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero, 1994; 
Billington, 1999; Globerman and Shapiro, 1999; Lipsey, 2000; Yang et al., 2000;  
Kottaridi, 2005; Wijeweera and Clark, 2006; Radulescu and Robson, 2008) do not use 
human capital variable.  
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Therefore, the independent variables in the FDI inflows equation are past level of FDI 
stock, inflation rate, exchange rate, trade openness, corporate tax revenue, R&D 
expenditure, unit labour cost, trade union density and employment protection legislation 
index. The same variables are used to examine the determinants of FDI outflows 
following the approach of Globerman and Shapiro (1999, 2002), Lipsey (2000), 
whereby as Lipsey (2000) argues that the determinants of outward FDI might be the 
same economic characteristics as those of inward FDI. Furthermore, Globerman and 
Shapiro (1999, 2002) also believe that FDI outflows are stimulated by the same factors 
that attract FDI inflows as FDI inflows and outflows are symmetrical.  
5.3 Methodology 
Cross-country techniques are not used here as there are several potential drawbacks to 
this approach. First, cross-country analysis assumes that countries share common 
characteristics and does not take into account country-specific characteristics (Ericsson 
and Irandoust, 2001). Second, Giles and Williams (2000) point out that the cross-
country regressions provide little insight into the way the various explanatory variables 
affect the dependent variable and the dynamic behaviours within countries. Moreover, 
cross-country models run increased risk of serious omitted variable bias due to both the 
lack of dynamics and degrees of freedom (Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 2001).  Finally, 
the cross-country analysis is unable to distinguish between the hypothesis that increased 
FDI has contributed to increased growth, versus the hypothesis that good growth has 
attracted more FDI (Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 2001).  
 
In contrast, panel data techniques allows the researchers to focus on the variations 
within a country over time, to control for country-specific and time invariant effects, 
and to reduce the omitted variable bias (Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 2001; Yang, 
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2008). Panel GMM model is not used as we have a small sample size and long time 
period, whereas the model is more efficient on large sample size and short time period. 
However, if the sample size is small, the robust standard errors and the Arellano-Bond 
autocorrelation test may be unreliable. Moreover, if the time period is large, the 
numbers of instruments are big and the dynamic panel bias is insignificant (Roodman, 
2006). Therefore, Panel fixed/random effect model and two stage least square 
instrumental variable estimation are employed.  
5.3.1 Fixed/random effect model 
According to Wooldridge (2003), the panel model is expressed as 
ititkkititit uXXXY   ...22110                  (5.1) 
itiitkkititit vaXXXY   ...22110           (5.2) 
Where i denotes a country, t denotes a time period, kXX ...1  is a vector of explanatory 
variables. The error term itu  has two components: the time-constant error ia  and the 
time-varying error itv .  ia  represents the unobserved factors that do not change over 
time and influence itY .  itv  represents the idiosyncratic error that changes over time and 
influences itY .  
 
If we assume that the time-variant error itv  is uncorrelated with each explanatory 
variable across all time periods, the estimation of the model (5.2) can be developed in 
two directions: the fixed effects estimation and the random effects estimation.  In the 
fixed effect estimation, the time-invariant error ia  is correlated with the explanatory 
variables.  In the random effect model, ia  is not correlated with any explanatory 
variables. 
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5.3.1.1 Fixed effects estimation 
Assuming the time-constant error ia  is correlated with explanatory variables and there 
is no intercept in equation (5.2), we average this equation over time for each i to get 
iiikkiii vaXXXY   ...2211         (5.3) 
Subtracting equation (5.3) from equation (5.2) for each t, we get 
iitikitkkiitiitiit vvXXXXXXYY  )(...)()( 222111     (5.4) 
Simplifying equation (5.4) to get 
ititkkititit vXXXY    ...2211                    (5.5) 
where 
iitit YYY 
 , 
ikitkitk XXX 
 and 
iitit vvv   
itY
  is the time-demeaned data on Y, itkX  is the time-demeaned data on kX  and itv  is 
the time-demeaned data on v . 
 
The use of pooled OLS estimation in equation (5.2) would be biased as it assumes no 
correlation between explanatory variables and error term. A pooled OLS regression 
based on the time-demeaned variables in equation (5.5) would solve this problem and it 
is fixed effects estimation. The purpose of fixed effects estimation is to eliminate the 
unobserved effect ia  if it is correlated with any explanatory variables at any time period. 
5.3.1.2 Random effects estimation 
If we assume that the time-invariant error ia  is not correlated with each explanatory 
variable in all time periods, equation (5.2) becomes a random effects model. As ia  is in 
the composite error itu  in each time period, the composite error itu  is serially correlated 
across time. The application of pooled OLS estimation would be biased as it assumes no 
serial correlation in the error term. Thus Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimation is 
used to eliminate serial correlation. Averaging equation (5.1) in each i over time to get 
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iikkiii uXXXY   ...22110         (5.6) 
Subtracting the multiplication of   and equation (5.6) from equation (5.1), we get 
quasi-demeaned data on each variable. 
)()(...)()()1( 2221110 iitikitkkiitiitiit uuXXXXXXYY  
(5.7) 
Where 2/1222 )]/([1 avv T  , 
2
a  is the variance of ia , 
2
v  is the variance of itv  
and T is the number of time periods. 
 
A pooled OLS regression based on the quasi-demeaned variables on equation (5.7) is 
therefore the random effect estimation.  
5.3.1.3 Hausman test 
The Hausman test is employed to guide us to the most appropriate technique: fixed 
effect or random effect. The null hypothesis of Hausman test is that time-invariant error 
ia  is not correlated with any explanatory variable in all time periods. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected, then the fixed effect model should be used. Whereas if the null 
hypothesis is accepted, the random effect model should be used. 
5.3.2 Two stage least squares instrumental variables estimation 
5.3.2.1 Two stage least squares estimation  
Fixed effect/random effect models do not solve the problem that time-varying errors are 
correlated with the explanatory variables. Two stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental 
variables (IV) estimation can be used to solve the problem of endogeneity of one or 
more explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2003). The structural equation is 
itiitkkitititit vaXXXYY   ...22112111    (5.8) 
Where i denotes a country, t denotes a time period, itkit XX ...1  are exogenous 
explanatory variables and are uncorrelated with idiosyncratic error itv  across all time 
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periods, 2itY  is an endogenous variable and is correlated with itv . The time-constant 
error ia  can be correlated with all explanatory variables. 
 
If we remove the time-constant error ia  by first differencing, we get 
ititkkitititit vXXXYY   ...22112111    (5.9) 
We assume that itkit XX  ...1  are exogenous and are not correlated with the error term 
itv . We cannot estimate the above equation (5.9) by OLS, as the error itv  is 
potentially correlated with explanatory variable 2itY . So at least one instrumental 
variable is needed, which is correlated with 2itY  but not correlated with error term itv . 
Suppose that we have two exogenous variables 1itZ  and 2itZ , which do not appear in 
equation (5.9) and are only correlated with the explanatory variable 2itY , the linear 
combination of the exogenous variables is a valid instrumental variable. This gives the 
reduced form equation for 2itY . 
ititkkitititit uXXZZY  213221102 ...     (5.10) 
We need at least one of 1  or 2  to be different from zero. The equation (5.9) cannot 
be identified if both 1  and 2  are zero.  
 
2SLS estimator can be obtained in two stages. The first stage is to run the reduced form 
regression in (5.10) by OLS and obtain the fitted values 
^
2itY . 
itkkitititit XXZZY  
^
21
^
32
^
21
^
1
^
0
^
2 ...     (5.11) 
The second stage is to run OLS regression using 
^
2itY  instead of 2itY . 
ititkkititit vXXYY   ...11
^
2111         (5.12) 
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Alternatively, we can estimate equation (5.8) using the fixed effects transformation and 
then apply an IV technique. Equation (5.9) will become 
ititkkititit vXXYY    ...112111    (5.13) 
1itY
 , 2itY , itkX , itv  are the time-demeaned data on 1itY , 2itY , itkX , itv . 
The reduced form equation for 2itY
  is 
ititkkitititit uXXZZY   213221102 ...     (5.14) 
1itZ
  and 2itZ  are IVs. 
The first stage regression is to get the fitted values of 2itY
  in equation (5.14), the second 
stage is to run regression (5.13) using the fitted values of 2itY
  instead of 2itY . 
5.3.2.2 Two stage least squares simultaneous equations model 
The simultaneous equations are shown below. 
111122112111 ... itiitkkitititit vaXXXYY      (5.15) 
222222111222 ... itiitkkitititit vaWWWYY      (5.16) 
Where i denotes a country, t denotes a time period, 1itX … 1itkX , 1itW … 2itkW  are 
exogenous explanatory variables and are uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic errors 1itv  
and 2itv , 2itY is endogenous in equation (5.12) and is correlated with 1itv , 1itY  is 
endogenous in equation (5.13) and is correlated with 2itv , the time-constant errors 1ia  
and 2ia  can be correlated with all explanatory variables.  
 
The rank condition for identifying equation (5.15) is that equation (5.16) contains at 
least one exogenous variable that is excluded from equation (5.15) and at least one of 
the exogenous variables has a non-zero coefficient in equation (5.16). Identification of 
equation (5.16) is the mirror image of identification of equation (5.15).  
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5.3.2.3 Endogeneity test 
Endogeneity test of an explanatory variable shows whether the variable is endogenous. 
The null hypothesis is that the explanatory variable is exogenous and the alternative 
hypothesis is that the explanatory variable is endogenous. If the null hypothesis is 
accepted, the explanatory variable is exogenous and OLS estimation is appropriate. If 
the null hypothesis is rejected, then the explanatory variable is endogenous and 2SLS 
IV estimation is required.  
5.3.2.4 Hansen test 
One requirement of instrumental variables is that they must not be correlated with the 
time-varying error term. If there is one endogenous explanatory variable, we need to 
have at least one instrumental variable. The number of overidentifying restrictions is the 
number of extra instrumental variables. If there are two IVs for one endogenous 
explanatory variable, the number of overidentifying restriction is one. Hansen test is 
used to check the correlation between an endogenous variable and time-varying error 
term or the over-identifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that instrumental 
variables are exogenous and overidentifying restrictions are valid. The alternative 
hypothesis is that some of the instrumental variables are not exogenous or are correlated 
with the time-varying error term. 
5.4 Model specification 
5.4.1 FDI-led growth country group 
As economic growth does not significantly influence FDI inflows/outflows, we employ 
fixed/random effect model and incorporate FDI inflows/outflows and its possible 
determinants into equation (5.2) 
itiitkkititit vaXXXY   ...22110        (5.2) 
i: a country 
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t: a year 
Y: the dependent variable which is FDI inflows/outflows as a percentage of GDP 
k: the number of explanatory variables  
ia : time-invariant error 
itv : time-variant error 
kXXX ,...,, 21 : a vector of explanatory variables including past level of FDI stock, 
inflation rate, exchange rate, trade openness, corporate tax revenue, R&D expenditure, 
unit labour cost, trade union density and employment protection legislation index. 
5.4.2 Growth-led FDI country group 
Economic growth has a significant impact on FDI inflows/outflows. In addition, it can 
be endogenous as it might be correlated with time-variant error term. Hence, we employ 
two stage least square model and incorporate FDI inflows/outflows and its possible 
determinants into equation (5.8) 
itiitkkitititit vaXXXYY   ...22112111    (5.8) 
i: a country 
t: a year 
Y1: the dependent variable which is FDI inflows/outflows as a percentage of GDP 
Y2: economic growth rate which is endogenous  
ia : time-invariant error 
itv : time-variant error 
1X … 1kX : a vector of exogenous explanatory variables in equation including past level 
of FDI stock, inflation rate, exchange rate, trade openness, corporate tax revenue, R&D 
expenditure, unit labour cost, trade union density and employment protection legislation 
index. 
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5.4.3 Bi-directional causality country group 
FDI inflows/outflows influence economic growth and economic growth affects FDI 
inflows/outflows. Therefore, both economic growth and FDI inflows/outflows are 
endogenous variables. Economic growth affects FDI inflows/outflows via equation 
(5.15) and FDI inflows/outflows in turn affect economic growth via equation (5.16). 
However, neglecting the interdependence between FDI inflows/outflows and economic 
growth may result in biased and inconsistent estimates. Hence, 2SLS simultaneous 
equations model is required to account for the simultaneity between economic growth 
and FDI inflows/outflows. 
 
We incorporate FDI inflows/outflows and economic growth regressions into equations 
(5.15) and (5.16) respectively:  
111122112111 ... itiitkkitititit vaXXXYY      (5.15) 
222222111222 ... itiitkkitititit vaWWWYY       (5.16) 
i: a country 
t: a year 
Y1: the dependent variable in equation (5.15) which is FDI inflows/outflows as a 
percentage of GDP, it is endogenous in equation (5.16) 
Y2: the dependent variable in equation (5.16) which is economic growth rate, it is 
endogenous in equation (5.15) 
ia : time-invariant error 
itv : time-variant error 
1X … 1kX : a vector of exogenous explanatory variables in equation (5.15) including past 
level of FDI stock, inflation rate, exchange rate, trade openness, corporate tax revenue, 
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R&D expenditure, unit labour cost, trade union density and employment protection 
legislation index. 
1W … 2kW : a vector of exogenous explanatory variables in equation (5.16) including 
government consumption, domestic investment, R&D expenditure and inflation rate. 
5.4.4 No-causality country group 
Similarly with Section 5.4.1, we employ fixed/random effect model and incorporate 
FDI inflows/outflows and its possible determinants into equation (5.2) 
itiitkkititit vaXXXY   ...22110        (5.2) 
i: a country 
t: a year 
Y: the dependent variable which is FDI inflows/outflows as a percentage of GDP 
k: the number of explanatory variables  
ia : time-invariant error 
itv : time-variant error 
kXXX ,...,, 21 : a vector of explanatory variables including past level of FDI stock, 
inflation rate, exchange rate, trade openness, corporate tax revenue, R&D expenditure, 
unit labour cost, trade union density and employment protection legislation. 
5.5 Data 
5.5.1 Time period and country sample 
The annual data covers the period 1981-2008. The time period starts from 1981 as the 
past level of FDI stock data is only available from 1981 and ends in 2008 as 
employment protection legislation index is only available until 2008. The sample has 20 
developed OECD countries including Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
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Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US. The time period and country sample 
are the same as those used in Chapter 4. 
5.5.2 Definitions of variables and data sources 
The dependent variable is the share of FDI inflows/outflows to GDP. FDI 
inflows/outflows values are not used as it is difficult to find a deflator to convert them 
into real values. The main interest of this empirical analysis is the sign and magnitude 
of the coefficients of labour market flexibility variables. The choice of the independent 
variables is motivated by the existing empirical studies and data availability.  
 
Trade union density and employment protection legislation index are employed to 
control for the effect of labour market flexibility on FDI inflows. In the FDI inflows 
equation, strict labour market systems can hamper or encourage FDI inflows and the 
signs of the two variables can be positive or negative. R&D expenditure in the host 
country can have a positive or negative impact on FDI inflows. Past level of inward FDI 
stock and economic growth are expected to have positive effects on FDI inflows as 
discussed in Chapter 3. In contrast, inflation rate and corporate tax revenue play 
negative roles in affecting FDI inflows. For trade openness, exchange rate and unit 
labour costs, it is difficult to predict the signs of these variables (discussed in Chapter 3), 
so we allow these variables to have indeterminate signs. The definitions and the 
expected signs of the independent variables are shown in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Definitions and expected signs of independent variables for FDI inflows 
equation 
 Dependent variable: FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP 
Independent variable  Definition  Sign 
Agglomeration  One year lagged inward FDI stock as a percentage of 
GDP 
+ 
Economic growth Annual GDP growth rate (%) + 
Inflation rate Inflation measured by the annual growth rate of CPI – 
Exchange rate Real effective exchange rate index (ULC based) 
(2005=100) (an increase represents a real depreciation 
+ or – 
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of the currency) 
Trade openness The sum of imports and exports of goods and services 
as a percentage of GDP 
+ or – 
Unit labour cost Real unit labour cost index in total economy 
(2005=100) 
+ or – 
Corporate tax 
revenue 
Corporate taxes on profits and capital gains as a 
percentage of GDP 
– 
R&D expenditure Gross domestic expenditure on R&D as a percentage 
of GDP 
+ or – 
Union density Trade union density (%) + or – 
Employment 
protection legislation  
A higher index shows a stricter regulation  + or – 
Notes: (1) Real effective exchange rate index (ULC based) takes into consideration changes in market 
exchange rate and variations in relative unit labour cost levels in manufacturing (OECD Stat Extracts, 
2011). (2) Real unit labour cost is computed as total labour costs divided by nominal output (OECD Stat 
Extracts, 2011).  
 
In terms of FDI outflows equation, we expect positive or negative coefficients of union 
density and employment protection legislation (see Chapter 3). The impact of R&D 
expenditure on FDI outflows can be positive or negative (see Chapter 3). One year 
lagged outward FDI stock, economic growth, inflation rate and corporate tax revenue 
are expected to play positive roles in affecting FDI outflows. For labour cost, exchange 
rate, trade openness, it is difficult to predict the sign, so we allow it to have 
indeterminate signs (see Chapter 3). The definitions and the expected signs of the 
independent variables are shown in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 presents data sources. The 
employment protection legislation index is originally from Nickell (2006), but then 
updated by the author from OECD Stat Extracts (2011), with details of calculation 
methods shown in Appendices 9.4 and 9.5. 
Table 5.2 Definitions and expected signs of independent variables for FDI outflows 
equation 
 Dependent variable: FDI outflows as a percentage of GDP 
Independent variable  Definition  Sign 
Agglomeration  One year lagged outward FDI stock as a percentage of 
GDP 
+ 
Economic growth Annual GDP growth rate (%) +  
Inflation rate Inflation measured by the annual growth rate of CPI + 
Exchange rate Real effective exchange rate index (ULC based) 
(2005=100) (an increase represents a real depreciation 
+ or – 
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of the currency) 
Trade openness The sum of imports and exports of goods and services 
as a percentage of GDP 
+ or – 
Unit labour cost Real unit labour cost index in total economy 
(2005=100) 
+ or – 
Corporate tax revenue Corporate taxes on profits and capital gains as a 
percentage of GDP 
+ 
R&D expenditure Gross domestic expenditure on R&D as a percentage 
of GDP 
+ or – 
Union density Trade union density (%) + or – 
Employment 
protection legislation  
A higher index shows a stricter regulation  + or – 
Notes: (1) Real effective exchange rate index (ULC based) takes into consideration changes in market 
exchange rate and variations in relative unit labour cost levels in manufacturing (OECD Stat Extracts, 
2011). (2) Real unit labour cost is computed as total labour costs divided by nominal output (OECD Stat 
Extracts, 2011).  
 
Table 5.3 Data sources 
Variable Data Source 
FDI inflows/outflows as a percentage of GDP World Development Indicators 
(2011) 
Inward/outward FDI stock as a percentage of 
GDP 
UNCTAD Foreign Direct 
Investment Database (2011) 
GDP growth rate  World Development Indicators 
(2011) 
Inflation measured by the annual growth rate of 
CPI  
World Development Indicators 
(2011) 
Real effective exchange rate index (ULC based)  
(2005=100) 
OECD Stat Extracts (2011) 
Imports of goods and services as a percentage of 
GDP 
World Development Indicators 
(2011) 
Exports of goods and services as a percentage of 
GDP 
World Development Indicators 
(2011) 
The sum of imports and exports of goods and 
services as a percentage of GDP 
Author‟s calculation 
Real unit labour cost index in total economy 
(2005=100) 
OECD Stat Extracts (2011) 
Corporate taxes on profits and capital gains as a 
percentage of GDP 
OECD Stat Extracts (2011) 
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D as a 
percentage of GDP 
OECD Main Science and 
Technology Indicators (2010) 
Trade union density OECD Stat Extracts (2011) 
Employment protection legislation index Nickell (2006) and OECD Stat 
Extracts (2011) 
General government final consumption 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
World Development Indicators 
(2011) 
Gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP World Development Indicators 
(2011) 
Notes: (1) Employment protection legislation data from 1985 to 2008 is from OECD Stat Extracts (2011), 
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data before 1985 is from Nickell (2006). 
 
5.6 Data analysis 
5.6.1 The determinants of FDI inflows 
For the countries which experience FDI-led growth (Australia and Sweden), economic 
growth does not significantly affect FDI inflows. Hence, economic growth is not 
included as an explanatory variable in FDI inflows equation and fixed/random effect 
estimation is used. The regression results based on panel fixed/random effect model are 
presented in Table 5.4. As the chi square statistics of Hausman test is negative, we 
cannot differentiate whether it is fixed effect or random effect. Therefore, the 
insignificant variables in Table 5.4 are excluded and Table 5.5 re-estimates the FDI 
inflows equation using significant variables – labour cost and employment protection 
legislation index. The hypothesis that the time-constant error is uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables is rejected based on the Hausman test. The corresponding p-
values of the test is 0.006, which shows that the fixed effect model is more appropriate 
than the random effect model. The coefficient of employment protection legislation 
index is negative and significant at 1% level, which means that strict employment 
legislation in the host country is a deterrent to FDI inflows. Labour cost variable is 
negative and marginally significant at the 10% level, which implies that low labour cost 
in the host country attracts FDI inflows.  
Table 5.4 Robust fixed/random effect equations 
 Dependent variable: FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP 
Independent variables  Fixed effect Random effect 
Inward FDI stock (-1) -0.173 
(-1.11) 
-0.173 
(-1.14) 
Trade openness 0.183 
(0.93) 
0.192 
(1.28) 
Unit labour cost -0.344* 
(-1.95) 
-0.349** 
(-2.26) 
Exchange rate  0.047 
(0.84) 
0.049 
(1.07) 
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Corporate tax revenue 0.196 
(0.33) 
0.197 
(0.34) 
Union density -0.080 
(-0.59) 
-0.068 
(-1.34) 
Employment 
protection legislation 
-6.174 
(-1.48) 
-6.025* 
(-1.67) 
Inflation rate 0.161 
(0.64) 
0.164 
(0.68) 
R&D expenditure 0.381 
(0.76) 
1.524 
(0.87) 
 
Countries 2 2 
Observations 31 31 
Notes: (1) All models are estimated with a constant. (2) Robust t-values or z-values are in 
parentheses. (3) *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. (4) The chi square statistics in the Hausman test is negative, model fitted on these 
data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman test. Therefore, Hausman test does 
not indicate whether fixed or random effect is the most appropriate technique. 
 
Table 5.5 Robust fixed effect equation 
 Dependent variable: FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP 
Independent variables  (1) 
Inward FDI stock (-1)  
Trade openness  
Unit labour cost -0.158
a
 
(-1.52) 
Exchange rate   
Corporate tax revenue  
Union density  
Employment 
protection legislation 
-3.662*** 
(-3.99) 
Inflation rate  
R&D expenditure  
 
Countries 2 
Observations 54 
Hausman test 
(p-value) 
10.23*** 
(0.0060) 
Fixed/random effect Fixed effect 
Notes: (1) All models are estimated with a constant. (2) Robust t-values or z-values are in 
parentheses. (3) *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. (4) 
a
: significant at 13.4% level.  
 
For those countries which experience growth-led FDI (Japan and Korea), we expect that 
economic growth is a significant determinant of FDI inflows. Moreover, economic 
growth might be endogenous and be correlated with time-variant error. Therefore, 2SLS 
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estimation is applied in Table 5.6. Model (1) includes all explanatory variables, whilst 
Model (2) only includes the significant variables found in Model (1). The endogeneity 
test accepts the null hypothesis at the 10% level indicating that economic growth is 
exogenous. Therefore, FDI inflows equations are estimated using fixed/random effect 
models in Table 5.7 and Table 5.8. However, economic growth is found to be 
insignificant, which is contradictory to the causality test results in Chapter 4. This might 
be due to different estimation methods used in this Chapter and Chapter 4. In addition, 
the important variables that affect FDI inflows for this group of countries are past level 
inward FDI stock, trade openness, labour cost, employment protection legislation index, 
inflation rate and R&D expenditure.  
Table 5.6 Robust two stage least squares equations 
 Dependent variable: FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP 
Independent variables  (1) (2) 
Economic growth -0.043* 
(-1.81) 
-0.025 
(-1.18) 
Inward FDI stock (-1) -0.069** 
(-2.35) 
-0.042* 
(-1.83) 
Trade openness 0.033*** 
(2.88) 
0.039*** 
(4.27) 
Unit labour cost -0.051** 
(-2.35) 
-0.056*** 
(-5.00) 
Exchange rate  -0.0005 
(-0.18) 
 
Corporate tax revenue 0.091 
(1.58) 
 
Union density -0.006 
(-0.12) 
 
Employment 
protection legislation 
-0.316 
(-1.03) 
 
Inflation rate -0.139*** 
(-3.55) 
-0.128*** 
(-3.64) 
R&D expenditure -1.491*** 
(-4.27) 
-1.497*** 
(-5.49) 
 
Countries 2 2 
Observations 46 46 
Hansen test 
(p-value) 
6.908*** 
(0.0086) 
7.829*** 
(0.0051) 
Endogeneity test 
(p-value) 
0.659 
(0.4169) 
0.254 
(0.6142) 
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Notes: (1) All models are estimated with a constant. (2) Robust z-values are in parentheses. (3) *, 
** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. (4) Economic 
growth is instrumented by government consumption and domestic investment in the host country. 
 
Table 5.7 Robust fixed/random effect equations 
 Dependent variable: FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP 
Independent variables  Fixed effect Random effect 
Economic growth -0.011 
(-0.69) 
-0.011 
(-0.72) 
Inward FDI stock (-1) -0.077** 
(-2.53) 
-0.090*** 
(-3.30) 
Trade openness 0.033** 
(2.68) 
0.028*** 
(2.90) 
Unit labour cost -0.038
a
 
(-1.57) 
-0.040* 
(-1.67) 
Exchange rate  0.001 
(0.19) 
-0.0002 
(-0.06) 
Corporate tax revenue 0.084 
(1.37) 
0.072 
(1.26) 
Union density -0.025 
(-0.46) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
Employment 
protection legislation 
-0.652* 
(-1.76) 
-0.838*** 
(-2.73) 
Inflation rate -0.110*** 
(-3.06) 
-0.109***  
(-3.11) 
R&D expenditure -1.432*** 
(-3.98) 
-1.217*** 
(-5.09) 
 
Countries 2 2 
Observations 46 46 
Notes: (1) All models are estimated with a constant. (2) Robust t-values or z-values are in 
parentheses. (3) *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively.  (4) 
a
: significant at 12.6% level. (5) The chi square statistics in the Hausman test is 
negative, model fitted on these data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman test. 
Therefore, Hausman test does not indicate whether fixed or random effect is the most appropriate 
technique. 
 
Table 5.8 Robust fixed/random effect equations 
 Dependent variable: FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP 
Independent variables  Fixed effect Random effect 
Economic growth   
Inward FDI stock (-1) -0.069*** 
(-2.76) 
-0.077*** 
(-3.19) 
Trade openness 0.032*** 
(3.25) 
0.025*** 
(4.57) 
Unit labour cost -0.041*** 
(-2.79) 
-0.031 
(-3.82) 
Exchange rate   
Corporate tax revenue   
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Union density   
Employment 
protection legislation 
-0.650** 
(-2.21) 
-0.926*** 
(-6.12) 
Inflation rate -0.097** 
(-2.65) 
-0.087** 
(-2.46) 
R&D expenditure -1.246*** 
(-4.34) 
-1.068*** 
(-4.75) 
 
Countries 2 2 
Observations 46 46 
Notes: (1) All models are estimated with a constant. (2) Robust t-values or z-values are in 
parentheses. (3) *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively.  (4) The chi square statistics in the Hausman test is negative, model fitted on these 
data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman test. Therefore, Hausman test does 
not indicate whether fixed or random effect is the most appropriate technique. 
 
For countries which experience bi-directional causality (Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland and US), we 
control the endogenity of both economic growth and FDI inflows by employing 2SLS 
simultaneous equations model in Table 5.9. We expect that FDI inflows contribute to 
economic growth and higher economic growth attracts FDI inflows. Model (1) includes 
all the explanatory variables, economic growth does not significantly affect FDI inflows 
equation in  Table 5.9 and FDI inflows positively affect economic growth in Table 5.10. 
Model (2) re-examine the simultaneous equations models by removing the insignificant 
variables found in Model (1). Economic growth is found to increase FDI inflows and 
FDI inflows is found to have no impact on economic growth in Model (2). Again, the 
results are not what we expected and they are not consistent to the causality test results 
in Chapter 4. In addition, trade openness is found to positively affect FDI inflows, while 
strict employment protection legislation negatively affects FDI inflows. 
Table 5.9 Robust two stage least squares simultaneous equations 
 Dependent variable: FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP 
Independent variables  (1) (2) 
Economic growth 0.296 
(1.07) 
0.392* 
(1.82) 
Inward FDI stock (-1) -0.004 
(-0.20) 
 
Trade openness 0.109** 0.127*** 
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(2.55) (3.83) 
Unit labour cost -0.100 
(-1.36) 
 
Exchange rate  -0.009 
(-0.68) 
 
Corporate tax revenue -0.061 
(-0.25) 
 
Union density 0.021 
(0.41) 
 
Employment protection 
legislation 
-3.361*** 
(-2.73) 
-2.439** 
(-2.28) 
Inflation rate 0.084 
(0.96) 
 
R&D expenditure -1.204 
(-1.16) 
 
 
Countries 11 11 
Observations 254 306 
Hansen test 
(p-value) 
2.079 
(0.1494) 
4.260 
(0.1188) 
Endogeneity test 
(p-value) 
1.303 
(0.2537) 
3.324* 
(0.0683) 
Notes: (1) All models are estimated with a constant. (2) Robust z-values are in parentheses. (3) *, ** 
and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
 
Table 5.10 Robust two stage least squares simultaneous equations 
 Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP 
Independent variable (1) (2) 
FDI inflows 0.318* 
(1.71) 
0.084 
(1.50) 
Government 
consumption 
-0.523*** 
(-3.33) 
-0.574*** 
(-5.36) 
Domestic investment 0.176** 
(2.41) 
0.138*** 
(3.18) 
Trade openness -0.035 
(-1.14) 
 
Inflation rate -0.135*** 
(-2.67) 
-0.168*** 
(-4.66) 
R&D expenditure 0.113 
(0.24) 
 
 
Countries 11 11 
Observations 254 306 
Hansen test 
(p-value) 
10.039* 
(0.0741) 
0.196 
(0.6583) 
Endogeneity test 
(p-value) 
1.796 
(0.1802) 
0.065 
(0.7995) 
Notes: (1) All models are estimated with a constant. (2) Robust z-values are in parentheses. (3) *, ** 
and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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In terms of countries which do not experience causality between FDI inflows and 
growth (Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK), economic growth variable is not 
included and fixed/random effect models are used. The important variables that 
influence FDI inflows in Table 5.11 are trade openness, corporate tax rate and trade 
union density.  
Table 5.11 Robust fixed/random effect equations 
 Dependent variable: FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP 
Independent variables  (1) (2) (3) 
Inward FDI stock (-1) -0.017 
(-0.50) 
  
Trade openness 0.081** 
(2.35) 
0.046*** 
(2.99) 
0.039** 
(2.43) 
Unit labour cost 0.106 
(1.45) 
  
Exchange rate  0.045 
(1.48) 
  
Corporate tax revenue 0.896** 
(2.36) 
0.878*** 
(4.51) 
0.850*** 
(4.45) 
Union density -0.085* 
(-1.75) 
-0.087*** 
(-7.71) 
-0.122*** 
(-5.18) 
Employment 
protection legislation 
-0.192 
(-0.28) 
  
Inflation rate -0.090* 
(-1.78) 
-0.032 
(-0.97) 
 
R&D expenditure -1.448 
(-1.28) 
  
 
Countries 5 5 5 
Observations 126 129 140 
Hausman test 
(p-value) 
60.64*** 
(0.0000) 
5.57 
(0.2333) 
0.26 
(0.9667) 
Fixed/random effect Fixed effect Random effect Random effect 
Notes: (1) All models are estimated with a constant. (2) Robust t-values or z-values are in 
parentheses. (3) *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively.  
 
5.6.2 The determinants of FDI outflows  
For countries which experience FDI-led growth (Australia, France, New Zealand, and 
Norway), economic growth has no significant impact on FDI outflows and 
fixed/random effect model is applied in Table 5.12. However, fixed/random effect 
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model cannot be differentiated due to the negative chi square statistics of Hausman test. 
Therefore, the insignificant variables in Table 5.12 are removed and Table 5.13 re-
estimates the equation. The results indicate that high past level of outward FDI stock, 
high trade union density and rigid employment protection legislation in the home 
country encourage FDI outflows. However, trade openness and high labour cost in the 
home country  negatively affect FDI outflows.  
Table 5.12 Robust fixed/random effect equations 
 Dependent variable: FDI outflows as a percentage of GDP 
Independent variables  Fixed effect Random effect 
Outward FDI stock (-1) 0.026 
(0.78) 
0.046*** 
(2.80) 
Trade openness 0.116 
(0.69) 
-0.050
a
 
(-1.60) 
Unit labour cost -0.167** 
(-2.13) 
-0.193*** 
(-3.21) 
Exchange rate  -0.006 
(-0.22) 
-0.013 
(-0.65) 
Corporate tax revenue -0.077 
(-0.29) 
-0.079 
(-0.68) 
Union density 0.110* 
(1.98) 
0.089*** 
(3.38) 
Employment protection 
legislation 
-0.819 
(-0.50) 
1.535** 
(2.12) 
Inflation rate -0.054 
(-0.39) 
0.082 
(1.00) 
R&D expenditure 0.263 
(0.18) 
1.197 
(0.99) 
 
Countries 4 4 
Observations 74 74 
Notes: (1) All models are estimated with a constant. (2) Robust t-values or z-values are in parentheses. 
(3) *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. (4) The chi 
square statistics in the Hausman test is negative, model fitted on these data fails to meet the asymptotic 
assumptions of the Hausman test. Therefore, Hausman test does not indicate whether fixed or random 
effect is the most appropriate technique. (5) 
a
: significant at 10.9% level. 
 
Table 5.13 Robust random effect equation 
 Dependent variable: FDI outflows as a percentage of GDP 
Independent variables  (1) 
Outward FDI stock (-1) 0.040*** 
(2.82) 
Trade openness -0.042** 
(-2.49) 
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Unit labour cost -0.139*** 
(-4.32) 
Exchange rate   
Corporate tax revenue  
Union density 0.065*** 
(3.99) 
Employment protection 
legislation 
1.652*** 
(4.54) 
Inflation rate  
R&D expenditure  
 
Countries 4 
Observations 106 
Hausman test 
(p-value) 
8.65 
(0.1240) 
Fixed/random effect Random effect 
Notes: (1) All models are estimated with a constant. (2) Robust z-values are in parentheses. (3) *, ** 
and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
 
For countries which experience growth-led FDI (Germany, Korea, Portugal and UK), 
2SLS technique is applied in Table 5.14. In Model (1), the endogeneity test shows that 
economic growth is not endogenous and it is not correlated with time-variant error. In 
addition, the coefficient of economic growth is not significant. After removing the 
insignificant variables, endogeneity test confirms the endogeniety of economic growth 
variable and Hansen test accepts the validity of the instruments at 10 percent level. 
Economic growth is found to have a positive impact on FDI outflows. Moreover, high 
corporate tax and low trade union density in the home country are associated with large 
FDI outflows.  
Table 5.14 Robust two stage least squares equations 
 Dependent variable: FDI outflows as a percentage of GDP 
Independent variables  (1) (2) (3) 
Economic growth 0.206 
(1.32) 
0.298** 
(1.98) 
0.359** 
(2.12) 
Outward FDI stock (-1) -0.070* 
(-1.86) 
-0.037 
(-1.07) 
 
Trade openness 0.084* 
(1.65) 
-0.011 
(-0.50) 
 
Unit labour cost 0.098 
(0.72) 
  
Exchange rate  0.055   
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(1.51) 
Corporate tax revenue 1.051*** 
(2.87) 
0.938*** 
(3.17) 
0.865*** 
(3.71) 
Union density -0.280*** 
(-2.72) 
-0.329*** 
(-3.11) 
-0.242*** 
(-3.93) 
Employment protection 
legislation 
-0.233 
(-0.26) 
  
Inflation rate 0.011 
(0.11) 
  
R&D expenditure -2.142 
(-1.42) 
  
 
Countries 4 4 4 
Observations 81 81 81 
Hansen test 
(p-value) 
0.045 
(0.8316) 
2.298 
(0.5130) 
2.208 
(0.6976) 
Endogeneity test 
(p-value) 
1.111 
(0.2919) 
7.097*** 
(0.0077) 
8.280*** 
(0.0040) 
Notes: (1) All models are estimated with a constant. (2) Robust z-values are in parentheses. (3) *, ** 
and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. (4) In equation (1), 
economic growth is instrumented by government consumption and domestic investment in the home 
country. In equation (2), economic growth is instrumented by government consumption, domestic 
investment, inflation rate and R&D expenditure. In equation (3), economic growth is instrumented by 
government consumption, domestic investment, inflation rate, R&D expenditure and trade openness. 
 
For countries which experience bi-directional causality (Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and US), 2SLS simultaneous equations 
model is used in Tables 5.15 and 5.16. Economic growth is found to be significant in 
FDI outflows equation and FDI outflows is found to be insignificant in economic 
growth equation, which is contradictory to the bi-directional causality between FDI 
outflows and economic growth in Chapter 4.  
Table 5.15 Robust two stage least squares simultaneous equations 
 Dependent variable: FDI outflows as a percentage of GDP 
Independent variables  (1) (2) (3) 
Economic growth 0.207 
(1.05) 
0.515** 
(2.30) 
0.598*** 
(2.73) 
Outward FDI stock (-1) 0.042** 
(2.42) 
0.063*** 
(4.54) 
0.063*** 
(4.54) 
Trade openness 0.032 
(1.03) 
  
Unit labour cost -0.164* 
(-1.91) 
-0.083 
(-1.11) 
 
Exchange rate  0.020   
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(1.47) 
Corporate tax revenue 1.447* 
(1.68) 
1.195* 
(1.83) 
1.524*** 
(2.82) 
Union density -0.020 
(-0.27) 
  
Employment protection 
legislation 
-1.342 
(-1.38) 
  
Inflation rate 0.116 
(1.22) 
  
R&D expenditure -1.561 
(-1.25) 
  
 
Countries 8 8 8 
Observations 185 217 217 
Hansen test 
(p-value) 
2.788* 
(0.0950) 
9.147*** 
(0.0025) 
8.621*** 
(0.0033) 
Endogeneity test 
(p-value) 
1.021 
(0.3123) 
1.611 
(0.2043) 
2.037 
(0.1535) 
Notes: (1) All models are estimated with a constant. (2) Robust z-values are in parentheses. (3) *, ** 
and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Table 5.16 Robust two stage least squares simultaneous equations 
 Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) 
FDI outflows 0.002 
(0.02) 
0.015 
(0.30) 
-0.016 
(-0.32) 
Government 
consumption 
-0.818*** 
(-3.74) 
-0.885*** 
(-5.64) 
-0.916*** 
(-5.76) 
Domestic investment 0.027 
(0.37) 
  
Trade openness 0.014 
(0.60) 
  
Inflation rate -0.165** 
(-2.16) 
-0.137** 
(-2.55) 
-0.145*** 
(-2.65) 
R&D expenditure -0.311 
(-0.74) 
  
 
Countries 8 8 8 
Observations 185 217 217 
Hansen test 
(p-value) 
17.872*** 
(0.0031) 
9.909*** 
(0.0071) 
3.494* 
(0.0616) 
Endogeneity test 
(p-value) 
0.898 
(0.3434) 
0.388 
(0.5333) 
1.362 
(0.2432) 
Notes: (1) All models are estimated with a constant. (2) Robust z-values are in parentheses. (3) *, ** 
and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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For countries which do not experience causality between the two variables (Canada, 
Italy, Japan and Spain), economic growth is not included as an independent variable and 
Table 5.17 shows the estimation results. The important determinants of FDI outflows 
for this group of countries are trade openness, exchange rate, corporate tax and 
employment protection legislation index.  
Table 5.17 Robust fixed/random effect equations 
 Dependent variable: FDI outflows as a percentage of GDP 
Independent variables  (1) (2) (3) 
Outward FDI stock (-1) 0.018 
(0.41) 
  
Trade openness 0.110*** 
(3.28) 
0.136*** 
(8.40) 
0.132*** 
(8.51) 
Unit labour cost -0.003 
(-0.16) 
  
Exchange rate  0.026*** 
(2.79) 
0.028*** 
(4.81) 
0.027*** 
(4.73) 
Corporate tax revenue 0.645*** 
(4.67) 
0.562*** 
(4.24) 
0.605*** 
(4.46) 
Union density -0.078*** 
(-4.89) 
0.031 
(1.06) 
 
Employment protection 
legislation 
0.357** 
(2.54) 
-0.400* 
(-1.68) 
-0.365
a
 
(-1.62) 
Inflation rate -0.0003 
(-0.01) 
  
R&D expenditure 0.083 
(0.30) 
  
 
Countries 4 4 4 
Observations 111 112 112 
Hausman test 
(p-value) 
9.36 
(0.4047) 
10.04* 
(0.0741) 
18.72*** 
(0.0009) 
Fixed/random effect Random effect Fixed effect Fixed effect 
Notes: (1) All models are estimated with a constant. (2) Robust t-values or z-values are in parentheses. 
(3) *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. (4) 
a
: 
significant at 10.8% level. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the determinants of FDI inflows 
and outflows based on causality test results in Chapter 4. The explanatory variables that 
might affect FDI inflows/outflows are economic growth, past level of FDI stock, trade 
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openness, labour cost, exchange rate, corporate tax, trade union density, employment 
protection legislation index, inflation rate and R&D expenditure. However, the results 
on the determinants of FDI inflows/outflows are contradictory to the causality test 
results in Chapter 4. For example, the causality test results in Chapter 4 show that 
economic growth Granger cause FDI inflows for a group of countries. However, the 
analysis of the determinants of FDI inflows for this group of countries shows that 
economic growth is not a significant determinant of FDI inflows.  
 
The reason for the inconsistency in the results in Chapter 4 and this Chapter is likely to 
be that Chapter 4 only examines the relationship between FDI inflows/outflows and 
economic growth, thereby ignoring other factors that may also affect FDI 
inflows/outflows or economic growth. In contrast, this chapter includes the other 
variables that might influence FDI inflows/outflows and economic growth. Therefore, 
the analysis results are different and are contradictory to each other.  
 
In addition, it should be noted that there are potential problems in using the Granger 
causality test proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995). According to Kurozumi and 
Yamamoto (2000), the causality test suffers from inefficiency because of the artificially 
augmented lag. In addition, although the empirical size of the test statistic is less 
distorted when the sample size is small, but the approach is not completely free from 
size distortion and it still has a large size distortion in some cases (Kurozumi and 
Yamamoto, 2000). Another limitation is that the causality test only examines the 
directions of causal links between inflows/outflows and economic growth and assume 
the causal links are positive. Furthermore, there are some criticisms about causality test. 
First, it relates to the final equations of an econometric system, whereby this 
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information is different in nature from the economic causation used in building a 
structural model (Osborn, 1984). Second, the number of variables involved and the 
maximum lag order to be considered are large in reality (Osborn, 1984). Third, the tests 
of choosing optimal lag length are not designed to estimate coefficients in a regression 
whose lag length may be infinite (Geweke, 1984). Moreover, causality test result is 
sensitive to the lag specification (Vilasuso, 2001). In addition, time aggregation bias 
might lead to spurious causality relationships, when observations are not collected 
frequently enough to capture the movements of economic variables (McCrorie and 
Chambers, 2006). Finally, as Nair-Reichert and Weinhold (2001) argue, there is a 
possibility that the (correct) expectation of future high growth rates has „caused‟ the 
increased FDI.  
 
Due to the problems of causality test and the contradiction in the analysis results in this 
Chapter and Chapter 4, it does not make sense to discuss the results and suggest policy 
implications. Therefore, we will change the research design and will re-estimate the 
determinants of FDI inflows and outflows and their relationship with economic growth 
in Chapter 6. 
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6 The determinants of inward and outward FDI and their 
relationship with economic growth revisited 
6.1 Introduction 
The causality test carried out in Chapter 4 divides the sample of 20 developed OECD 
countries into four groups – countries which have one-way causal relationship from FDI 
to growth, countries which have one-way causal relationship from growth to FDI, 
countries which have two-way causal relationship between FDI and growth and 
countries which do not have any causal relationship between the two variables. Chapter 
5 examines the determinants of FDI inflows and outflows for each of the above country 
groups. However, the results in Chapters 4 and 5 are contradictory to each other due to 
the limitations of the research design and the problems of causality testing. Therefore, 
this chapter re-investigates the determinants of inward and outward FDI and their 
relationship with economic growth using all the 20 sample countries as a whole.  
6.2 Model specification 
Two stage least squares simultaneous equations model is used since both economic 
growth and FDI inflows/outflows can be endogenous variables (see Chapter 5.3.2.2) 
Economic growth might affect FDI inflows/outflows, so it can be one of the 
determinants of FDI inflows/outflows. On the other hand, economic growth is not 
necessarily an independent variable and may also be affected by FDI inflows/outflows 
such that there may be a reverse relationship from FDI inflows/outflows to economic 
growth. Therefore, economic growth can affect FDI inflows/outflows via equation (5.15) 
and FDI inflows/outflows can in turn affect economic growth via equation (5.16). 
Neglecting the interdependence between FDI inflows/outflows and economic growth 
may result in biased and inconsistent estimates. Hence, 2SLS simultaneous equations 
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model is required to account for the simultaneity between economic growth and FDI 
inflows/outflows.  
 
We incorporate FDI inflows/outflows and economic growth regressions into equations 
(5.15) and (5.16) respectively:  
111122112111 ... itiitkkitititit vaXXXYY      (5.15) 
222222111222 ... itiitkkitititit vaWWWYY       (5.16) 
i: a country 
t: a year 
Y1: the dependent variable in equation (5.15) which is FDI inflows/outflows as a 
percentage of GDP, it is endogenous in equation (5.16) 
Y2: the dependent variable in equation (5.16) which is economic growth rate, it is 
endogenous in equation (5.15) 
ia : time-invariant error 
itv : time-variant error 
1X … 1kX : a vector of exogenous explanatory variables in equation (5.15) including 
past level of FDI stock, trade openness, unit labour cost, exchange rate, corporate tax 
revenue, trade union density, employment protection legislation, inflation rate and R&D 
expenditure. 
1W … 2kW : a vector of exogenous explanatory variables in equation (5.16) including 
government consumption, domestic investment, trade openness, R&D expenditure and 
inflation rate. 
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6.3 Data 
The annual data cover the period 1981-2008 with a sample of 20 developed OECD 
countries including Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US.   
6.4 Data analysis 
6.4.1 Descriptive analysis 
Appendix 9.6 reports the descriptive statistics, while Appendices 9.7 and 9.8 report the 
correlation matrix for the variables in FDI inflows and outflows equations respectively. 
The correlation matrix indicates a moderate level of correlation between one year 
lagged inward FDI stock and trade openness (r = 0.6329), between one year lagged 
outward FDI stock and trade openness (r = 0.5253), between government expenditure 
and domestic investment (r = -0.5178 or -0.5215). However, variance-inflation factor 
(VIF) tests do not show any problem of multicollinearity (all VIF tests are less than 3 as 
shown in Table 6.1 – Table 6.4). 
6.4.2 FDI inflows model 
We control the endogeneity of both economic growth and FDI inflows by employing 
2SLS simultaneous equations model shown in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2. Model (1) 
includes all the variables, while Model (2) removes the insignificant variables found in 
Model (1). The endogeneity test in Table 6.1 rejects the null hypothesis confirming that 
economic growth is endogenous. Moreover, the Hansen test for over identification does 
not reject the null hypothesis suggesting the validity of our instruments.  
 
The coefficient of economic growth is positive and significant in Table 6.1, suggesting 
it is one of the determinants of FDI inflows, which corresponds to the findings of 
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Billington (1999) and Lipsey (2000). Employment protection legislation index is 
marginally significant in Model (1) and significant at 5% level in Model (2), which 
means that strict employment legislation in the host country is a deterrent to inward FDI 
and it is consistent with the study of Radulescu and Robson (2008). Union density,  
R&D expenditure and inflation rate do not have significant effects on the amount of 
FDI the host country receives. For the other variables, the results agree with Lipsey 
(2000) and show strong support for the existence of the positive relationship between 
trade openness and FDI inflows indicating that open economy encourages FDI inflows 
and FDI inflows are complements of trade. In addition, the past level of inward FDI and 
corporate tax revenue are not statistically significant, which corresponds to the findings 
of Yang et al. (2000) and Radulescu and Robson (2008) respectively. Moreover, labour 
cost does not have a significant impact on FDI inflows and the result is consistent with 
Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Riveoro (1994) and Billington (1999). Finally, we agree with 
Yang et al. (2000), Wijeweera and Clark (2006) and find that exchange rate is not a 
significant determinant of FDI inflows.  
 
The results of the economic growth regression are reported in Table 6.2. The 
endogeneity test shows that FDI inflows is an exogenous variable. The Hansen test 
indicates that some of the instrumental variables are not valid and not exogenous. The 
results show that FDI inflows do not have a significant impact on economic growth, 
which corresponds to the findings of Blonigen and Wang (2005). In addition, domestic 
investment contributes to economic growth, while government consumption and 
inflation rate deter economic growth.  
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Table 6.1 FDI inflows model 
 Dependent variable: FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP 
Independent variables (1) (2) 
Economic growth 0.349** 
(2.16) 
0.381*** 
(2.79) 
Inward FDI stock (-1) 0.001 
(0.07) 
 
Trade openness 0.099*** 
(3.09) 
0.113*** 
(4.36) 
Unit labour cost -0.051 
(-1.04) 
 
Exchange rate  0.001 
(0.16) 
 
Corporate tax revenue 0.039 
(0.25) 
 
 
Union density  -0.009 
(-0.27) 
 
Employment 
protection legislation 
-0.748
a
 
(-1.39) 
-1.013** 
(-2.03) 
Inflation rate  0.074 
(1.24) 
 
R&D expenditure -0.195 
(-0.27) 
  
 
Countries  20 20 
Observations  457 538 
VIF test 1.59 1.03 
Hansen test  
(p-value) 
2.349 
(0.1253) 
3.894 
(0.1427) 
Endogeneity test  
(p-value) 
2.857* 
(0.0910) 
4.788** 
(0.0287) 
Notes: (1) All models are estimated with a constant. (2) Robust z-values are in parentheses. (3) *, 
** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. (4) 
a
: significant 
at 16.5%.  
 
Table 6.2 Economic growth model 
 Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP 
Independent variables (1) (2) 
FDI inflows 0.374 
(1.35) 
0.024 
(0.39) 
Government 
consumption 
-0.441*** 
(-3.64) 
-0.549*** 
(-7.23) 
Domestic investment 0.217*** 
(3.98) 
0.201*** 
(4.78) 
Trade openness -0.037 
(-1.07) 
 
R&D expenditure -0.256 
(-0.66) 
 
 
Inflation  -0.170*** -0.188*** 
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(-4.08) (-5.99) 
 
Countries  20 20 
Observations 457 538 
VIF test 1.34 1.27 
Hansen test  
(p-value) 
22.252*** 
(0.0005) 
3.118* 
(0.0774) 
Endogeneity test  
(p-value) 
0.448 
(0.5033) 
0.820 
(0.3653) 
Notes: (1) All models are estimated with a constant. (2) Robust z-values are in parentheses. (3) *, 
** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
6.4.3 FDI outflows model 
The FDI outflows equation is shown in Table 6.3 and economic growth equation is 
shown in Table 6.4. All variables are included in Model (1), while only the significant 
variables are included in Model (2). In Table 6.3, the endogeneity test confirms that 
economic growth is endogenous and the Hansen test confirms that the instruments are 
valid. The analysis results in Table 6.3 show that higher economic growth in the home 
country encourages FDI outflows, which is consistent with the study of  Lipsey (2000). 
Moreover, the degree of trade openness in the home country and FDI outflows are 
positively related, which corresponds to the findings of Lipsey (2000), Kyrkilis and 
Pantelidis (2003), Wang and Wong (2007). In addition, the results agree with Lipsey 
(2000) and find that current FDI outflows positively depend on the past level of outward 
FDI stock. Moreover, currency depreciation in the home country leads to more FDI 
abroad, as it might be viewed as a signal of future depreciation, which is consistent with 
the study of Kyrkilis and Pantelidis (2003). Furthermore, low labour cost in the home 
country encourages FDI outflows as low labour cost might reflect low skill level and 
low productivity. Among these significant variables, it is found that past level of 
outward FDI stock, economic growth and trade openness are the most important 
determinants, with the highest significance level. However, corporate tax revenue, union 
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density, employment protection legislation, inflation rate and R&D expenditure are not 
significant determinants of FDI outflows.  
 
The results for economic growth equation are presented in Table 6.4. In Model (1) 
endogeneity test shows that FDI outflows is an exogenous variable and Hansen test 
shows that some instruments are not valid. Model (2) suggests the endogeneity of FDI 
outflows and the validity of the instruments. FDI outflows are negative and significant, 
which means that FDI outflows reduce the home country‟s economic growth. Moreover, 
domestic investment and trade openness are positively related with economic growth, 
while government consumption and inflation rate are negatively associated with 
economic growth.  
Table 6.3 FDI outflows model 
 Dependent variable: FDI outflows as a percentage of GDP 
Independent variables (1) (2) 
Economic growth 0.410*** 
(3.90) 
0.357*** 
(3.84) 
Outward FDI stock (-1) 0.048*** 
(4.28) 
0.049*** 
(5.15) 
Trade openness 0.076*** 
(3.86) 
0.094*** 
(5.15) 
Unit labour cost -0.067** 
(-2.02) 
-0.044* 
(-1.93) 
Exchange rate  0.014* 
(1.88) 
0.016** 
(2.23) 
Corporate tax revenue 0.206 
(1.20) 
 
 
Union density  0.023 
(0.72) 
 
Employment protection 
legislation  
-0.396 
(-1.02) 
 
Inflation  0.054 
(0.94) 
 
R&D expenditure -0.150 
(-0.22) 
 
 
Countries  20 20 
Observations  451 535 
VIF test 1.47 1.31 
Hansen test  0.099 1.579 
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(p-value) (0.7529) (0.4540) 
Endogeneity test  
(p-value) 
9.932*** 
(0.0016) 
7.079*** 
(0.0078) 
Notes: (1) All models are estimated with a constant. (2) Robust z-values are in parentheses. (3) *, ** 
and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
 
Table 6.4 Economic growth model 
 Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP 
Independent variables (1) (2) 
FDI outflows -0.109 
(-1.05) 
-0.392*** 
(-2.83) 
Government consumption -0.635*** 
(-6.76) 
-0.716*** 
(-8.44) 
Domestic investment 0.215*** 
(4.07) 
0.196*** 
(4.44) 
Trade openness 0.022 
(1.15) 
0.060*** 
(2.62) 
R&D expenditure -0.304 
(-0.88) 
 
 
Inflation  -0.225*** 
(-5.20) 
-0.253*** 
(-6.48) 
 
Countries  20 20 
Observations 451 535 
VIF test 1.37 1.32 
Hansen test  
(p-value) 
28.439*** 
(0.0000) 
2.167 
(0.3384) 
Endogeneity test  
(p-value) 
2.282 
(0.1309) 
17.249*** 
(0.0000) 
Notes: (1) All models are estimated with a constant. (2) Robust z-values are in parentheses. (3) *, ** 
and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This Chapter has sought to examine the determinants of FDI inflows and outflows and 
their relationship with economic growth. We employ a panel data for 20 developed 
OECD countries over the period 1981-2008 and use 2SLS simultaneous equations 
econometric method. The results show that FDI inflows do not have a significant impact 
on economic growth as found in Blonigen and Wang (2005), but economic growth is a 
significant determinant of FDI inflows as found in Billington (1999) and Lipsey (2000). 
It finds evidence of a negative effect on FDI inflows from an index of the strictness of 
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employment protection legislation in line with findings from Radulescu and Robson 
(2008), which means that rigid employment protection legislation in the host country 
helps to deter inward FDI. Trade openness is found to be a strong explanatory variable 
for FDI inflows, indicating that open host economies encourage foreign firms to invest 
as it leads to a better business climate and the enhanced expectations of economic 
growth prospects. 
 
However, labour cost is not an important factor in influencing FDI inflows, which is 
consistent with the findings of Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero (1994) and Billington 
(1999). Although high labour cost in developed countries should not be taken as a 
serious threat to FDI inflows since multinational firms in developed countries are more 
concerned with skilled labour force and are less concerned with labour cost. While 
multinational firms in developing countries might give more preference to cheap 
unskilled labour (Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero, 1994). Finally, the effects of union 
density, R&D expenditure, past level of inward FDI stock, corporate tax, exchange rate 
and inflation rate on FDI inflows are statistically insignificant. 
 
In terms of FDI outflows, they have negative impacts on economic growth, while 
economic growth positively influences FDI outflows as found in Lipsey (2000). In 
addition, the results show evidence consistent with findings of previous studies that 
trade openness (Lipsey, 2000; Kyrkilis and Pantelidis, 2003; Wang and Wong, 2007) 
and past level of outward FDI stock (Lipsey, 2000) in the home country boost outward 
FDI. Moreover, currency depreciation in the home country encourages FDI outflows, 
which is the same as the results of Kyrkilis and Pantelidis (2003). Furthermore, low 
labour cost in the home country encourages FDI outflows as low labour cost might 
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indicate low labour productivity. Finally, union density, employment protection 
legislation, R&D expenditure, corporate tax and inflation rate are not important factors 
influencing FDI outflows.  
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7 Conclusion 
This Chapter summarizes the major findings of the thesis, policy implications, study 
limitations and possible future research areas. The central research topics considered in 
this thesis are the determinants of inward and outward FDI and their relationship with 
economic growth in developed OECD countries. The central research topics are divided 
into three research questions. The first research question is to examine the determinants 
of inward FDI in the host country with respect to labour market flexibility. The second 
research question analyses the effect of labour market flexibility on outward FDI and 
other factors which influence outward FDI in the home country. The third research 
question investigates the two-way relationship between inward/outward FDI and 
economic growth. 
 
Chapter 2 looks at the trends of FDI inflows/outflows in developed OECD countries and 
finds that the developed OECD countries encompass the significant proportion of global 
FDI inflows and outflows. Therefore, developed OECD countries are the major sources 
and recipients of global FDI. However, FDI distribution shows that individual OECD 
countries have different amounts of FDI inflows/outflows. Therefore, it is important to 
examine why different countries have different FDI inflows/outflows and what country 
factors affect inflows/outflows. 
 
Chapter 3 reviews economic theory and empirical literature on the research questions. 
Current empirical studies on the determinants of inward FDI and the two-way 
relationship with economic growth concentrate on developing countries. In terms of the 
developed countries, empirical studies employ firm level data, industry level data, 
bilateral FDI data, with limited studies on aggregate inward FDI data from the rest of 
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the world. Moreover, there is a dearth of empirical literature on the determinants of 
outward FDI and the two-way link between outward FDI and home country‟s economic 
growth. In addition, current studies on the determinants of inward/outward FDI include 
economic growth as an important determinant, but do not take into account the reverse 
relationship from inward/outward FDI to economic growth. Furthermore, there is only 
one developed country study on the impact of labour market flexibility on inward FDI 
using aggregate FDI data and no empirical study on the effect of labour market 
flexibility on outward FDI. Finally, developed country studies on the two way 
relationship between FDI and economic growth do not explain why different countries 
experience different FDI-growth relationships. Therefore, this thesis complements 
current studies by focusing on developed OECD countries and aggregate 
inward/outward FDI data from/to the rest of the world. Moreover, it examines the 
determinants of inward/outward FDI with economic growth as an explanatory variable 
and takes into account of the feedback relationship from inward/outward FDI to 
economic growth. In addition, it analyses whether labour market flexibility has a 
significant impact on inward/outward FDI. Finally, it investigates the two-way 
relationship between inward/outward FDI and economic growth and looks at whether 
country-specific factors can explain the different FDI-growth relationships in different 
countries.     
 
Therefore, Chapter 4 addresses the causal link between FDI inflows/outflows and 
economic growth for 20 developed OECD countries. There are four possible results for 
inflows-growth relationships – FDI-led growth, growth-led FDI, bi-directional causality 
and no causality. If the causality is unidirectional from inflows to economic growth, it 
would suggest FDI inflows contribute to economic growth in the host country and 
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approve FDI-led growth hypothesis. If the causal link runs in the opposite direction, it 
would imply that economic growth in the host country attracts FDI inflows and confirm 
growth-led FDI hypothesis. If the causal process is bi-directional, then inflows and 
growth would have a reinforcing causal relationship. Finally, no causality means that no 
relationship exists between the two variables. The causal links between outflows and 
economic growth are the same as discussed above. A time-series causality test is 
applied to 20 developed OECD counties over the period 1981-2008. The analysis results 
divide the sample of countries into 4 groups – countries that experience FDI-led growth, 
countries that experience growth-led FDI, countries that experience bi-directional 
causality and countries that do not experience any causality between the two variables. 
 
Chapter 5 empirically tests the factors that attract FDI inflows and encourage FDI 
outflows using fixed/random effect model and 2SLS simultaneous equations model 
based upon causality test results in Chapter 4. Hence, the determinants of inflows and 
outflows are analysed for each of the country groups – countries that experience FDI-
led growth, countries that experience growth-led FDI, countries that experience bi-
directional causality and countries that do not experience causality. However, the results 
on the determinants of FDI inflows/outflows are contradictory with the causality test 
results in Chapter 4. For instance, economic growth in the host country is found to cause 
FDI inflows for a group of countries in Chapter 4, whilst the results in Chapter 5 
indicate that economic growth is not a significant determinant of FDI inflows for the 
same group of countries. Therefore, the results in Chapters 4 and 5 are not consistent 
and it is not rational to discuss the determinants of FDI inflows/outflows based on 
causality test results. 
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Upon realising the limitations of the research design in Chapters 4 and 5 and the 
disadvantages of causality testing, then Chapter 6 re-investigates the determinants of 
FDI inflows and outflows and their relationship with economic growth for the whole 
sample countries using 2SLS simultaneous equations model between 1981 and 2008. 
The empirical findings suggest that FDI inflows do not contribute to economic growth 
in the host country and economic growth positively affects FDI inflows. In addition, 
trade openness and flexible employment protection legislation in the host country attract 
FDI inflows. Moreover, past level of inward FDI stock, labour cost, exchange rate, 
corporate tax, union density, inflation rate and R&D expenditure in the host country do 
not have significant impacts on FDI inflows.  
 
In terms of FDI outflows, they reduce economic growth in the home country, while 
economic growth in the home country increases FDI outflows. Moreover, high past 
level of outward FDI stock, trade openness, low labour cost and currency depreciation 
in the home country provide incentives for domestic firms to invest abroad. Finally, the 
effects of corporate tax, union density, employment protection legislation, inflation rate 
and R&D expenditure are not significant.   
 
The empirical results show that FDI inflows do not affect economic growth in 
developed host countries, which is consistent with the findings of Blonigen and Wang 
(2005). One explanation might be that M&As dominate FDI inflows in developed 
countries rather than greenfield investment projects that entail the establishment of new 
production facilities (Moran et al., 2005). In contrast, cross-border M&As involve the 
partial or full takeover or the merging of capital, assets and liabilities of existing firms 
in a host country by foreign firms (UNCTAD, 2006). Hence, greenfield investment adds 
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to production capacity and contributes to employment generation in the host country, 
whilst cross border M&As may be less beneficial for economic development than 
greenfield investment in the short term since they transfer the ownership and control of 
local assets from domestic to foreign owners, do not add to productive capacity at the 
time of entry (UNCTAD, 2000). This may lead to layoffs of existing employees by the 
new owner to enhance efficiency and to reduce excess capacity  (UNCTAD, 2000).  
Moreover, M&As can lead to a reduction of R&D in acquired firms in the host country 
if there is duplication of R&D or few complementarities between the acquired and 
acquiring firms, while greenfield investment does not directly reduce the technological 
assets and capabilities in the host country (UNCTAD, 2000). Although cross-border 
M&As are often followed by sequential investments by the foreign acquirers, however, 
an acquired firm in developed host countries may be highly efficient and does not need 
much sequential investments (UNCTAD, 2000).  
 
Moran et al. (2005) argue that the insignificant effect might be also due to FDI 
measurement issues. The absolute magnitude of FDI inflows into developed countries is 
large, but FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP are smaller to developed countries than 
to developing countries. Therefore, the percentage data do not enable econometric 
filters to discern the effect of FDI inflows on growth (Moran et al., 2005). However, the 
problem of using absolute FDI inflows data is that an appropriate investment deflator is 
not available to change nominal values into real values.  
 
Returning to the original finding that FDI outflows negatively influence economic 
growth in the home developed countries, possible reasons are that FDI outflows replace 
domestic investment and reduce domestic employment in the home country. If the 
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repatriated profits from FDI outflows are invested domestically, it would increase 
capital spending, boot economic growth and create new jobs in the home country. 
However, there is strong evidence that the repatriated profits were not used on domestic 
investment in US. Instead, they were used to purchase stock, to increase the reinvested 
earnings abroad, to pay dividends to corporate owners and shareholders in US (Marr 
and Highsmith, 2011). For example, Cisco has increased the amount of profits that are 
permanently reinvested overseas by $24.8 billion since 2004 and announced an 
additional $10 billion stock purchase programme on top of a previously-announced $72 
billion in November 2010, Pfizer announced a new $5 billion share purchase 
programme in February 2011, Microsoft announced a 23 percent increase in its 
quarterly dividend in September 2010, Adobe Systems announced a plan to purchase 
$1.6 billion in stock in June 2010, Qualcomm announced a $3 billion stock purchase 
program and a 12 percent increase in its quarterly dividend in March 2010, CA, Inc 
announced a $0.5 billion new stock purchase programme in May 2010 (Marr and 
Highsmith, 2011).  
 
In addition, there is evidence that repatriated profits do not create jobs in the home 
country. Hewlett-Packard repatriated around $14.5 billion and laid off 14,500 domestic 
workers in the first half of 2005, Pfizer repatriated around $37 billion and eliminated 
around 10,000 domestic jobs in 2005, Ford Motors repatriated around $850 million and 
laid off more than 30,000 domestic workers in 2005 and 2006, Merck repatriated $15.9 
billion and laid off 7,000 domestic workers in 2005, Honeywell International repatriated 
$2.7 billion and laid off 2,000 domestic workers in 2005 and 2006 (Marr and Highsmith, 
2011). Therefore, it would appear that FDI outflows shift investment and jobs overseas 
and reduce economic growth in the home country. 
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Therefore, since the analysis results do not find a positive impact of FDI inflows on 
economic growth in the host country, this would suggest that developed countries 
should reconsider the incentives to attract FDI inflows. Such encouragement to foreign 
firms to invest in a host country include fiscal incentives (import duty exemptions, tax 
holidays, tax reduction, investment and reinvestment allowances), financial incentives 
(government subsidies and loans at concessionary rates) and other incentives 
(preferential government contracts, closing the market for further entry, granting of 
monopoly rights, protection from import competition, preferential treatment for foreign 
exchange, infrastructure subsidy and service subsidy) (UNCTAD, 1998; UNCTAD, 
2004). However, the number of countries promoting investment incentives and the 
range of possible incentives have increased (UNCTAD, 2003; UNCTAD, 2004). 
Especially, there has been an expansion of incentive packages that developed countries 
have adopted to attract foreign investors (Moran et al., 2005). For example, Ireland 
offered special incentive packages to more than 1200 foreign firms between 1980 and 
2000. Moreover, fiscal incentives are the most widely used and they have increased in 
the developed countries between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s (UNCTAD, 1995). 
In addition, financial incentives are more frequently used in developed countries as they 
can afford the upfront subsidies for FDI inflows (UNCTAD, 2003; UNCTAD, 2004). 
Hence, the subsidy per FDI-related job is very high, for example, financial subsidy per 
job created is $50,588 for Fuji-Isuzu‟s investment in Lafayette, US in 1986, $254,451 
for Auto Europa, Ford and Volkswagen investing in Setubal, Portugal in 1991, 
$166,667 for Mercedes-Benz‟s investment in Tuscaloosa, US in 1993 and $128, 720 for 
Jaguar‟s investment in Castle Bromwich, UK in 1995 (UNCTAD, 1995).  
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In addition, since the analysis results show that FDI outflows negatively affect 
economic growth in the home country, this would suggest that developed countries 
should reconsider the promotional policies to encourage FDI outflows. Promotional 
policies for FDI outflows include information and technical assistance (information on 
financing, legal framework and administrative process), direct financial support and 
fiscal incentives (government subsidies, preferential loans to domestic firms, 
government equity participation, tax holidays, tax reduction) and investment insurance 
(UNCTAD, 1995). Japan is the most active developed country promoter of FDI 
outflows. The Export-Import Bank of Japan offered overseas investment loans in 1957 
and supported 143 Japanese corporations over the next decade, which represents about 
20% of the value of Japanese FDI in manufacturing and non-mineral/energy resource 
industries. In addition, the bank devoted nearly 40% of its financing to overseas loans in 
1992 and 1993 (UNCTAD, 1995). 
 
Hence, in terms of policy implications, this study agrees with Carkovic and Levine 
(2005), which does not support offering special incentives to foreign investors in order 
to attract FDI inflows. In addition, this study does not support promotional policies to 
encourage FDI outflows. Instead, government should provide incentives for domestic 
investment and other sound policies to increase economic growth, which in itself 
provides a good environment to attract FDI inflows and to encourage FDI outflows.  
 
Finally, this thesis has its own limitations. First, the empirical analysis uses 2SLS 
simultaneous equations model to control for the potential endogeneity of FDI 
inflows/outflows and economic growth, but does not control for the potential 
endogeniety of other variables. Another limitation is that this study does not distinguish 
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between FDI data in the primary, manufacturing and service sector or in different 
industries within a sector. We would expect that the determinants of FDI and FDI-
growth relationship vary according to different sectors and industries. For example, the 
effect of FDI in manufacturing/service sector on economic growth might be greater than 
the effect of FDI in primary sector. However, good quality data on sectoral or industry 
level FDI is not available, which prevents us from evaluating FDI in different sectors or 
industries. Hence, future research should focus on the determinants of FDI and FDI-
growth relationship on sectoral/industry level. In addition, future research should 
investigate whether inward FDI increases or reduces the productivity of domestic firms 
in the host country. Lipsey and Sjoholm (2005) argue that the spillover effect from 
foreign firms to domestic firms could be either positive or negative. It could be positive 
as foreign firms might possess superior technology and could produce high-quality 
goods and services at lower prices (Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2005). Hence, the productivity 
of local firms can be improved by imitating the more advanced technology brought by 
foreign firms or by the increased competition with foreign firms (Blomstrom and Kokko, 
1997; Ozturk, 2007). However, the spillover effect could be negative if foreign firms 
out-compete local firms and drive local firms out of business, which might lead to 
foreign firms taking the majority of market shares or establishing monopolies 
(Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997; Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2005; Hill, 2009). Therefore, it 
would be interesting to examine whether the effect of inward FDI on the productivity of 
local firms is positive or negative in future research.  
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9 Appendices 
Appendix 9.1 Details of unit root tests  
DF-GLS and ADF unit root tests on level series 
 DF-GLS test 
k     ERS Test Statistic 
ADF test 
k   Test Statistic (p-value) 
Australia (1981-2008)   
FDI inflows (constant) 
FDI outflows (constant) 
GDP growth (constant) 
 
1                 -3.861*** 
1                 -3.967*** 
3                 -2.022** 
 
1         -3.663*** (0.0047) 
1         -4.029*** (0.0013) 
3         -2.088 (0.2494) 
Austria (1981-2008) 
FDI inflows (constant and trend) 
FDI outflows (constant and trend) 
GDP growth (constant) 
 
1                 -2.371 
4                 -0.807 
1                 -2.053** 
 
1         -2.662 (0.2524) 
4          3.482 (1.000) 
1         -3.435*** (0.0098) 
Canada (1981-2008) 
FDI inflows (constant and trend) 
FDI outflows (constant and trend) 
GDP growth (constant) 
 
1                 -3.017* 
1                 -2.001 
1                 -3.185*** 
 
1         -3.094
a
 (0.1076) 
1         -2.264 (0.4541) 
1         -4.367*** (0.0003) 
Denmark (1981-2008) 
FDI inflows (constant and trend) 
FDI outflows (constant and trend) 
GDP growth (constant) 
 
1                 -2.713 
1                 -3.105* 
1                 -2.575** 
 
1         -2.751 (0.2154) 
1         -3.176* (0.0893) 
1         -2.711* (0.0722) 
Finland (1981-2008) 
FDI inflows (constant and trend) 
FDI outflows (constant and trend) 
GDP growth (constant) 
 
1                 -1.913 
1                 -1.789 
1                 -3.127*** 
 
1          -1.852 (0.6792) 
1          -1.802 (0.7040) 
1          -3.278** (0.0159) 
France (1981-2008)  
FDI inflows (constant and trend) 
FDI outflows (constant and trend) 
GDP growth (constant) 
 
1                 -2.726 
1                 -3.626** 
1                 -2.370** 
 
1          -2.872 (0.1716) 
1          -3.724** (0.0208) 
1          -2.696* (0.0748) 
Germany (1981-2008) 
FDI inflows (constant and trend) 
FDI outflows (constant and trend) 
GDP growth (constant) 
  
1                 -2.818 
1                 -4.198*** 
1                 -2.589** 
 
1          -2.891 (0.1651) 
1         -4.387*** (0.0023) 
1         -3.446*** (0.0095) 
Ireland (1981-2008) 
FDI inflows (constant and trend) 
FDI outflows (constant and trend) 
GDP growth (constant) 
 
2                 -1.729  
2                 -1.438 
1                 -1.429 
 
2         -1.572 (0.8033) 
2         -1.977 (0.6141) 
1         -1.631 (0.4667) 
Italy (1981-2008) 
FDI inflows (constant and trend) 
FDI outflows (constant and trend) 
GDP growth (constant) 
 
4                 -1.171 
1                 -2.106 
2                 -1.699* 
 
4         -1.283 (0.8922) 
1         -1.907 (0.6511) 
2         -1.897 (0.3335) 
Japan (1981-2008) 
FDI inflows (constant and trend) 
FDI outflows (constant and trend) 
GDP growth (constant) 
 
2                 -2.301 
2                 -1.436 
2                 -1.353 
 
2          -2.579 (0.2897) 
2          -0.768 (0.9683) 
2          -1.164 (0.6889) 
Korea (1981-2008)  
FDI inflows (constant and trend) 
 
3                 -1.577 
 
3           -1.340 (0.8776) 
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FDI outflows (constant and trend) 
GDP growth (constant) 
1                 -2.407 
4                 -1.009 
1           -2.171 (0.5060) 
4           -0.800 (0.8193) 
Netherlands (1981-2008) 
FDI inflows (constant and trend) 
FDI outflows (constant and trend) 
GDP growth (constant) 
 
1                 -1.910 
4                 -1.270 
4                 -1.014 
 
1           -1.993 (0.6051) 
4           -1.042 (0.9382) 
4           -2.425 (0.1349) 
New Zealand (1981-2008) 
FDI inflows (constant) 
FDI outflows (constant) 
GDP growth (constant) 
 
3                 -1.213  
4                 -1.257  
1                 -2.171** 
 
3           -2.634* (0.0862) 
4           -1.209 (0.6697) 
1           -2.274 (0.1806) 
Norway (1981-2008) 
FDI inflows (constant and trend) 
FDI outflows (constant and trend) 
GDP growth (constant) 
 
2                 -2.044 
2                 -2.361  
1                 -3.038*** 
 
2         -1.999 (0.6021) 
2         -2.235 (0.4703) 
1         -3.672*** (0.0045) 
Portugal (1981-2008) 
FDI inflows (constant and trend) 
FDI outflows (constant and trend) 
GDP growth (constant) 
 
2                 -2.037 
2                 -1.420 
1                 -2.340** 
 
2         -2.016 (0.5929) 
2         -1.365 (0.8708) 
1         -2.634* (0.0861) 
Spain (1981-2008) 
FDI inflows (constant and trend) 
FDI outflows (constant and trend) 
GDP growth (constant) 
 
1                 -2.333 
1                 -2.798  
1                 -1.989** 
 
1         -2.373 (0.3940) 
1         -3.004 (0.1309) 
1         -2.703* (0.0736) 
Sweden (1981-2008) 
FDI inflows (constant and trend) 
FDI outflows (constant and trend) 
GDP growth (constant) 
 
1                 -2.738 
1                 -2.904* 
1                 -2.309** 
 
1         -2.806 (0.1948) 
1         -2.968 (0.1412) 
1         -2.969** (0.0379) 
Switzerland (1983-2008) 
FDI inflows (constant and trend) 
FDI outflows (constant and trend)  
GDP growth (constant) 
 
2                 -1.844  
1                 -4.456*** 
1                 -2.809*** 
 
2         -1.767 (0.7206) 
1         -4.488*** (0.0016) 
1         -3.277** (0.0159) 
UK (1981-2008) 
FDI inflows (constant and trend) 
FDI outflows (constant and trend) 
GDP growth (constant) 
 
1                 -3.404** 
1                 -3.108* 
3                 -1.497 
 
1         -3.462** (0.0436) 
1         -3.173* (0.0900) 
3         -2.830* (0.0541) 
US (1981-2008) 
FDI inflows (constant and trend) 
FDI outflows (constant and trend) 
GDP growth (constant) 
 
1                 -3.312** 
4                 -1.807 
3                 -1.695* 
 
1         -3.321* (0.0628) 
4         -1.797 (0.7064) 
3         -1.782 (0.3895) 
Notes: (1) Data in Germany refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) before 1990, 
data refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) and former democratic republic of 
Germany (East Germany) from 1990. (2) The optimum lag length (k) is selected by the minimum AIC. 
Hsiao and Hsiao (2006) choose maximum lags as 3 for a sample of 19 observations. We choose the 
maximum lags as 4 for all countries as the number of observation is 28. (3) ***, **, * denote rejection of 
null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. (4) 
a
: marginally significant at 
10% level. 
Chapter 9 Appendices 
193 
 
DF-GLS and ADF unit root tests on first-difference series 
 DF-GLS test 
k     ERS Test Statistic 
ADF test 
k      Test Statistic (p-value) 
Australia (1981-2008)   
First difference of FDI inflows 
First difference of FDI outflows 
First difference of GDP growth 
 
 
 
1                  -4.724*** 
 
 
 
1           -6.220*** (0.0000) 
Austria (1981-2008)   
First difference of FDI inflows 
First difference of FDI outflows 
First difference of GDP growth 
 
3                  -0.947 
2                  -2.346** 
 
 
3          -4.132***  (0.0009) 
2           -3.429*** (0.0100) 
 
Canada (1981-2008)   
First difference of FDI inflows 
First difference of FDI outflows 
First difference of GDP growth 
 
1                  -3.033*** 
3                  -1.027 
 
 
1           -3.473*** (0.0087) 
3           -1.498 (0.5343) 
 
Denmark (1981-2008)   
First difference of FDI inflows 
First difference of FDI outflows 
First difference of GDP growth 
 
1                  -3.886*** 
 
 
 
1           -4.094*** (0.0010) 
 
 
Finland (1981-2008)   
First difference of FDI inflows 
First difference of FDI outflows 
First difference of GDP growth 
 
4                  -1.264 
1                  -3.254*** 
 
 
4           -1.687 (0.4380) 
1           -3.415** (0.0105) 
 
France (1981-2008)   
First difference of FDI inflows 
First difference of FDI outflows 
First difference of GDP growth 
 
3                  -1.657* 
 
 
 
3           -2.863** (0.0498) 
 
 
Germany (1981-2008)   
First difference of FDI inflows 
First difference of FDI outflows 
First difference of GDP growth 
 
1                  -4.674*** 
 
 
 
1           -4.942*** (0.0000) 
 
 
Ireland (1981-2008)   
First difference of FDI inflows 
First difference of FDI outflows 
First difference of GDP growth 
 
3                  -1.919* 
4                  -1.906* 
4                  -1.232 
 
3           -2.046 (0.2667) 
4           -2.229 (0.1958) 
4           -1.809 (0.3760) 
Italy (1981-2008)   
First difference of FDI inflows 
First difference of FDI outflows 
First difference of GDP growth 
 
4                  -1.090 
4                  -0.113  
2                  -2.965*** 
 
4           -2.653* (0.0825) 
4           -2.625* (0.0879) 
2           -3.228** (0.0184) 
Japan (1981-2008)   
First difference of FDI inflows 
First difference of FDI outflows 
First difference of GDP growth 
 
1                  -4.185*** 
1                  -2.011** 
2                  -2.481** 
 
1           -4.366*** (0.0003) 
1           -1.954 (0.3070) 
2           -3.175** (0.0215) 
Korea (1981-2008)   
First difference of FDI inflows 
First difference of FDI outflows 
First difference of GDP growth 
 
1                  -4.424*** 
3                  -1.619* 
1                  -5.703*** 
 
1           -4.607*** (0.0001) 
3           -1.752 (0.4043) 
1           -6.272*** (0.0000) 
Netherlands (1981-2008)   
First difference of FDI inflows 
First difference of FDI outflows 
 
1                  -1.929* 
1                  -4.314*** 
 
1           -2.595* (0.0940) 
1           -4.570*** (0.0001) 
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First difference of GDP growth 1             -3.407*** 1           -4.139*** (0.0008) 
New Zealand (1981-2008)   
First difference of FDI inflows 
First difference of FDI outflows 
First difference of GDP growth 
 
1             -5.921*** 
1             -6.449*** 
2             -2.584** 
 
 
1           -6.628*** (0.0000) 
2           -2.796* (0.0589) 
Norway (1981-2008)   
First difference of FDI inflows 
First difference of FDI outflows 
First difference of GDP growth 
 
2            -3.011*** 
2            -2.949*** 
 
2           -3.239** (0.0179) 
2           -3.183** (0.0210) 
 
Portugal (1981-2008)   
First difference of FDI inflows 
First difference of FDI outflows 
First difference of GDP growth 
 
2            -2.655** 
2            -2.525** 
 
 
2           -2.728* (0.0694) 
2           -2.733* (0.0685) 
Spain (1981-2008)   
First difference of FDI inflows 
First difference of FDI outflows 
First difference of GDP growth 
 
1            -2.372** 
1            -3.510*** 
 
 
1           -2.488 (0.1184) 
1           -4.053*** (0.0012) 
 
Sweden (1981-2008)   
First difference of FDI inflows 
First difference of FDI outflows 
First difference of GDP growth 
 
1           -4.083*** 
1           -4.352*** 
 
 
1           -4.283*** (0.0005) 
1           -4.564*** (0.0002) 
 
Switzerland (1983-2008)   
First difference of FDI inflows 
First difference of FDI outflows 
First difference of GDP growth 
 
2            -0.730 
 
 
 
2            -1.276 (0.6400) 
 
 
UK (1981-2008)   
First difference of FDI inflows 
First difference of FDI outflows 
First difference of GDP growth 
 
 
 
4            -0.743 
 
 
 
 
US (1981-2008)   
First difference of FDI inflows 
First difference of FDI outflows 
First difference of GDP growth 
 
 
4            -0.500 
4            -1.033 
 
 
4             -2.036 (0.2711) 
4             -2.396 (0.1430) 
Notes: (1) Data in Germany refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) before 1990, 
data refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) and former democratic republic of 
Germany (East Germany) from 1990. (2) The test equations include only constant. (3) The optimum lag 
length (k) is selected by the minimum AIC. We choose the maximum lags as 4 for all countries. (4) ***, 
**, * denote rejection of null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively.  
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DF-GLS and ADF unit root tests on second-difference series 
 DF-GLS test 
k  ERS Test Statistic 
ADF test 
k  Test Statistic (p-value) 
Australia (1981-2008)   
Second difference of FDI inflows 
Second difference of FDI outflows 
Second difference of GDP growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Austria (1981-2008)   
Second difference of FDI inflows 
Second difference of FDI outflows 
Second difference of GDP growth 
 
4                1.104 
 
 
 
 
Canada (1981-2008)   
Second difference of FDI inflows 
Second difference of FDI outflows 
Second difference of GDP growth 
 
 
4               -0.845 
 
 
  
4           -1.697 (0.4324) 
 
Denmark (1981-2008)   
Second difference of FDI inflows 
Second difference of FDI outflows 
Second difference of GDP growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finland (1981-2006)   
Second difference of FDI inflows 
Second difference of FDI outflows 
Second difference of GDP growth 
 
4               -1.387 
 
 
 
4          -2.682* (0.0772) 
 
 
France (1981-2008)   
Second difference of FDI inflows 
Second difference of FDI outflows 
Second difference of GDP growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Germany (1981-2008)   
Second difference of FDI inflows 
Second difference of FDI outflows 
Second difference of GDP growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ireland (1981-2008)   
Second difference of FDI inflows 
Second difference of FDI outflows 
Second difference of GDP growth 
 
4               -0.483 
1               -8.050*** 
2               -1.785* 
 
4         -1.642 (0.4611) 
1         -8.746*** (0.0000) 
2         -2.711* (0.0722) 
Italy (1981-2008)   
Second difference of FDI inflows 
Second difference of FDI outflows 
Second difference of GDP growth 
 
1               -4.720*** 
4               -0.954 
 
 
 
 
 
Japan (1981-2008)   
Second difference of FDI inflows 
Second difference of FDI outflows 
Second difference of GDP growth 
 
 
3               -1.748* 
 
 
 
3          -1.721 (0.4201) 
 
Korea (1981-2008)   
Second difference of FDI inflows 
Second difference of FDI outflows 
Second difference of GDP growth 
 
 
4               -1.279 
 
 
4          -2.211 (0.2024) 
Netherlands (1981-2008)   
Second difference of FDI inflows 
Second difference of FDI outflows 
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Second difference of GDP growth 
New Zealand (1981-2008)   
Second difference of FDI inflows 
Second difference of FDI outflows 
Second difference of GDP growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Norway (1981-2008)   
Second difference of FDI inflows 
Second difference of FDI outflows 
Second difference of GDP growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Portugal (1981-2008)   
Second difference of FDI inflows 
Second difference of FDI outflows 
Second difference of GDP growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spain (1981-2008)   
Second difference of FDI inflows 
Second difference of FDI outflows 
Second difference of GDP growth 
 
 2               -2.241** 
 
 
2           -2.542
a
 (0.1055) 
 
Sweden (1981-2008)   
Second difference of FDI inflows 
Second difference of FDI outflows 
Second difference of GDP growth 
 
 
 
 
Switzerland (1983-2008)   
Second difference of FDI inflows 
Second difference of FDI outflows 
Second difference of GDP growth 
 
2               -2.464** 
 
 
 
2           -2.810* (0.0569) 
 
 
UK (1981-2008)   
Second difference of FDI inflows 
Second difference of FDI outflows 
Second difference of GDP growth 
 
 
 
4                -1.441 
 
 
 
US (1981-2008)   
Second difference of FDI inflows 
Second difference of FDI outflows 
Second difference of GDP growth 
 
 
1               -8.206*** 
4               -0.183 
 
 
1         -8.640*** (0.0000) 
4         -3.528*** (0.0073) 
Notes: (1) Data in Germany refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) before 1990, 
data refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) and former democratic republic of 
Germany (East Germany) from 1990. (2) The test equations include only constant. (3) The optimum lag 
length (k) is selected by the minimum AIC, we choose the maximum lags as 4 for all countries. (4) ***, 
**, * denote rejection of null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. (5) 
a
: 
marginally significant at 10% level.  
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Appendix 9.2 Details of diagnostic tests 
Summary of diagnostic tests 
Country Optimum lag k Maximum order  
of integration d 
Normality  
tests 
LM test Stability 
test  
Australia 4 
1 
1 
1 
√ 
X 
√a 
√ 
X 
√ 
Austria 4 1 X X X 
Canada 4 
1 
1 
1 
X 
X 
√ 
X 
X 
√ 
Denmark 4 1 √ X X 
Finland 4 
4 
2 
1 
X 
√ 
X
a
 
√ 
X 
X 
France 4 1 √ √ X 
Germany 4 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
√ 
X 
X 
√ 
√a 
√a 
X 
√ 
√ 
Ireland 4 2 X X
a
 X 
Italy 4 
4 
1 
2 
1 
1 
√ 
√ 
X 
X
a
 
√a 
√ 
X 
X 
√ 
Japan 4 
1 
1 
1 
√ 
X 
X 
√a 
X 
√ 
Korea 2 
1 
1 
1 
√a 
X 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
Netherlands 4 
2 
1 
1 
X 
X 
√ 
X 
X 
√ 
New Zealand 4 1 √ X √ 
Norway 3 1 √ √ X 
Portugal 3 1 √ √ √ 
Spain 4 
4 
1 
2 
1 
1 
X 
X 
X 
X
a
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
√ 
Sweden 4 
1 
1 
1 
√ 
X 
X 
√a 
√ 
√ 
Switzerland 4 2 X X
a
 X 
UK 3 
1 
1 
1 
X 
X 
X 
√ 
X 
√ 
US 4 2 √a Xa X 
Notes: (1) Data in Germany refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) before 1990, 
data refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) and former democratic republic of 
Germany (East Germany) from 1990. (2) Normality tests include skewness statistic, kurtosis statistic and 
the Jarque-Bera statistic tests for normally distributed disturbances after VAR. The null hypothesis is that 
the errors are normally distributed after VAR at 10% level. √ means that the null hypothesis is accepted at 
10% level. √a means the null hypothesis is accepted at 5% level, but rejected at 10% level. X means the 
null hypothesis is rejected at both 5% level and 10% level. (3) In Lagrange-multiplier (LM) test for 
residual autocorrelation after VAR, the null hypothesis is that the residual is not auto-correlated after 
VAR at 10% level. √ means that the null hypothesis is accepted at 10% level until lag 4, √a means the null 
hypothesis is accepted at 5% level, but rejected at 10% level until lag 4. X means the null hypothesis is 
rejected at both 5% and 10% level until lag 4. X
a
: the exogenous variables may not be collinear with the 
dependent variables or their lags. (4) In stability test, √ means that the VAR model satisfies stability 
condition and X means that the VAR model does not satisfy stability condition.  
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Chi-square probability for Normality tests in Canada 
Equation Jarque-Bera test Skewness test Kurtosis test 
Canada (k=4, d=1) 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows 
GDP growth 
All 
 
0.00038 
0.52763 
0.92113 
0.00852 
 
0.00562 
0.26008 
0.76048 
0.02891 
 
0.00441 
0.91881 
0.78936 
0.04227 
Canada (k=1, d=1) 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows 
GDP growth 
All 
 
0.00260 
0.01832 
0.82024 
0.00245 
 
0.02651 
0.01274 
0.66357 
0.01013 
 
0.00825 
0.18086 
0.64906 
0.02955 
Notes: (1) The numbers are chi square probabilities. (2) The null hypothesis is that the errors are normally 
distributed after VAR. (3) The null hypothesis is rejected at 1% level in both cases. However, 4 numbers 
are less than 1% in the case (k=4, d=1) and  3 numbers are less than 1% in the case (k=1, d=1). Therefore, 
the case (k=1, d=1) is better than the case (k=4, d=1). 
 
Chi-square probability for Normality tests in Netherlands 
Equation Jarque-Bera test Skewness test Kurtosis test 
Netherlands (k=4, d=1) 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows 
GDP growth 
All 
 
0.00526 
0.29895 
0.82680 
0.03863 
 
0.15550 
0.38477 
0.60773 
0.38605 
 
0.00359 
0.19766 
0.73245 
0.01651 
Netherlands (k=2, d=1) 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows 
GDP growth 
All 
 
0.98694 
0.00000 
0.81676 
0.00001 
 
0.92607 
0.00041 
0.90062 
0.00579 
 
0.89422 
0.00001 
0.53271 
0.00010 
Notes: (1) The numbers are chi square probabilities. (2) The null hypothesis is that the errors are normally 
distributed after VAR. (3) The null hypothesis is rejected at 1% level in both cases. However, 2 numbers 
are less than 1% in the case (k=4, d=1) and 6 numbers are less than 1% in the case (k=2, d=1). Therefore, 
the case (k=4, d=1) is better than the case (k=2, d=1). 
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Chi-square probability for Normality tests (chosen combination) 
Equation Jarque-Bera test Skewness test Kurtosis test 
Australia (k=1, d=1) 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows 
GDP growth 
All 
 
0.07490 
0.63056 
0.00000 
0.00000 
 
0.86182 
0.49950 
0.00013 
0.00177 
 
0.02321 
0.49469 
0.00000 
0.00001 
Austria (k=4, d=1) 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows 
GDP growth 
All 
 
0.81924 
0.41186 
0.01096 
0.08241 
 
0.70487 
0.25453 
0.04956 
0.15123 
 
0.61337 
0.49030 
0.02298 
0.11651 
Canada (k=1, d=1) 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows 
GDP growth 
All 
 
0.00260 
0.01832 
0.82024 
0.00245 
 
0.02651 
0.01274 
0.66357 
0.01013 
 
0.00825 
0.18086 
0.64906 
0.02955 
Denmark (k=4, d=1) 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows 
GDP growth 
All 
 
0.15261 
0.53616 
0.66873 
0.44468 
 
0.21016 
0.26528 
0.37126 
0.30668 
 
0.13896 
0.94009 
0.94199 
0.53188 
Finland (k=4, d=1) 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows 
GDP growth 
All 
 
0.13824 
0.63800 
0.66071 
0.45936 
 
0.13913 
0.48598 
0.47572 
0.36446 
 
0.18339 
0.52024 
0.57148 
0.47464 
France (k=4, d=1) 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows 
GDP growth 
All 
 
0.43073 
0.76078 
0.10316 
0.34223 
 
0.20479 
0.53641 
0.15350 
0.25854 
 
0.78182 
0.68498 
0.11343 
0.43230 
Germany (k=4, d=1) 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows 
GDP growth 
All 
 
0.97920 
0.98922 
0.89038 
0.99952 
 
0.92838 
0.91412 
0.62998 
0.96882 
 
0.85380 
0.92013 
0.99095 
0.99757 
Ireland (k=4, d=2) 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows 
GDP growth 
All 
 
0.05729 
0.02939 
0.62158 
0.03287 
 
0.34110 
0.04444 
0.62321 
0.15857 
 
0.02824 
0.08254 
0.39958 
0.03613 
Italy (k=1, d=1) 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows 
GDP growth 
All 
 
0.00190 
0.58818 
0.03473 
0.00244 
 
0.01187 
0.31327 
0.02197 
0.00560 
 
0.01277 
0.83277 
0.22504 
0.05224 
Japan (k=1, d=1) 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows 
 
0.17619 
0.03571 
 
0.81318 
0.03686 
 
0.06455 
0.12872 
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GDP growth 
All 
0.98805 
0.11802 
0.98767 
0.22017 
0.87738 
0.12453 
Korea (k=2, d=1) 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows 
GDP growth 
All 
 
0.06006 
0.81970 
0.15465 
0.13532 
 
0.06698 
0.94695 
0.08095 
0.09346 
 
0.13194 
0.53062 
0.40705 
0.34073 
Netherlands (k=4, d=1) 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows 
GDP growth 
All 
 
0.00526 
0.29895 
0.82680 
0.03863 
 
0.15550 
0.38477 
0.60773 
0.38605 
 
0.00359 
0.19766 
0.73245 
0.01651 
New Zealand (k=4, d=1) 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows 
GDP growth 
All 
 
0.71386 
0.37179 
0.52603 
0.68509 
 
0.42406 
0.44955 
0.29267 
0.50906 
 
0.85135 
0.23554 
0.67352 
0.65493 
Norway (k=3, d=1) 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows 
GDP growth 
All 
 
0.18487 
0.70572 
0.40093 
0.43435 
 
0.13997 
0.77586 
0.31744 
0.35341 
 
0.27375 
0.43254 
0.36272 
0.45012 
Portugal (k=3, d=1) 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows 
GDP growth 
All 
 
0.43224 
0.87144 
0.62690 
0.82293 
 
0.19564 
0.80034 
0.33619 
0.44647 
 
0.95696 
0.64578 
0.92418 
0.97375 
Spain (k=1, d=1) 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows 
GDP growth 
All 
 
0.00036 
0.26180 
0.66173 
0.00356 
 
0.05492 
0.16094 
0.99480 
0.12994 
 
0.00048 
0.39780 
0.36350 
0.00329 
Sweden (k=4, d=1) 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows 
GDP growth 
All 
 
0.48960 
0.73568 
0.52693 
0.76726 
 
0.23427 
0.48712 
0.25868 
0.36566 
 
0.90711 
0.71735 
0.94032 
0.98519 
Switzerland (k=4, d=2) 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows 
GDP growth 
All 
Matrix not positive 
definite 
 
Matrix not 
positive definite 
 
 
Matrix not 
positive definite 
 
UK (k=1, d=1) 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows 
GDP growth 
All 
 
0.01158 
0.00308 
0.18243 
0.00055 
 
0.02279 
0.53084 
0.10164 
0.04099 
 
0.05339 
0.00083 
0.39512 
0.00135 
US (k=4, d=2) 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflows 
 
0.83265 
0.94271 
 
0.85055 
0.75464 
 
0.56520 
0.88661 
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GDP growth 
All 
0.15268 
0.64381 
0.06813 
0.32589 
0.51135 
0.85367 
Notes: (1) Data in Germany refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) before 1990, 
data refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) and former democratic republic of 
Germany (East Germany) from 1990. (2) The null hypothesis is that the errors are normally distributed 
after VAR. 
 
Chi-square probability for LM test (chosen combination) 
Country Lag Chi-square probability 
Australia  
(k=1, d=1) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0.12149 
0.65991 
0.33560 
0.40998 
Austria 
(k=4, d=1) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0.01806 
0.23631 
0.17946 
0.08386 
Canada 
(k=1, d=1) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0.05025 
0.01238 
0.51405 
0.30173 
Denmark  
(k=4, d=1) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0.09001 
0.00727 
0.13751 
0.05567 
Finland  
(k=4, d=1) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0.85969 
0.67196 
0.41942 
0.71380 
France  
(k=4, d=1) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0.64538 
0.19350 
0.79098 
0.52730 
Germany 
(k=4, d=1) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0.87684 
0.59068 
0.41963 
0.95970 
Ireland 
(k=4, d=2) 
 The exogenous variables may not be collinear with 
the dependent variables or their lags. 
Italy  
(k=1, d=1) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0.95747 
0.38937 
0.67410 
0.82647 
Japan 
(k=1, d=1) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0.35325 
0.34090 
0.05231 
0.54139 
Korea 
(k=2, d=1) 
1 
2 
0.56449 
0.83095 
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3 
4 
0.89198 
0.93515 
Netherlands 
(k=4, d=1) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0.19288 
0.96405 
0.46008 
0.48917 
New Zealand  
(k=4, d=1) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0.08483 
0.71476 
0.03058 
0.68634 
Norway 
(k=3, d=1) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0.68867 
0.35124 
0.92078 
0.98221 
Portugal  
(k=3, d=1) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0.88552 
0.21199 
0.23853 
0.40055 
Spain  
(k=1, d=1) 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0.09034 
0.24963 
0.07484 
0.01037 
Sweden  
(k=4, d=1) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0.36177 
0.04644 
0.00034 
0.00567 
Switzerland  
(k=4, d=2) 
 The exogenous variables may not be collinear with 
the dependent variables or their lags. 
UK  
(k=1, d=1) 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0.51426 
0.46786 
0.18060 
0.92899 
US 
(k=4, d=2) 
 The exogenous variables may not be collinear with 
the dependent variables or their lags. 
Notes: (1) Data in Germany refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) before 1990, 
data refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) and former democratic republic of 
Germany (East Germany) from 1990. (2) The null hypothesis is that the residual is not auto-correlated 
after VAR. 
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Eigenvalue stability condition test (chosen combination) 
Country Eigenvalue condition 
Australia (k=1, d=1) All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. 
VAR model satisfies stability condition. 
Austria (k=4, d=1) 9 eigenvalues are more than 1. 
VAR model does not satisfy stability condition. 
Canada (k=1, d=1) All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. 
VAR model satisfies stability condition. 
Denmark (k=4, d=1) 10 eigenvalues are more than 1. 
VAR model does not satisfy stability condition. 
Finland (k=4, d=1) 6 eigenvalues are more than 1. 
VAR model does not satisfy stability condition. 
France (k=4, d=1) 6 eigenvalues are more than 1. 
VAR model does not satisfy stability condition. 
Germany (k=4, d=1) 2 eigenvalues are more than 1. 
VAR model does not satisfy stability condition. 
Ireland (k=4, d=2) 14 eigenvalues are more than 1. 
VAR model does not satisfy stability condition. 
Italy (k=1, d=1) All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. 
VAR model satisfies stability condition. 
Japan (k=1, d=1) All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. 
VAR model satisfies stability condition. 
Korea (k=2, d=1) All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. 
VAR model satisfies stability condition. 
Netherlands (k=4, d=1) 8 eigenvalues are more than 1. 
VAR model does not satisfy stability condition. 
New Zealand (k=4, d=1) All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. 
VAR model satisfies stability condition. 
Norway (k=3, d=1) 1 eigenvalue is more than 1. 
VAR model does not satisfy stability condition. 
Portugal (k=3, d=1) All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. 
VAR model satisfies stability condition. 
Spain (k=1, d=1) All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. 
VAR model satisfies stability condition. 
Sweden (k=4, d=1) All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. 
VAR model satisfies stability condition. 
Switzerland (k=4, d=2) 9 eigenvalues are more than 1. 
VAR model does not satisfy stability condition. 
UK (k=1, d=1) All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. 
VAR model satisfies stability condition. 
US (k=4, d=2) 8 eigenvalues are more than 1. 
VAR model does not satisfy stability condition. 
Notes: (1) Data in Germany refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) before 1990, 
data refer to former federal republic of Germany (West Germany) and former democratic republic of 
Germany (East Germany) from 1990. (2) If all the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle, VAR model 
satisfies stability condition. If at least one eigenvalue is equal or more than 1, VAR model does not satisfy 
stability condition. 
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Appendix 9.3 FDI-growth relationship and country specific factors 
Country Inflows-growth 
relationship 
Outflows-growth 
relationship 
Financial  
development 
GDP 
per capita 
Trade 
openness 
Domestic 
investment 
R&D 
expenditure 
Australia FDI → growth                           FDI → growth                              70.14 19276 35.75 24.72 1.38 
Austria FDI ↔ growth FDI ↔ growth 94.29 21033 80.87 23.71 1.70 
Canada No causality No causality 110.68 21034 64.48 20.65 1.68 
Denmark FDI ↔ growth FDI ↔ growth 81.56 26526 78.19 20.05 1.83 
Finland  FDI ↔ growth FDI ↔ growth 67.29 20900 64.52 22.41 2.49 
France  FDI ↔ growth FDI → growth                              90.88 19674 47.85 20.06 2.17 
Germany No causality FDI ← growth        98.62 20619 57.63 20.88 2.46 
Ireland  FDI ↔ growth FDI ↔ growth 84.38 19068 133.93 21.35 1.04 
Italy No causality No causality 65.56 17154 45.66 21.29   1.08 
Japan FDI ← growth          No causality 184.09 33619 22.35 27.47 2.94 
Korea FDI ← growth          FDI ← growth        65.08 9048 68.09 31.96 2.44 
Netherlands FDI ↔ growth FDI ↔ growth 111.45 20815 117.75 21.21 1.91 
New Zealand FDI ↔ growth FDI → growth                              82.18 12551 58.12 22.60 1.03 
Norway FDI ↔ growth FDI → growth                              56.82 32318 72.90 23.27 1.55 
Portugal FDI ↔ growth FDI ← growth        90.38 9461 63.36 26.04 0.63 
Spain No causality No causality 96.18 12389 46.44 24.50 0.82 
Sweden FDI → growth                           FDI ↔ growth 98.81 25150 73.67 18.95 3.26 
Switzerland FDI ↔ growth FDI ↔ growth 156.10 33202 77.74 24.12 2.65 
UK No causality                       FDI ← growth        111.89 22036 53.77 17.74 1.94 
US FDI ↔ growth FDI ↔ growth 144.37 30733 22.31 18.95 2.61 
 
Country Inflows-growth 
relationship 
Outflows-growth 
relationship 
Inflation rate  Corporate tax 
revenue 
Trade union 
density 
Employment 
protection index 
Unemployment 
rate 
Australia FDI → growth                           FDI → growth                              4.60 4.14 33.19 1.05 7.39 
Austria FDI ↔ growth FDI ↔ growth 2.70 1.76 42.18 2.14 3.88 
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Canada No causality No causality 3.49 3.05 31.91 0.75 8.70 
Denmark FDI ↔ growth FDI ↔ growth 3.49 2.49 75.34 1.95 6.45 
Finland  FDI ↔ growth FDI ↔ growth 3.59 2.57 73.66 2.17 8.44 
France  FDI ↔ growth FDI → growth                              3.44 2.40 10.20 2.93 9.85 
Germany No causality FDI ← growth        2.03 1.64 28.73 2.75 8.57 
Ireland  FDI ↔ growth FDI ↔ growth 4.80 2.54 43.99 0.97 10.83 
Italy No causality No causality 5.50 3.40 38.18 2.98 9.70 
Japan FDI ← growth          No causality 1.01 4.82 23.99 1.67 3.39 
Korea FDI ← growth          FDI ← growth        5.04 2.55 12.86 2.32 3.50 
Netherlands FDI ↔ growth FDI ↔ growth 2.44 3.32 24.69 2.50 5.98 
New Zealand FDI ↔ growth FDI → growth                              5.28 3.62 36.42 1.05 6.24 
Norway FDI ↔ growth FDI → growth                              4.13 6.42 56.30 2.77 3.80 
Portugal FDI ↔ growth FDI ← growth        8.78 2.79 29.89 3.83 6.35 
Spain No causality No causality 5.68 2.44 13.97 3.37 16.23 
Sweden FDI → growth                           FDI ↔ growth 4.06 2.46 79.59 2.80 5.52 
Switzerland FDI ↔ growth FDI ↔ growth 1.92 2.21 21.64 1.14 3.36 
UK No causality                     FDI ← growth        4.29 3.40 36.09 0.64 7.47 
US FDI ↔ growth FDI ↔ growth 3.50 2.39 14.89 0.21 6.05 
Data source: Financial development, GDP per capita, trade openness, domestic investment, inflation rate and unemployment rate are from World Development Indicators 
(2011). R&D expenditure is from OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators (2010). Corporate tax and trade union density are from OECD. Stat Extracts (2011). 
Employment protection index is from Nickell (2006) and OECD. Stat Extracts (2011). 
Note: They are period average data based on causality test period and data availability.  
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Appendix 9.4 Original employment protection index data in Australia from two sources 
Year Data from Nickell (2006) Data from OECD Stat Extracts (2011) 
1981 0.3  
1982 0.3  
1983 0.3  
1984 0.3  
1985 0.3 0.94 
1986 0.3 0.94 
1987 0.3 0.94 
1988 0.3 0.94 
1989 0.3 0.94 
1990 0.3 0.94 
1991 0.3 0.94 
1992 0.3 0.94 
1993 0.3 0.94 
1994 0.3 0.94 
1995 0.3 0.94 
1996 0.4 1.19 
1997 0.4 1.19 
1998 0.4 1.19 
1999 0.4 1.19 
2000 0.4 1.19 
2001 0.4 1.19 
2002 0.4 1.19 
2003 0.4 1.19 
2004  1.19 
2005  1.19 
2006  1.19 
2007  1.15 
2008  1.15 
Note: Data from Nickell (2006) are available from 1981 to 2003 and data from OECD Stat Extracts 
(2011) are available from 1985 to 2008. 
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Appendix 9.5 Employment protection index data in Australia used in this study 
Year Employment protection index 
1981 0.94 
1982 0.94 
1983 0.94 
1984 0.94 
1985 0.94 
1986 0.94 
1987 0.94 
1988 0.94 
1989 0.94 
1990 0.94 
1991 0.94 
1992 0.94 
1993 0.94 
1994 0.94 
1995 0.94 
1996 1.19 
1997 1.19 
1998 1.19 
1999 1.19 
2000 1.19 
2001 1.19 
2002 1.19 
2003 1.19 
2004 1.19 
2005 1.19 
2006 1.19 
2007 1.15 
2008 1.15 
Note: (1) In Appendix 9.4, we assume that the ratio of year 1984 data and year 1985 data from Nickell 
(2006) is equal to the ratio of year 1984 data and year 1985 data from OECD Stat Extracts (2011). Hence, 
the index in 1984 using OECD Stat Extracts (2011) standards is calculated as 0.94. Similarly, data from 
1981 and 1983 using OECD Stat Extracts (2011) standards can be obtained in the same way. Therefore, 
data from Nickell (2006) in 1981-1984 period are converted into the red numbers shown in Appendix 9.5 
that are compatible with data from OECD Stat Extracts (2011). (2) Employment protection index data for 
other countries are calculated using the same methods above.  
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Appendix 9.6 Descriptive statistics 
 Sample:  20 countries (1981-2008) 
Variable  Observations  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
FDI inflows 558 2.15 3.44 -15.05 26.95 
Inward FDI stock  
(-1) 
560 22.47 25.35 0 185.44 
FDI outflows 558 2.62 3.49 -4.88 27.02 
Outward FDI stock  
(-1) 
553 20.77 22.46 0 148.68 
Economic growth 560 2.79 2.30 -6.85 11.49 
Trade openness 560 64.24 28.61 16.01 184.74 
Unit labour cost 555 105.48 7.71 92.58 137.35 
Exchange rate 560 99.06 25.25 56.24 208.27 
Corporate tax  552 3.02 1.52 0.27 12.95 
Union density 560 36.39 21.11 7.62 83.86 
Employment 
protection index 
551 1.99 1.05 0.21 4.19 
Inflation rate    549 4.04 3.89 -9.63 28.78 
R&D expenditure 478 1.85 0.79 0.28 4.17 
Government 
consumption 
560 19.15 4.15 9.66 29.64 
Domestic 
investment 
560 22.60 4.15 14.90 39.73 
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Appendix 9.7 Correlation matrix for FDI inflows equation 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 inflows 1.0000             
2 inward 
FDI stock (-
1) 
0.2360 1.0000            
3 economic 
growth 
0.2121 0.1421 1.0000           
4 trade 
openness 
0.3733 0.6329 0.2027 1.0000          
5 unit 
labour cost 
-0.2971 0.0531 -0.1040 -0.0951 1.0000         
6 exchange 
rate 
-0.1184 0.0741 -0.0484 -0.1186 0.2457 1.0000        
7 corporate 
tax 
0.0819 0.0055 0.1426 0.0032 -0.1260 -0.1849 1.0000       
8 union 
density 
0.0059 0.0470 -0.0738 0.2453 0.2068 0.1114 0.0180 1.0000      
9 
employment 
protection 
-0.0851 -0.2715 -0.1164 0.0010 0.1168 -0.0528 -0.0209 0.0025 1.0000     
10 inflation 
rate 
-0.1116 0.0052 -0.1069 -0.0820 0.4315 -0.0133 -0.1801 0.1111 0.1911 1.0000    
11 R&D 
expenditure 
0.0303 -0.2051 -0.0510 -0.1232 -0.3049 0.2954 0.1055 0.0549 -0.2708 -0.4120 1.0000   
12 
government 
expenditure 
0.0398 0.0186 -0.3431 0.2018 -0.0152 0.0449 -0.1015 0.5483 0.1934 -0.0206 0.0965 1.0000  
13 domestic 
investment 
-0.0928 -0.1500 0.3160 -0.0829 0.1418 0.0182 0.1692 -0.2098 0.2630 0.1562 -0.0710 -0.5178 1.00000 
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Appendix 9.8 Correlation matrix for FDI outflows equation 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 outflows 1.0000             
2 outward 
FDI stock (-
1) 
0.5739 1.0000            
3 economic 
growth 
0.1078 -0.0306 1.0000           
4 trade 
openness 
0.4262 0.5253 0.2055 1.0000          
5 unit 
labour cost 
-0.3801 -0.4003 -0.1101 -0.1573 1.0000         
6 exchange 
rate 
-0.0721 -0.0194 -0.0471 -0.1463 0.2063 1.0000        
7 corporate 
tax 
0.1676 0.1269 0.1435 0.0194 -0.0899 -0.1695 1.0000       
8 union 
density 
-0.0096 -0.0324 -0.0745 0.2375 0.1829 0.1008 0.0299 1.0000      
9 
employment 
protection 
-0.0546 -0.2171 -0.1178 0.0159 0.1763 -0.0368 -0.0351 0.0157 1.0000     
10 inflation 
rate 
-0.2116 -0.3168 -0.1151 -0.1276 0.3527 -0.0570 -0.1588 0.0811 0.2503 1.0000    
11 R&D 
expenditure 
0.1658 0.2483 -0.0527 -0.1042 -0.2647 0.3306 0.0879 0.0739 -0.2973 -0.3909 1.0000   
12 
government 
expenditure 
0.1396 0.2338 -0.3438 0.2019 -0.0244 0.0433 -0.1004 0.5500 0.1969 -0.0309 0.1009 1.0000  
13 domestic 
investment 
-0.0958 -0.3244 0.3183 -0.0861 0.1371 0.0167 0.1734 -0.2159 0.2698 0.1424 -0.0667 -0.5215 1.0000 
 
